r/PoliticalDiscussion

Why have Republicans continued be against firearm regulation?

With the recent event at the press dinner, and the third attempted assassination of the president during his term, why have Republicans continued to fight against any regulation of firearms? Why not take the credit for it and be the ones pushing for this after these events? Would that not be politically advantageous?

Even Regan, one of the most conservative presidents advocated for the passage of the Brady Bill and the Federal Assault Wepons Ban. Regan was extremely pro-second amendment and still advocated for passage of legislation after his time as president.

Even if they wanted to take a more tradionally conservative approach, why not push to allow states and localities to have more freedom in creating and enforcing regulation?

Jumping on train now seems like the potlical smart thing to do but why won't they?

I would describe myself as left-leaning, even a socialist in the context of American politics. I used to firmly support the legalization movement of euthanasia. But I’ve since become increasingly conservative on this and other related issues.

I now think that while the policy is well-intentioned, it fundamentally undermines the basic values a moral obligations of a civilized society. Those being, at the very least, a basic respect and commitment to human life and social welfare.

Society should not condone self-destructive tendencies such as alcohol/drug abuse, gambling, suicide, etc. by setting up commercial markets that profit off of these behaviors. In a capitalist society, many people make these decisions under coercion I’d argue, not “freedom of choice”. You enter a dangerous dynamic when you introduce markets that only exist to profit from social failures.

I believe many individuals who “desire” their own death due to chronic health conditions are people who were ultimately failed by society throughout their lives. Nutrient-poor diets, sedentary lifestyles, social isolation and more are all considered common features of modern society. These people who fall through the cracks, our profit-centered society views them as a burden and is eager to get rid of them. Allowing the healthcare system to present this as a viable option to people, who are often under coercion mind you, allows society to start valuing some human life less than others.

I argue that instead of legalization of physician-assisted suicide, we should make serious investments and reforms to our system to hopefully prevent these decisions from having to be made in the first place.

I am open to discussing this however. What are your thoughts?

I'm engaging with a certain Russian community, and they think the whole world is rotten, full of pedophiles, and secret societies. Their solution is to make a government in such a way that its officials live in constant terror and under surveillance, with harsh penalties for the slightest offenses before the common good. Where all horizontal ties to other nations are banned (so no CIA working with the KGB against the good of the country). And no state secrets ever - everything in the government must be completely transparent to every citizen. Some variations also introduce a benevolent AI which dispassionately evaluates officials on the subject of treason.

The buzzwords I've heard them use are: meritocracy, transhumanism (eternal life, space exploration), scientism and cyberocracy.

My question is - to what extent is it feasible? Sounds close to anarchism, with the belief that power corrupts all the time, and that common people are holy and inherently good, innocents slaughtered by evil sadists in the secret CIA/KGB systems of oppression.

My obious objection would be that the one with power will inevitably recreate the old order anyway as "common people" never have any power (aside from maybe forming the culture where the elite dwells), so a structure to kill the officials must be empowered... which will eventually start resembling the old state apparatus all the same.

So I tend to circle back to the old argument that "democracy is the worst system, but there is none better". These folks tend to invent horror stories about the current system, too, because otherwise they will face the reality that it's not even that bad, and what they're proposing is anarchist blood letting which will lead to much more carnage and savagery than the current system (despite a random pedophile here and there). But maybe it's simply never been tried?

Recent hearings involving senior administration officials have followed a recognizable pattern. Pam Bondi appeared before committees regarding the DOJ's handling of the Epstein Files Transparency Act, which passed the House 427-1 and the Senate by unanimous consent before the DOJ released material with roughly 200,000 pages withheld and missed the statutory deadline. Kash Patel has appeared regarding FBI operations including the Butler investigation and the Epstein file process, despite having argued for years before his confirmation that he would release the client list. Dan Bongino, who took similar pre-office positions, announced his departure in December 2025 and left the bureau in January 2026, reportedly over disputes about the file handling. In each case the hearings generated viral content, partisan media coverage, and fundraising activity but did not produce prosecutions, removal through congressional action, or structural legislation. Bondi was eventually removed by the President rather than by Congress.

Specific members on both sides have built substantial public profiles around these moments. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's questioning sequences regularly produce shareable clips that circulate on left-leaning social media within hours of the hearing ending, are clipped into fundraising emails, and feature in subsequent media appearances. Jim Jordan's confrontational exchanges with witnesses follow the same pattern in right-leaning media. Ted Cruz, Katie Porter, Josh Hawley, and Jasmine Crockett have all built recognizable political brands substantially anchored in hearing performance. The structure of the five-minute questioning round, combined with the social media ecosystem, appears to incentivize this regardless of party. What is striking is the apparent shared awareness among participants and audiences: members structure questions for viral moments rather than information extraction, witnesses give non-answers that run out the clock, committee staff prepare both sides, the press covers the moments rather than the substance, and voters across the spectrum report low confidence in hearings as accountability mechanisms while continuing to engage with the content.

This pattern is not unique to the current administration. Comparable dynamics were observed in Biden-era hearings on the Afghanistan withdrawal and Hunter Biden investigations, and in first-Trump-administration hearings on the Russia investigation and impeachment proceedings. The Church Committee (1975-76) and Iran-Contra hearings (1987) are commonly cited as examples of oversight that produced substantive institutional outcomes, including the FISA Court and Inspector General Act in the post-Watergate period and Independent Counsel reauthorization following Iran-Contra. Hearings of the past fifteen years are more often cited for their viral moments than their outcomes. Political scientists including Frances Lee and Jonathan Rauch have argued that contemporary hearings function more as partisan signaling than deliberative oversight.

Most participants and observers across the political spectrum already understand that current hearings function primarily as content production rather than accountability. What explains the persistence of the format? Are the AOC, Cruz, and similar performance-style sequences continuing because they serve real functions for all involved (members get content and fundraising, witnesses get partisan loyalty signals, voters get tribal affirmation, media gets coverage) even when no one believes they produce accountability, or is there genuine residual belief that they still might? If the former, is this a stable equilibrium that no specific party or reform proposal could disrupt, or is it the kind of arrangement that eventually collapses under its own credibility cost?

Like, basically how do you envision an improvement from here on out, and what would the improvement look like? Whether you're liberal, conservative, or whatever else, the state of the national politics are extremely divisive and I suspect no one is fully happy with what's going on whether it relates to the war, to borders, to the prochoice/prolife debate, or anything else, and from what I'm seeing in my life it's only making everyone I know so tense around each other.

Every administration talks about improving how government works, but the approach is usually incremental—adjusting existing agencies rather than fundamentally redesigning them.

Some argue that this is the only practical path, since large-scale restructuring risks disruption, loss of institutional knowledge, and political resistance.

Others argue that incremental reform just preserves outdated structures, and that a new administration should start by redefining what government needs to do and then reorganize agencies around those functions.

Which approach actually works better in practice? What are the biggest risks of each? I would be particularly interested in input from people who used to work in these agencies before Doge as well as others who have worked for large private organizations with a high level of complexity.

Is there anyone who thinks the current way our federal agencies are working is just fine and should be continued?

My thesis is simple.

“Mamdani socialism” is being framed as a tight, disciplined message built on economic fairness, dignity of work, and a government that delivers. It resonates in a moment of rising costs and instability, and some argue it could scale into a national doctrine - a clear, written blueprint that unifies the left and serves as a counter to Project 2025, similar in coherence to an anti-MAGA framework.

However, I’m not convinced it translates cleanly.

Does elevating this into a defined ideology strengthen the left by creating clarity and alignment, or does branding it as “socialism” cap its appeal before it even scales? Can a message that works locally survive national scrutiny across diverse regions and media environments, or does it lose effectiveness once it’s formalized? And more broadly, is building a doctrine the right move, or does it trade flexibility for rigidity in a volatile political landscape?

Where do you land - viable national counterweight, or strategically limiting?

With primary seasons tightening as Democratic candidates move closer to general elections, a common claim has come up again in many political spaces: that the modern Democratic Party would not really be considered left-wing in many European countries. This is often used to argue that the U.S. political spectrum is shifted unusually far to the right, especially on healthcare, labor policy, welfare spending, and redistribution.

There is a real argument behind this, but the comparison becomes more complicated when economic and social issues are separated. The Democratic Party is also difficult to analyze as a single ideological bloc because the U.S. two-party system forces a very wide coalition into one party.

To ground this question in a few comparisons:

• The OECD’s work on collective bargaining and social dialogue shows how different the labor-policy baseline is in many advanced democracies compared to the United States. Many European countries have stronger union systems, broader collective bargaining coverage, or more institutionalized labor representation than the U.S. does.

• Germany’s 2024 asylum/deportation reforms under a center-left-led government expanded the grounds for declaring asylum applications manifestly unfounded and increased deportation possibilities in some cases. Similar approaches to immigration and asylum policy can also be found in the Party of European Socialists’ 2024 manifesto.

• On trans rights, Labour’s position is more mixed and cautious than the mainstream Democratic position in the U.S. Labour’s 2024 manifesto promised a trans-inclusive ban on conversion practices and some reform to gender recognition, but also retained the requirement for a specialist medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria. The Labour government also continued the UK restriction on puberty blockers for minors with gender dysphoria. By contrast, the 2024 Democratic platform says Democrats will oppose state and federal bans on gender-affirming healthcare and protect access to medically necessary gender-affirming care.

These are only a handful of examples, but they point to why direct comparisons can become messy, especially when comparing the Democratic Party to parties in European countries, including Nordic countries. Economic policy, social policy, party structure, and coalition-building do not always line up neatly across countries.

The factional nature of the Democratic Party makes this even harder to identify. The party includes a progressive wing, more standard liberal or center-left Democrats, and more conservative or business-friendly Democrats. In a more proportional parliamentary system, many of these factions might exist as separate parties or coalition partners. In the U.S. two-party system, they are compressed into one party.

That being said:

1. How valid is the criticism that Democrats would not be considered left-wing in Europe?
2. Which policy areas make the comparison stronger or weaker?
3. If the Democratic Party existed in various European countries, where would it likely fit within those party systems?

Equality is one of the most invoked concepts in political thought, yet also one of the most ambiguously defined. In some traditions, equality refers to equal wealth or material conditions. In others, it refers to equal rights, equal opportunity, or equal moral worth. These interpretations often overlap in political debate, but they are not the same thing. As a result, discussions of equality frequently collapse into confusion: societies are judged unequal for having different incomes, unequal for having different outcomes, or unequal for failing to treat people identically in practice, even when legal equality is formally declared.

Aequism introduces a more precise and structural interpretation. It argues that equality is not primarily a matter of distribution, nor is it fully captured by legal language alone. Instead, equality is a system condition that emerges only when accountability scales proportionally with power. In this view, equality is not what societies declare or aspire to—it is what their enforcement structures produce.

At the core of Aequism is a simple but powerful relationship:

E = \frac{A}{P}

Where E represents equality of legal consequence, A represents accountability (the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms), and P represents power (the capacity to influence outcomes). This formulation shifts equality from a moral ideal to a structural ratio. It suggests that equality exists only when accountability keeps pace with power. When power expands faster than accountability, equality declines—not in abstract principle, but in measurable enforcement reality.

This redefinition has a significant implication: equality is not primarily about whether people are equal in wealth, talent, or status. Those forms of inequality are natural outcomes of freedom. In any society that protects liberty—freedom of speech, religion, property, and pursuit of opportunity—people will inevitably diverge in outcomes. Some will accumulate wealth, others will pursue non-material goals, and others will rise to positions of influence or remain outside formal power structures. Aequism does not treat this divergence as a failure of equality. Instead, it treats it as an expected consequence of freedom.

The critical question is not whether people end up equal, but whether they are equally accountable.

This distinction separates two fundamentally different concepts that are often conflated: equality of outcome and equality of consequence. Aequism rejects the idea that justice requires identical outcomes. Instead, it insists that justice requires identical consequences for identical actions, regardless of who performs them.

This leads to a more precise definition of equality:

Equality exists when identical conduct produces identical legal consequences, regardless of the actor’s wealth, status, or influence.

From this perspective, inequality of income or status does not necessarily violate equality. A society where one person becomes wealthy through innovation and another remains poor is not inherently unjust. However, a society where wealthy individuals face different legal consequences than poor individuals for the same actions does violate equality.

Aequism therefore reframes equality as a property of enforcement symmetry.

The stability of this symmetry depends on the balance between power and accountability. Power naturally tends to concentrate. Economic systems produce wealth accumulation. Political systems produce institutional authority. Information systems concentrate influence. Without counterbalancing mechanisms, power expands more quickly than oversight. Accountability, however, does not automatically scale at the same rate. Courts, regulators, and oversight institutions often lag behind new forms of concentrated power.

This mismatch creates what Aequism calls the accountability gap:

G = P - A

The accountability gap measures the distance between the power actors possess and the accountability mechanisms capable of constraining them. When this gap is small, enforcement remains relatively symmetrical. When it widens, enforcement becomes selective. Individuals with greater power begin to experience fewer consequences for similar behavior, while those with less power remain fully exposed to legal and institutional penalties.

At this point, equality begins to erode—not in law, but in practice.

Importantly, this erosion does not occur linearly. Aequism argues that inequality of enforcement follows nonlinear dynamics. Small increases in the accountability gap may produce limited and localized distortions. However, as the gap expands, those distortions compound. Networks of influence develop. Enforcement discretion becomes normalized. Institutions begin to adapt to power rather than constrain it. Eventually, the system reaches a tipping point where selective enforcement becomes structurally embedded.

In mathematical terms, corruption and enforcement asymmetry accelerate as a nonlinear function of the accountability gap:

\frac{dC}{dt} = \alpha (P - A)^n

When the exponent exceeds one, the system becomes sensitive to thresholds. This explains why many societies appear stable for long periods while underlying inequality of enforcement quietly increases, only to experience sudden institutional crises when legitimacy collapses.

From this perspective, equality is not a static condition. It is a dynamic equilibrium that must be continuously maintained. Because power naturally expands and accountability does not automatically keep pace, equality is always under structural pressure. It must be actively preserved through institutional design.

This leads to one of Aequism’s most important claims: equality is not primarily produced by laws themselves, but by enforcement structures. Legal declarations of equality—such as constitutional guarantees—are necessary but insufficient. They define the standard, but they do not guarantee its realization. What determines whether equality exists in practice is whether enforcement mechanisms apply those laws uniformly across different levels of power.

This insight reframes the phrase “no one is above the law.” In Aequism, this is not a moral slogan but a structural requirement. It means that the probability of legal consequence must be independent of social status. If power influences enforcement outcomes, then equality does not exist in functional terms, even if it is formally declared.

This also clarifies why societies can maintain high levels of inequality in wealth or status while still preserving legitimacy. Citizens may accept unequal outcomes if they believe that rules are applied fairly. However, when enforcement becomes visibly selective—when powerful individuals appear to operate under different legal standards—trust erodes rapidly. The perceived fairness of the system collapses even if material conditions remain unchanged.

Aequism therefore distinguishes between two types of inequality: inequality of outcome and inequality of consequence. The first is compatible with liberty and even expected within free societies. The second is corrosive to legitimacy and stability. It transforms legal systems from neutral arbiters into instruments of power.

The implications are significant. Under Aequism, the central question of governance is not how to eliminate inequality, but how to maintain enforcement symmetry under conditions of growing power concentration. This shifts the focus from redistributing outcomes to strengthening accountability mechanisms.

Equality, in this framework, is not a moral aspiration imposed on society. It is a structural property that emerges only when power is constrained by proportionate accountability. When that balance holds, societies can tolerate wide variation in outcomes while maintaining legitimacy. When it fails, inequality becomes indistinguishable from selective justice.

In this sense, Aequism does not reject freedom. It depends on it. But it insists that freedom alone is not sufficient for justice. Freedom produces diversity of outcomes; accountability ensures fairness of consequence. Without both, equality is either illusory or coercively imposed.

The final implication is perhaps the most important: equality is not something societies achieve once and maintain indefinitely. It is something they must continuously reproduce by ensuring that accountability scales with power. When that balance is preserved, equality exists as a lived reality. When it breaks, equality becomes a formal statement disconnected from institutional behavior.

Aequism thus offers a simple but demanding conclusion:

Equality is not the absence of difference, but the absence of enforcement privilege.

And in that sense, equality is not about making people the same. It is about ensuring that no one stands outside the reach of consequence.

What is your take on this?

I know how this sounds. Believe me. But after living on this continent and watching how Americans talk about us, both Black Americans and Africans, I can't unsee it.

Conservatives are easy to spot. They say what they mean. They don't want us around. Fine. I can work with honesty. But progressives? They hug you while picking your pocket. And the worst part? They actually believe they're helping.

I went back and read Malcolm X. Not the quotes you see on Instagram. The actual speeches. Then I read Thomas Sowell, not because I agree with everything he says, but because he asked a question nobody on the left wants to touch: What if we're part of the problem too?

Then I just started watching Reddit. And Twitter. And the way people talk about us when they think nobody's looking.

Here's what I found.

1. They treat us like rescue dogs

When a Black neighborhood has high crime or poverty, progressives will write ten paragraphs about redlining and systemic racism. And look, those things are real. I'm not stupid. But after the tenth paragraph, have you noticed what's missing? Us. Our choices. Our ability to say no.

They talk about Black people the way you talk about a flooded basement. Something to be fixed. Never something that fixes itself.

I swear to God, read their comments closely. They'll say "Black people are dying" but they won't say "Black people are killing each other at rates that would make any other community riot." Not because they don't know. Because they're afraid. They're afraid that saying the truth means agreeing with racists. So they say nothing. And then they call that allyship.

That's not respect. That's what you do for a dog that keeps running into traffic. You build a fence. You don't say "hey, maybe the dog should learn to look both ways."

That stung to write. But it's true.

2. Africa is just a prop to them

Every time there's news about homophobia in Africa, progressives rush to explain it. Always the same script:

· "It's the evangelicals."

· "It's colonialism."

· "It's the Americans."

And again, yes. Those things are real. But do you hear what you're implying? You're saying we Africans cannot be intolerant on our own. We have no original thoughts. No native cruelty. No native kindness either, apparently. Everything is imported.

That's racist. That's actually, literally racist. You've reduced 54 countries and a billion people to puppets with no strings of our own.

If we can't be truly wrong about something, we can never be truly right.

Progressives don't want us to be equal. They want us to be pure. And when we fail to be pure, when an African country passes a stupid law without any white man telling them to, progressives get confused. Because their whole story falls apart.

3. The immigration thing they won't think about

I live here. In Africa. Every single smart person I know wants to leave. Doctors. Engineers. Your best students. Gone.

Progressives cheer this. Open borders. Come to Europe. Come to Canada. They post flags and hearts.

But who does that help? Not us. It helps Germany. It helps France. They get our brightest for free. And then they send us "aid" programs run by 22 year olds who have never seen a mosquito net before and think they're saving babies.

Meanwhile, the people who stay are the ones who couldn't leave. And we wonder why nothing gets built.

I'll say something that will make progressives angry. The right wing anti-immigration people are accidentally helping us. Because when Europe closes its doors, our engineers stay home. Our doctors stay home. And maybe, just maybe, they'll look around and decide to build something here.

I know the right wingers don't mean to help us. They hate us. But at least their hate is honest. Progressives love us to death. And their love is killing us.

4. So how do we pull ourselves up? Since nobody else will

I'm tired of waiting. Here's what we actually need to do. Not theory. Real things.

For Black Americans:

· Stop waiting for white people to fix your neighborhoods. The Irish didn't wait. The Italians didn't wait. The Koreans built their own banks. Start a savings circle with ten people. One hundred dollars each. That's a thousand. Lend it to each other. Build credit. Own something.

· Talk about the violence. Not for white approval. For yourselves. If your son can't walk to the corner store without getting shot, don't blame redlining from 1968. Blame whatever idiot pulled the trigger. Then figure out why he did it. Then fix that. But don't skip the blame part like it doesn't exist. That's denial, not justice.

· Malcolm X said we need our own leaders, our own schools, our own everything. He didn't say "wait for the Democrats to save us." He said save yourselves. That man was murdered and he still had more hope than half the people on Twitter.

For us Africans:

· Stop taking aid like it's charity. It's a leash. Every dollar comes with a white person telling you what to do. Say no. Even if it hurts. Pain builds character. Comfort builds dependency.

· Build roads to your neighbor, not to London. Trade with each other. We sell raw materials to China and buy back finished goods. That's stupidity. Pure stupidity. Stop it.

· Hold your own leaders accountable. When your president steals, don't say "colonialism made him." No. Colonialism ended 60 years ago in most places. At some point, the problem is us. Jail your own thieves. I know it's hard. Do it anyway.

· Create a reason for your smart people to come home. Tax breaks. Land. Respect. Right now, a Nigerian doctor in London is treated like a human being. In Nigeria, he's treated like an ATM by his own family and police. Fix that. And he'll come back.

5. The part that will really sting progressives

Here's what nobody says.

Progressives need us to be broken. Because if we fixed ourselves, what would they do with all that guilt? All those donations? All that virtue?

Think about it. A progressive who truly believed in Black agency would shut up and listen. But they don't. They keep talking. They keep explaining us to ourselves. Because our suffering gives their life meaning. They need the tragedy. Without it, they're just another person with a Twitter account.

That's the most racist thing I've ever written. And it's the truest.

Malcolm X saw this. He said white liberals are worse than white conservatives because at least conservatives are honest about their hatred. Liberals smile while they strip you of your dignity. They call it love. It's not love. It's a leash.

TL;DR

Progressives treat us like pets, not people. They deny our agency, infantilize Africa, and cheer brain drain while calling it compassion. Conservatives are rude but honest. We need neither. We need to save ourselves through economic self-reliance, facing our own violence, rejecting aid as a lifestyle, and demanding accountability from our own leaders.

And progressives won't like this because our suffering is their hobby.

Sorry. Truth stings.

In the recent weeks it's been mentioned a few times that the EU is planning on removing the veto due to how Orban made use of it to block funding for Ukraine.

I am personally not a fan of changing the rules on case by case basis without actual pros, cons and risks analysis of one rule Vs the other but at this point it kind of feels like EU wants to push this for another agenda and just tries to find excuses.

At the same time I am not that familiar but my gut feeling is that removing the veto will benefit bug economies leaving smaller ones like Bulgaria, Croatia, etc in a disadvantage.

What do you think? What are the pros, cons, risks of having a veto vs not and what would really make sense long-term?

Background

Traditional American conservative value has long emphasised the following: limited government, fiscal responsibility, free markets, traditional family values(social beliefs about family structure, gender roles, and personal conduct), strong national defense, and support for law and order.

However, a review of recent Republican-controlled governments reveals actions that appear inconsistent with these stated principles—suggesting that the party's actual governing priorities may differ from its advertised values. Below is a series of brief demonstrations contradictions:

Value 1: Fiscal Responsibility

The Republican Party has long championed balanced budgets and spending restraint. Yet in 2025, congressional Republicans passed the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" (OBBBA) — legislation that the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office determined will increase the federal deficit by $3.4 trillion

*Value 2: Limited Government

Traditional conservatism advocates for constitutionally limited federal power and resistance to government overreach. However, under recent Republican leadership, MAGA Republicans have slashed programs they disliked while doubling spending on the military and ICE, turned government into an instrument of control by meddling with the stock market and pressuring the Federal Reserve, and federalized enforcement by sending ICE and troops into unwilling states while withholding federal funds from political enemies.

• Value 3: Free Market Economics*

Republicans have historically championed free-market principles. repeatedly used government power—including contract conditioning, merger review threats, tariff leverage, and explicit demands for partisan loyalty—to pressure private companies into political compliance. The Department of Homeland Security explicitly demanded that federal contractors demonstrate "an established track record of promoting Trump administration policies in the media" in a public relations contract.

• Value 4: Traditional Family Values and Moral Leadership*

The Republican Party has long prided itself on being the party of family values. Yet the party has elevated leaders whose personal conduct runs in opposite with this commitment. This includes a Cabinet member who faced allegations of sexual assault (Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth), an attorney general nominee who withdrew amid accusations of sexual misconduct with a 17-year-old (Matt Gaetz), and a president found liable for sexual abuse.

• Value 5: Strong National Defense

Republicans have traditionally supported a strong national defense to protect American sovereignty. Yet under Republican leadership, the military has suffered from chronic financial mismanagement, depleted readiness, and eroded alliances. The Pentagon has failed its audits, with the Department of Defense continuing to be unable to account for billions of dollars' worth of assets.

Discussion Point

The pattern above reveals multiple inconsistencies between stated conservative principles and recent Republican actions. What do these actions suggest about the party's actual values and priorities? Do they reflect a redefinition of conservatism, or has the Republican Party always been like this? Contributors are encouraged to cite specific actions, voting records, or statements from Republican officials to support their interpretations.