I've been working on a set of ideas that try to answer one question: why do we have so much technology (AI, automation, instant communication) yet most of us work longer hours, feel more anxious, and earn less than our grandparents did?
I don't point to a single villain. I describe several mechanisms that feed into each other. I'd like to know if any of this matches your experience or engages with critical theory debates.
1. The productivity paradox
We were promised machines would free our time. Instead, productivity gains have gone mostly to profits. Wages stagnated. Debt (student loans, mortgages, credit cards) filled the gap. Now many of us work just to service debt.
Do you feel you work more or less than your parents at your age? Does technology make your job better or worse?
2. The principle of xenophobic difference
Not interpersonal xenophobia, but structural: selling the same branded product with lower quality in some countries (often called "emerging markets"), while charging similar or even higher prices.
Examples: a car sold in Europe with 5-star safety, sold in Latin America with 0 stars. A diet soda using a sweetener banned in the US but legal elsewhere. A washing machine motor that lasts 8 years in one country and 3 years in another.
I call it a principle of xenophobic difference because it consists of treating certain human groups as inferior based purely on their geographical location. A CEO can share your nationality and still enforce lower quality on "your" market – because the system treats the peripheral as less. That's institutionalized contempt translated into thinner steel and banned sweeteners.
Have you noticed this? A product that broke fast, or lacked features you saw in reviews from other countries? Or do you see this as just normal "market adaptation"?
3. Local economies and the middle class
Hypermarkets, monopolies, and financialization systematically crush small shops. Money that used to circulate in neighborhoods flows out to corporate headquarters. Result: fewer small business owners, more precarious jobs, hollowed-out communities.
Does this match your experience? Has your neighborhood lost local shops?
4. Surveillance
We voluntarily participate in our own surveillance because each step seems convenient. The problem is that the data is used to predict and manipulate behavior – not just to sell us things.
Ever been creeped out by how well an algorithm knew what you were about to do? Or are privacy concerns overblown?
5. The CI 116 Plan – "Freeze prices, raise wages"
Most critiques stop at diagnosis. I propose an actual economic sequence (designed for Argentina but adaptable).
The core idea:
- Freeze the price of basic food, energy, and essential services.
- Raise wages.
- Let the exchange rate float freely at first – it will spike. That spike acts as an escape valve for capital flight.
- Then focus on what your country already produces. Protect those goods with tariffs. Let in, with zero tariffs, what you cannot yet produce.
- After six months, clean up private debt. Mandate reinvestment of profits.
This plan lifts people out of poverty starting day one – not after years of adjustment. Because by freezing prices and raising wages, you restore purchasing power immediately.
Does this sound like naive populism? Or is there something to the "freeze prices, raise wages" logic? Would this work in your country? Why or why not?
A point of debate from another thread
Someone objected that "xenophobic" is the wrong term – that this is just capitalist extraction or colonialism. My reply:
- The mechanism isn't only profit. It's geographic location used as a criterion for human disposal. That's institutionalized xenophobia: contempt translated into material standards.
- Saying "it's just capitalism" is like saying a heart attack is "just biology" – true, but useless for surgery. The principle of xenophobic difference doesn't only exploit; it teaches the exploited to see themselves as second-class. That's a psychological lock, and it needs a name.
What I'm honestly asking for
I'm not here to convince anyone. I'm here to learn where my arguments are weak, where the tone is off, and where I might be completely wrong.
If you've read this far: what do you actually think?
- Have you noticed any of these patterns?
- Does the "freeze prices, raise wages" idea seem plausible or deeply flawed?
- What am I missing?
Kind regards.
PS: THE CI 116 PLAN – SUMMARY
Economic regime change for Argentina, but adaptable anywhere. Phases: wage recomposition, free exchange rate as escape valve, selective protectionism, credit in dollars, mandatory reinvestment, patents, political reform. Objective: transform productive structure in 24 months while shielding wages. Why a $6,000 dollar is not a problem under this plan.
The CI 116 Plan was designed for Argentina in April 2026. However, the underlying formula—"freeze prices, raise wages"—is universal. Any nation can apply this sequence, provided it adapts the specific tools (which prices to freeze, which products are considered "producible" or "non-producible", the percentage of wage increases) to its own productive structure. A country that produces textiles will protect textiles; a country that produces microchips will protect microchips. The logic is the same; the execution must be local.
Here the CI 116 Plan: A Practical Case Study
Argentine Economic Reconstruction Plan (CI 116 Model)
Detailed Monthly Analysis: Foundations, Impact and Projections
Author: Adrián D. Noé Orfois
Date: April 2026
Executive Summary
This document details the temporal sequence of an economic regime change designed for Argentina. The plan is structured in clearly differentiated phases combining: initial wage recomposition, the use of the free exchange rate as an escape valve, selective industrial protection based on real productive capacity, productive credit in hard currency, mandatory reinvestment of profits, the development of patents and exportable services, and a long-term institutional anchor through political reform.
The objective is not to stabilise nominal variables in the short term, but to transform the productive and distributive structure over a 24-month horizon, shielding the purchasing power of wage-earning sectors during the transition. This document explains, month by month, why a dollar at $4,500 or $6,000 does not constitute a problem for the real economy under the conditions of this plan, and how inflationary, fiscal and social risks are managed.
CHAPTER 1: Theoretical Foundations of the Model
1.1 The Disassociation between the Exchange Rate and the Cost of Living
Traditionally, in Argentina, an increase in the exchange rate translates into inflation due to the "pass-through" effect (transfer to prices). This plan breaks that link by means of:
- Price floors on regulated goods (basic foods, energy, transport, fuels).
- Accelerated wage recomposition (30% nominal monthly for 5 months).
- A completely free dollar as an absorption valve for monetary surpluses and expectations.
1.2 The Function of the Initially High Dollar
A dollar that climbs to $4,500 or $6,000 in the first few months fulfils three strategic functions:
- Expels speculative capital before capital controls and mandatory reinvestment are implemented.
- Liquifies dollar-denominated liabilities of companies that will later be cleaned up by the State in Month 6.
- Generates an extremely competitive real exchange rate for the export phase without the need for an abrupt devaluation later on.
1.3 Intelligent Protectionism Based on Productive Capacity
The tariff is not applied by sector, but by the real possibility of local production:
- 0% Tariff: Technology, medical equipment, industrial inputs not locally manufacturable.
- 70% Tariff: Goods that Argentina already produces or can produce (textiles, footwear, furniture, processed foods, etc.).
Month 1: The Distributive Take-Off
Policies Implemented
- General wage increase of 30% (collective bargaining, pensions, social plans tied to the minimum wage).
- Price freeze on the basic food basket, public service tariffs, fuels, and essential medicines.
- Complete liberation of the exchange market (without Central Bank intervention).
- Monetary issuance to finance wage and pension spending.
- Pesification of all private contracts and rental agreements denominated in foreign currency, effective retroactively to the day prior to the plan's launch.
Economic Analysis
The real wage in terms of mass consumer goods increases significantly (between 20% and 25% in real terms). The dollar begins to rise due to monetary expansion and precautionary demand for foreign currency. Core inflation (non-regulated prices) begins to show tensions, but the official CPI remains low due to the controls.
Social and Sectoral Impact
| Sector | Situation | Mood |
|---|---|---|
| Registered wage earners | Strong increase in purchasing power for food and services. | Optimism |
| Pensioners | Recover lost purchasing power. | Relief |
| Importers | See their replacement costs become more expensive. | Unease |
| Exporters | The real exchange rate improves, but they do not yet liquidate due to expectations of a further rise. | Expectant |
| Professional middle class | Incomes not tied to collective bargaining stagnate in dollar terms. | Moderate discontent |
The Dollar at $4,500: A Problem?
No. The basic basket is capped. The peso salary rose by 30%. People eat and travel using fixed prices. The high dollar only affects imported durable goods (electronics, cars), whose consumption is postponed or financed in unindexed instalments.
Month 2: Consolidation of the Shock
Policies Implemented
- Second wage increase of 30% (cumulative 69%).
- Strict maintenance of maximum prices with oversight from the Secretariat of Commerce.
- The Central Bank continues with controlled issuance to sustain demand.
Economic Analysis
Aggregate demand grows at unprecedented rates. Local industry that uses national inputs increases production and hiring. Selective shortages begin to appear in high-turnover imported products (sweets, electronics), but not in basic foods. The free dollar continues its climb, approaching values of $3,000 - $3,500.
Social and Sectoral Impact
- Local shops and supermarkets: High turnover of national products.
- Local manufacturers of food, beverages, and textiles: Increase in margins (prices are capped but salary costs are still low in real terms).
- Financial speculators: Begin to migrate massively to the dollar, accelerating the exchange rate rise. This is desired: they are leaving before Month 5.
Real Purchasing Power
The average wage earner can now buy approximately 50% more food than 60 days ago. The consumption of meat, dairy products, and dry goods skyrockets.
Month 3: Peak of Demand and Exchange Rate Tension
Policies Implemented
- Third wage increase of 30% (cumulative 119.7%).
- Meetings with industrialists to ensure the supply of regulated products.
- The dollar reaches the $4,500 - $5,000 range.
Economic Analysis
The gap between official prices and parallel market prices widens for non-regulated goods. A "resale market" appears for some imported products. However, products from the basic basket remain accessible. National industry accelerates investment to expand capacity.
Why Doesn't a $5,000 Dollar Generate Chaos?
- Food: Fixed price.
- Energy and Transport: Flat rate.
- Wages: Have risen more than the dollar over the cumulative 3 months.
- Dollar debts: Companies know that in Month 6 the State will absorb part of that liability.
Business Climate
- Multinational importers: Contained fury. They pressure their parent companies. Some begin to plan their exit from the Argentine market (hot money).
- National Industry (SMEs): Productive euphoria. They hire staff and add shifts.
Month 4: The Escape Valve Works
Policies Implemented
- Fourth wage increase of 30% (cumulative 185.6%).
- Announcement of the measures to take effect from Month 5 (tariffs and exchange rate cap). The market discounts the change of rules.
Economic Analysis
The exchange rate "overshooting" reaches its maximum peak ($5,500 - $6,500) this month. It is the last month of "total freedom" for capital flight. Large fortunes and speculative funds complete their exit. Mission accomplished: they left at an exchange rate that is very expensive for them and cheap for the real country.
Real Purchasing Power
The wage earner now has a peso salary equivalent to around US$2,500 - US$3,000 at the parallel exchange rate, but since they spend in pesos on regulated goods, their standard of living is the highest in the last 10 years.
Month 5: The Strategic Turn (Tariffs and Rules of the Game)
Policies Implemented
- 0% Tariff for goods NOT locally producible (Technology, Medical Equipment, Specific Chemical Inputs).
- 70% Tariff for producible goods (Textiles, Footwear, Furniture, Toys, Luxury Processed Foods).
- Dollar purchase cap: US$200,000 per year per legal or natural person (except for the purchase of a first home or essential productive inputs).
- End of pure monetary issuance. Start of financing via customs revenue.
Economic Analysis
The dollar, which was at extremely high levels due to speculation, finds a natural ceiling:
- There is less demand for foreign currency to import producible goods (they are substituted).
- The demand for foreign currency for capital flight is limited by the US$200k cap.
- The supply of foreign currency from exporters begins to normalise.
Immediate Impact
- Textile and Footwear Industry: Explosion of orders. Massive hiring. The 70% tariff makes importing competition unviable.
- Technology: Stable or falling prices due to 0% tariff. Companies breathe a sigh of relief.
- Dollar: Stabilises around $4,000 - $4,500 (a fall from the speculative peak).
Month 6: Financial Clean-up and Banking Regulation
Policies Implemented
Absorption of Private Debt by the State:
- The State buys from banks the portfolio of non-performing or uncollectible loans from families and SMEs.
- 10-year public debt is issued to finance this operation (or part of the trade surplus generated by the tariffs is used).
Limit on Bank Profit: It is established by law that the profitability of financial institutions may not exceed 30% per annum on net equity. The surplus must be allocated to productive credit at a subsidised rate or to reserves.
Why Month 6 and Not Month 24?
- Balance sheet clean-up: Families and businesses begin the investment phase without the burden of old debts.
- Avoids the "Credit Crunch": Banks, cleaned up by the State, can lend again.
- Narrative coherence: It is a countercyclical technical measure, not a bailout for speculators (because the speculators already left in months 1-5).
Social and Business Climate
- Mortgage or pledge debtors: Total relief. They free up income for consumption or investment.
- Banks: Accept the profit cap in exchange for having clean balance sheets and systemic stability.
- State: Takes on a manageable liability, offset by the economic reactivation.
Months 7-8: The Calm After the Storm
Policies Implemented
- Monitoring of tariff application (Technology enters without obstacles; Textiles are stopped at Customs).
- First loans in dollars for technology (line to be launched in Month 9).
Economic Analysis
Monthly inflation falls drastically:
- Food: Capped.
- Technology: Cheap (0% tariff).
- Services: Rise due to demand, but the real wage remains high.
- Dollar: Moves in a range of $3,800 - $4,200.
Real Purchasing Power
The real wage reaches its historical peak. A typical family with two minimum wages can access a diversified consumption basket, save in pesos to buy technology (cheap), and think about domestic holidays.
Month 9: Credit for Productivity
Policies Implemented
- Launch of a Line of Credit in Dollars for Technology Acquisition:
- Rate: 4% per annum.
- Term: Up to 10 years.
- Purpose: Machinery, Software, Medical Equipment, Automation (Non-Producible Goods).
Key Reasoning (Debate on "Burning Dollars")
- Criticism: "They will use dollars to import technology that does not export."
- Model's Response: That technology substitutes future imports. It is preferable to import a machine once (with credit) and produce locally for 10 years, than to import the finished product every year. In both cases, dollars are consumed at the beginning; in one case, you stop consuming them forever; in the other, the bleeding is perpetuated.
Sectoral Impact
- Industrial SMEs: Gain access to unimaginable modernisation. Increase in productivity.
- Agricultural Sector: Renewal of machinery with soft financing.
- Health: High-complexity equipment at international prices.
Months 10-11: Sustained Industrial Growth
General Overview
The economy is operating at full capacity. Unemployment falls to historic lows. Imported "producible" goods have disappeared from the shelves, replaced by national production of increasing quality.
Social Climate
- Industrial workers: Full employment and high wages.
- Consumers: Less imported variety, but more purchasing power in national goods and technology.
- National Business Owners: Wide profit margin (costs in pesos controlled, external competition blocked).
Month 12: Investment in Knowledge (R&D and Patents)
Policies Implemented
- National Innovation Fund: Massive state investment in Universities, CONICET, and technology-based companies.
- Patent Regime: Tax benefits for the registration of industrial intellectual property in Argentina.
- Strategic Input Stock: State purchase of electronic and chemical components to guarantee supply for local industry for 24 months.
Objective
To move from "Buying Technology" (Month 9) to "Producing Technology". Argentina must generate genuine dollars through the export of royalties, software licences, biotechnology, and engineering services.
Months 13-14: Preparation for the Second Exchange Rate Phase
Situation
The real exchange rate has appreciated slightly due to the fall of the dollar (from $6,000 to $4,000) and residual inflation in services. To maintain export competitiveness and align expectations, an adjustment is prepared.
Month 15: Capital Discipline and Exchange Rate Recalibration
Policies Implemented
- Mandatory Reinvestment Regime:
- Companies operating in Argentina may only send abroad 30% of their annual profits.
- The remaining 70% must be reinvested in the country (plant expansion, R&D, or acquisition of local assets).
- Outsourced Services Agreements (Offshoring):
- Agreements with foreign companies to install Call Centres, Technical Support Centres, Software Development, and Back-office operations in Argentina.
- Managed Exchange Rate Adjustment:
- A slide of the official/commercial exchange rate of 35% over the quarter is permitted (not a single jump).
Analysis of the Exchange Rate Adjustment
- Why now? Because the real wage is at its peak. A 35% adjustment takes it from "Very High" to "Highly Competitive", without generating poverty.
- Effect: More profitable exports. Non-essential imports are curbed even further.
Business Climate
- Multinationals: Initial rejection of mandatory reinvestment, but acceptance in the face of the profitability of the protected domestic market.
- Services Sector: Youth employment boom. Argentina becomes "The India of South America" for Spanish and English language services.
Months 16-17: Expansion of the Services Sector
Dynamics
Call Centres and software companies hire on a massive scale. These are jobs that do not require imported inputs. Every dollar that enters through this means is a "clean" dollar that strengthens reserves without pressuring the trade balance of goods.
Month 18: Institutional Stability and Defence of the Domestic Market
Policies Implemented
Domestic Supply Quota:
- It is established that a percentage of the production of sensitive goods (food, energy) must be allocated primarily to the local market before authorising exports.
- Objective: To prevent export success from generating shortages or inflation due to scarcity in the domestic market.
Political Reform Proposal:
- Submission to Congress of a bill to transition from a Presidentialist system to a Parliamentary one.
- Economic Basis: A parliamentary system reduces institutional uncertainty, flattens the country risk curve, and allows for 20-year state policies.
Analysis of the Economy-Politics Link
Without this step, the economic plan is vulnerable to a change of government in year 4. With this step, the aim is to shield the productive accumulation regime. The market discounts future stability, lowering the long-term interest rate.
Months 19-23: Consolidation of the Regime
Key Indicators
- Exports: Growing, driven by Manufactures of Industrial Origin (MOI) and Knowledge-Based Services (SBC).
- Inflation: Core controlled (local competition). Regulated prices managed.
- Real Wage: Stable, at levels higher than 2025.
- Dollar: Managed float, with a minimal exchange rate gap thanks to the US$200k cap and mandatory reinvestment.
Month 24: The New Country
Final Situation of the Plan (2 Years)
- Private Debt: Cleaned up.
- Financial System: Stable and regulated (maximum profit 30%).
- Industry: Modernised with credit at 4%.
- Services: Exporting talent.
- Patents: First income from royalties on local developments.
- Politics: Transition towards a parliamentary system underway.
- Dollar: Has ceased to be the centre of economic life. It is just one more price, relevant only for large transactions.
CHAPTER 3: The Debate on the $6,000 Dollar – A Technical Refutation
3.1 The Fallacy of Universal "Pass-Through"
In Argentina, it is assumed that High Dollar = High Inflation = Poverty. The CI 116 Model demonstrates that this equation is false if two independent variables are intervened:
- Wage-Goods Prices (Food and Energy): Frozen.
- Nominal Incomes (Wages): Growing above the inflation of non-regulated goods.
3.2 Simulation of Real Impact (Month 3 with Dollar at $5,000)
| Concept | Price / Value | Purchasing Power of the Wage (Base 100 = 2025) |
|---|---|---|
| Average Wage | $2,500,000 (ARS) | +185% |
| Basic Food Basket | $250,000 (Frozen) | Yields 10 Baskets (Previously yielded 4) |
| Mid-Range Mobile Phone (Imported) | $4,000,000 (ARS) | Temporarily inaccessible |
| National Clothing | $80,000 (ARS) | Very Accessible |
| Bus Ticket | $800 (Frozen) | Irrelevant in the budget |
Conclusion: The wage earner lives better in terms of essentials (eating, travelling, dressing in national production). They lose access to imported luxury consumption for 6-9 months, until credit or local production substitutes it.
3.3 Impact on Importers and Exporters
- Importer of Producible Goods (Textile): Closes or reconverts. This is the policy's objective: to substitute imports.
- Technology Importer: Wins. Accesses a relatively cheap dollar (due to the 0% tariff) and finances over 10 years.
- Commodity Exporter: Wins. Liquidates at an extremely high real exchange rate, while their internal costs in dollars (wages, energy) are extremely low.
CHAPTER 4: Conclusions and Long-Term Sustainability
4.1 Strengths of the Model
- Sequential Coherence: No phase contradicts the previous one.
- Social Shield: Workers do not pay the cost of the productive transition.
- Capital Debugging: Speculative capital dismisses itself in the first 5 months.
- Institutional Anchor: Political reform (Parliamentarism) is the nominal anchor the markets need to believe in the long term.
4.2 Identified Risks and Mitigations
| Risk | Mitigation in the Plan |
|---|---|
| Shortages due to capped prices | Expensive dollar discourages imported consumption. Domestic Quota (Month 18) ensures local supply. |
| Corruption in Tariffs | Technology (Non-Producible) enters "in a sealed box". Control is focused only on mass consumer goods (PSA and Customs). |
| Fiscal Crisis due to initial issuance | Financing via Tariffs (Month 5) and lower spending on subsidies due to reactivation. |
| Flight of Multinationals | Those that do not want to reinvest leave. The domestic market of 45 million people with high wages attracts new productive investments. |
4.3 Final Verdict
The plan described is neither an adjustment nor irresponsible populism. It is a change of accumulation regime.
- Short Term (Months 1-6): Distributive shock and controlled exchange rate chaos.
- Medium Term (Months 7-18): Productive and technological leap.
- Long Term (Months 19+): Institutional stability and sustained growth.
The question "What if the dollar goes to $6,000?" is answered with another question: "How many kilos of barbecue can a worker buy today with their wages?" Under this plan, the answer is: Many more than before.
Document prepared based on the CI 116 technical exchange. Reproduction prohibited without citing the source. Argentina, April 2026.
Author's Note: The CI 116 Plan is a concrete application of the "freeze prices, raise wages" formula in a specific country under specific historical conditions. If you intend to adapt this model to your own nation, begin by answering these three questions: (1) What do we already produce that can be protected? (2) What do we not produce that we must allow in with zero tariffs to avoid strangling our industry? (3) What percentage of the population's income is spent on basic foods, and can we freeze those prices immediately? Answer these, and you will have the foundations of your own plan. The rest is discipline, sequencing, and the political courage to tell speculators: "The exit is that way."
Adapting to your country: Answer three questions – (1) What do you already produce? (2) What must you import (0% tariff) to avoid strangling industry? (3) Can you freeze basic food prices immediately? Then execute with discipline and tell speculators: "The exit is that way."
THE END
Argentina, April 2026 – CI 116 Model