r/worldevents

From May 13 to 15, U.S. President Trump visited China, where he received a warm welcome and held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The visit was highly ceremonial and friendly. According to the latest reports, the two sides have already reached multiple important agreements, such as China expanding market access for American trade and commerce, increasing mutual imports of goods, and reaching consensus on keeping the Strait of Hormuz open and on the denuclearization of Iran.

In his banquet speech, Trump also mentioned Benjamin Franklin’s admiration for Confucius and Franklin Roosevelt’s praise for the courage of the Chinese people during World War II, in order to illustrate that China and the United States share “common values.” Xi Jinping, meanwhile, stated during the talks that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “Make America Great Again” are not contradictory, and proposed a new blueprint for a “constructive and strategically stable China–U.S. relationship.” The talks between the two sides were very cordial. Trump also invited Xi Jinping to visit the United States in late September this year.

During this visit to China, Trump also brought along a large delegation of political and business figures, including Secretary of State Rubio, who has been sanctioned by China since 2020, billionaire Elon Musk, who is deeply involved in American politics, and NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang, who is ethnically Chinese.

Judging from the agenda and developments of this visit, China–U.S. relations have clearly warmed significantly. Regarding more sensitive issues such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, as well as the issue of releasing Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong, Trump did raise them, but handled them in a low-key manner and even deliberately avoided publicly answering reporters’ questions on Taiwan.

Trump does not wish to make the Chinese side unhappy, and in reality does not care very much about these non-economic issues that have relatively weak connections to America’s concrete interests. The topics of this meeting were mainly concentrated in the commercial and trade sphere, while also involving certain technological cooperation and major international affairs, showing a distinctly pragmatic diplomatic character.

This means that during the remaining two and a half years of Trump’s second term, China–U.S. relations will likely be centered on friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation, while competition between the two sides will mainly focus on the economic and trade sphere. Ideological differences and confrontation will be shelved, and bilateral relations will enter a relatively stable and harmonious new period. If the Chinese leader’s visit to the United States this September continues the tone and atmosphere of Trump’s current visit to China, then the new normal in which pragmatic competition and cooperation between China and the United States override ideology will become even more firmly established.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China–U.S. relations have displayed different characteristics and patterns in different periods. From 1949 through the 1960s, because of ideological confrontation, interstate conflict, and the atmosphere of the global Cold War, the two sides were locked in a highly hostile antagonistic relationship, even erupting into direct military conflict at one point. China viewed the United States as an imperialist aggressor, the most reactionary fortress of the bourgeoisie, and the manipulator behind Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. The United States, meanwhile, regarded China as a detestable communist state, a terrifying red demon, and an aggressive provocateur.

However, by the early 1970s, because of the Sino-Soviet split and the intensification of U.S.–Soviet confrontation, both China and the United States faced the enormous threat posed by the Soviet Union, as well as crises within their own countries. The ruling authorities of both nations therefore chose to end confrontation, shelve disputes, and normalize China–U.S. relations. In 1972, Mao Zedong and Nixon achieved their historic handshake. This laid the foundation for China and the United States to put aside ideological struggles and pursue pragmatic cooperation.

After Mao Zedong’s death, CCP leaders such as Deng Xiaoping continued this path of developing China–U.S. relations, strengthened cooperation between the two countries, and formally established diplomatic relations in 1979. Through expanding economic, trade, technological, and cultural exchanges, as well as mutual personnel exchanges, China and the United States deepened and normalized bilateral relations.

After the June Fourth Incident in 1989, China–U.S. relations briefly cooled because of political turmoil within China and related issues. China also restarted anti-Western and anti-Westernization political campaigns and propaganda, causing a decline in mutual trust between the two countries. However, cooperation and exchanges between China and the United States were not fundamentally destroyed, and relations warmed again after only a short downturn.

China’s enormous economic potential, especially its vast supply of cheap labor and huge market size, made the United States and other Western countries see the benefits of cooperating with China. At the same time, the West also believed that China’s economic development would promote political democratization and social openness, and therefore increased investment in China while supporting China’s entry into the WTO and its integration into globalization.

As a result, China and the United States maintained pragmatic cooperation for more than thirty years afterward, without interrupting exchanges because of ideological issues. However, during different periods, under different leaders, and under differing specific circumstances, the state of China–U.S. relations and their priorities varied. During the presidencies of the two Bushes, Clinton, and Obama’s first term, bilateral relations were relatively cordial, with more cooperation and fewer conflicts.

By contrast, during Obama’s second term, the Biden administration, and the latter half of Trump’s first term, friction and conflict between China and the United States increased, and the trend toward confrontation became more apparent. In addition, when Democrats are in power, conflicts are more likely to arise over China’s human rights issues and matters involving Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, while Republicans, being more pragmatic, tend to have fewer clashes with China on these matters.

The reason China–U.S. relations have experienced repeated fluctuations and transformations is that, on the one hand, China and the United States possess obvious differences in political systems and ideology, leading to frequent conflict and difficulties in building mutual trust. China’s rise has also challenged American hegemony and intensified competition between the two countries. On the other hand, China and the United States also need each other and are interdependent in many fields, making true “decoupling” difficult under globalization and massive economic and trade exchanges.

Because China is not a democratic system based on political pluralism and competitive politics, but instead possesses highly centralized power, it has an inherent contradiction with the United States, which emphasizes liberal democracy and separation of powers. China’s official claim to uphold communist ideology also causes dissatisfaction among conservative anti-communist forces in the United States.

China’s frequent human rights controversies, the long-standing issues involving Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and disputes such as those in the South China Sea also attract criticism and concern from the United States, which places importance on human rights and the international order, while China’s countermeasures further provoke friction between the two countries. The United States has also never fully trusted China because of its lack of transparency and its institutional differences from the West, and together with allies such as Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, has sought to balance China strategically and ideologically.

However, China’s rapid economic growth, its rise as the world’s second-largest economy, the “world’s factory,” and a key engine of the global economy, as well as its enormous international influence, have made it an important economic and trade partner for the United States. These realities make it difficult for the United States to “leave” China; on the contrary, America needs China in many areas. Therefore, the United States has been forced to partially abandon or soften political and ideological confrontation with China in order to maintain pragmatic cooperation.

China achieved economic rise and strategic and technological competition with the United States on the basis of a system different from that of the West. Facing China’s dual challenge in ideology and economic trade, the United States also attempted to “decouple” from China. But facts have proven that under deep globalization, China’s indispensable influence, and America’s serious economic dependence on China, genuine “decoupling” is impossible. Even limited “decoupling” imposed heavy self-inflicted costs on the United States and proved not worth the price.

Trump promoted “decoupling” and a trade war during his first term. The Biden administration later worked with allies to contain China, and at the beginning of Trump’s second term there was also a tariff war against China. Yet none of these efforts achieved ideal results, and several “decoupling” and containment policies toward China ultimately began with great momentum but faded away without resolution.

Therefore, the United States must reconsider its relationship with China and once again place pragmatic cooperation at the forefront. This also has much to do with Trump’s own stance and preferences. Trump’s style is highly pragmatic and profit-oriented. He shows disdain toward democracy and human rights, has strengthened authoritarian tendencies even domestically, and does not care much about issues outside the scope of “America First.”

Internationally, Trump has been at odds with America’s traditional allies and with the European establishment based on shared liberal democratic values. Trump also admires political strongmen and has repeatedly publicly praised the strength and decisiveness of the leaders of China, Russia, and North Korea, envying their unquestioned authority. This has also enabled Trump and Xi Jinping to establish a good personal relationship.

Trump’s supporters, especially the “MAGA” camp, also care primarily about America’s own interests and not the human rights conditions of other countries. From both the American and global perspectives, liberal democracy has likewise shown signs of retreat, while populism and authoritarianism have become increasingly prevalent. Under such a background, a Trump-led United States pursuing détente and expanded cooperation with China faces not only fewer ideological obstacles, but also several additional favorable factors.

Of course, there have always been divisions and fluctuations within Trump’s governing team and China policy between hardline and moderate approaches. Figures such as Secretary of State Rubio, former Secretary of State Pompeo, former adviser Bolton, and current adviser Miles Yu have all advocated a hardline approach toward China out of ideological and geopolitical considerations. Meanwhile, important Trump collaborators such as Elon Musk and Treasury Secretary Bessent focus more on economic and trade considerations and place greater emphasis on cooperation with China.

Trump himself once stood with the hardliners and initiated the process of “decoupling” from China, but now he has clearly shifted toward a more moderate approach. In fact, cooperating with China and making money from such cooperation aligns more closely with Trump’s preferences. Even before becoming president, Trump already had extensive commercial dealings with China.

As an anti-establishment populist politician without a fixed political creed, Trump is not constrained by the human rights positions valued by traditional politicians, is indifferent toward sensitive issues involving Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and is even less likely to pressure China over the Ukraine issue. As for competition in economics, trade, and strategy, although intense, it is not a zero-sum game, and Trump, as a businessman, is willing and skilled at competing and cooperating simultaneously.

This year is a U.S. midterm election year. Facing domestic opposition, economic slowdown, and employment problems, Trump needs to improve relations with China in order to stimulate the American economy, sell more agricultural and industrial products, increase income and employment, and win voter support. American conglomerates and the business class also tend to favor cooperation with China. Under these circumstances, Trump has strong motivation to enthusiastically visit China and improve China–U.S. relations.

China, meanwhile, is also facing economic slowdown and many domestic problems, and therefore hopes to improve the external environment and expand foreign trade. At the same time, China has value-based disagreements with the European Union and worsening relations with Japan. Improving relations with the United States benefits China’s domestic and foreign policy goals and can also weaken the U.S.–Europe–Japan alliance aimed at containing China. Trump’s pragmatic orientation and lack of emphasis on ideological issues also suit the preferences of the Chinese side. China likewise has no intention of exporting ideology or changing the American system, and has also avoided direct confrontation with the United States on issues such as Iran and Venezuela, which has further increased Trump’s favorable impression of China.

During this meeting, Xi Jinping stated that China and the United States should avoid falling into the “Thucydides Trap” of great-power zero-sum rivalry. This also reflects China’s desire to avoid uncontrolled conflict with the United States and to maintain long-term stable cooperation. Both China and the United States recognize that cooperation is better than confrontation, and that a strong G2 partnership is preferable to mutual losses that would allow third parties to benefit. Therefore, Trump’s visit to China and the summit between the Chinese and American leaders proceeded naturally and encountered almost no obstacles. Compared with Xi Jinping’s 2024 visit to the United States and his meeting with Biden, where both sides had considerable disagreements and each harbored their own concerns and calculations, this Xi–Trump meeting was far more harmonious.

Although Trump’s visit to China can be described as friendly, smooth, and productive, it also has its limitations. Sensitive issues including Taiwan, as well as economic and trade competition and friction between the two countries, were handled in a low-key manner and shelved by both sides, which also means that they were not actually resolved, and contradictions and hidden dangers still remain.

The hardliners toward China within Trump’s governing team, such as Rubio, may accept compromises and visits to China, but this does not mean that they agree with a pro-China friendly approach. In the future, they will still advocate hardline policies toward China and continue to play important roles in decision-making within the Trump administration. In addition, although the atmosphere of this meeting was very friendly, the achievements reached were not truly groundbreaking and still remained within the scope of conventional cooperation.

Trump himself frequently changes positions and abruptly shifts policies, while circumstances constantly evolve. Whether the achievements of this visit to China can truly be realized, and how long the atmosphere of China–U.S. friendliness can last, remain uncertain. If Democrats regain control of Congress in this year’s midterm elections, or if the presidency changes hands again in 2028, China–U.S. relations may once again undergo major transformations. Therefore, Trump’s visit to China and its outcomes should not be overly glorified, and only cautious optimism is warranted regarding China–U.S. relations.

From a longer-term perspective, China–U.S. relations will continue to be characterized by the intertwining of pragmatic competition and cooperation with ideological confrontation. At times, friendly cooperation will outweigh confrontation and conflict, while at other times contradictions between the two sides will cause cooperation to stagnate and lead to mutual sanctions. The specific situation will depend on the domestic and international circumstances of the time, the decisions of the leaders of both countries, and the influence of unexpected events. Competition between China and the United States on the global level, as well as the risk of unintended escalation, will always exist, yet the two sides are also mutually dependent and unable to truly “decouple and sever supply chains.”

The author, of course, hopes that China and the United States can engage in more cooperation and as little conflict as possible, while balancing economic livelihood concerns with democracy and human rights, and promoting the well-being of China, the United States, and the world in a constructive manner.

(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer living in Europe and an international politics researcher.)

On May 7, 2026, the United Kingdom held local elections, with more than 5,000 local council seats up for re-election, accounting for about one quarter of all seats. According to the official results released on May 10, the right-wing populist party Reform UK achieved a major victory, ranking first with 26% of the vote, winning 1,453 seats, and securing absolute majorities in 14 local councils.

Meanwhile, the currently governing Labour Party saw its number of seats fall by more than 50%, while the other major party, the Conservatives, also suffered major losses in both votes and seats. The radical left-wing Green Party saw a huge increase in seats, with a larger growth rate than Reform UK, though its share of the vote and total number of seats remained below that of Reform UK. Another important liberal party, the Liberal Democrats, saw slight increases in both votes and seats.

This marks a clear shift in the political direction of Britain and a dramatic transformation of its political landscape. It also means that populism has gained further momentum in the UK, while the traditional establishment has significantly declined. The rise of Reform UK is the most notable manifestation and result of this trend.

Reform UK was formerly known as the Brexit Party, whose main platform at the time was advocating Britain’s “decoupling” from the European Union. The party later gradually evolved into a right-wing populist “big tent” party based on white nationalism, populism, xenophobia, anti-establishment sentiment, and opposition to multiculturalism, bringing together various anti-establishment populists and groups.

The party is broadly similar in its core ideology and political orientation to other right-wing populist parties in Europe and the United States, such as the National Rally, Alternative for Germany, and Fidesz, though it also possesses certain “British characteristics.”

Compared with right-wing populist parties in other countries, Reform UK places greater emphasis on the uniqueness of the “Anglo-Saxon” people, separation from continental Europe, and opposition to the European Union. Its anti-immigration and exclusionary positions are also relatively stronger. Asian immigrants such as Indians and Chinese, as well as Muslims, who form sizable communities in Britain, are among the main targets of Reform UK. The opportunity for its rise came from the Brexit wave roughly a decade ago, echoing the rise of America’s “MAGA” movement and France’s “Yellow Vest Movement.”

The rise of British populism is, in fact, somewhat surprising. Traditionally, unlike the prevalence of radicalism in continental Europe, Britain has long been the major Western country with the weakest soil for populism and the strongest tradition of moderate democratic forces.

Whether in ideology or political tradition, Britain has long leaned toward “moderate conservatism.” In confronting social problems, reformist approaches such as “Fabianism” and the “Third Way” have been prevalent. British conservatism was also long dominated by the establishment-oriented Conservative Party, and Britain’s electoral system favored traditional major parties, leaving almost no room for populism.

From the early 20th century to the early 21st century, for more than a hundred years, British politics was essentially characterized by alternating rule between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, each serving as the other’s opposition, with the Liberal Democrats functioning as an important third party. Regional parties in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales also held a place in politics. The rise of Reform UK, especially its major victory in this local election, has strongly impacted this tradition, ushering in what could be described as “changes unseen in a century” in Britain’s political landscape.

In previous years, Reform UK had already gained considerable public support, second only to Labour and the Conservatives. However, Britain’s electoral system elects all members of Parliament and local councils through single-member constituencies with plurality voting. This benefits the leading party in elections and parties with deep local roots, while disadvantaging parties with relatively high nationwide support but whose supporters are evenly dispersed across constituencies and whose organizational foundations are weaker.

As a result, although Reform UK had a fairly high support rate in previous elections, it struggled to gain seats. For example, in the 2024 British House of Commons election, Reform UK won 14.3% of the vote but secured only 5 out of 650 seats. Labour and the Conservatives still monopolized the House of Commons and most parliamentary and local council positions.

However, as Reform UK’s support rate continued to rise and surpassed Labour and the Conservatives in many constituencies, climbing into first place, its support and votes began to convert efficiently into parliamentary seats.

In the 2025 British local elections, Reform UK already achieved a remarkable victory, ranking first in vote share and surging from its previous 2% to 30%, winning 677 out of 1,641 contested seats, five times its previous number of local council seats. In this year’s elections, although Reform UK’s vote share slightly declined compared with 2025, it won even more seats and further expanded its advantage.

Although Labour and the Conservatives still hold more total local council seats than Reform UK because Britain only re-elects part of local councilors each year, based on election results and seat changes over the past two years, if Reform UK maintains its current momentum and support rate, it is highly likely to gain even more local council seats over the next two years and become the largest party in local government. If its public support remains stable, it could also secure more seats in the next parliamentary election and may even become the ruling party.

After the conclusion of the 2026 local elections, Reform UK newly gained control of 14 local councils. Combined with those it had already won previously, it is now able to exercise local governing power in more than 20 counties and districts.

This means Reform UK is no longer merely an opposition populist party that voices protests without the ability to determine policy. It is now a genuine ruling force capable of implementing policies such as anti-immigration, opposition to multiculturalism, and anti-environmental measures. If Reform UK wins control of more municipalities and eventually gains a parliamentary majority, it could implement its policies nationwide, fundamentally reshaping Britain’s political ecology as well as its domestic and foreign affairs.

The reason Reform UK has risen so powerfully, step by step evolving from a fringe party into a major political force and climbing to first place in support ratings, is due to a combination of internal and external factors. Among them, immigration issues and conflicts between different ethnic groups and cultures are the most direct and critical causes.

Traditionally, Britain has been a country dominated by white Anglo-Saxon ethnic groups, with Christianity as the primary religion of its people. During Britain’s colonial expansion from the 17th to the 20th century, which established the “Empire on Which the Sun Never Sets,” many people from colonized nations came to Britain to study and work, but relatively few settled permanently, and they often could not enjoy the same rights and status as native British whites.

Only after the development of globalization following World War II and the influence of anti-racist movements did Britain grant more non-white and non-Christian people British citizenship. In the 21st century, the promotion of multiculturalism and humanitarianism, combined with the practical demand for cheap labor, led Britain to accept more immigrants and refugees.

The new immigrants and refugees made Britain more diverse, increased its labor force, and promoted economic development, but they also brought many problems such as public security concerns, cultural conflicts, and disputes over interests. For example, Muslim communities practicing forms of “self-governance” based on Islamic law and customs, South Asian gang crime, and Chinese communities occupying educational resources and white-collar positions in Britain have all triggered dissatisfaction among native British whites, especially lower- and middle-class conservative whites.

In recent years, scandals involving Pakistani-origin criminals in Muslim communities grooming underage British girls into sexual exploitation, with more than 1,400 underage white girls reportedly victimized, and the government and police allegedly failing to intervene aggressively due to fears of ethnic tensions, have provoked especially strong anger among many whites.

In addition, Britain’s economic stagnation in recent years and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on people’s livelihoods have further intensified public dissatisfaction and anxiety, making immigrants and minorities even more likely targets of hostility. At the same time, anti-immigration sentiment has surged across the United States and continental Europe. Billionaire Elon Musk has openly supported Reform UK, criticized the establishment, and attacked Britain’s immigration policies and perceived tolerance of crimes committed by non-whites. This has further boosted the momentum of Britain’s conservative populist forces, whose support rates have steadily risen.

Of course, immigration is not the only issue. Many longstanding social problems and structural illnesses in Britain — such as persistent wealth and class inequality, corruption and inefficiency in bureaucracy, and dissatisfaction caused by pension and healthcare reforms under fiscal pressure — have also caused people to lose faith in the traditional establishment and turn toward populist forces such as Reform UK that promise to break the status quo. Compared with the “politically correct” rhetoric of traditional establishment politicians, the unconventional and provocative statements of populist politicians such as Nigel Farage are indeed more attractive.

In addition, many conservative voters are dissatisfied with the “multiculturalism,” feminism, environmentalism, and related agendas promoted by Labour and the left, while believing that the traditional establishment right represented by the Conservatives has been ineffective in opposing them. As a result, they have chosen to support more right-wing and radical anti-multicultural, anti-feminist, and anti-environmentalist forces such as Reform UK. This resembles the situation in the United States, where some voters, frustrated by the Democratic Party’s progressive policies, support the Republican Party, while the Republican establishment has gradually yielded ground to populist forces.

The British right-wing populist forces represented by Reform UK are, in essence, rooted in extreme nationalism and racial superiority. Their policies also include tax cuts and welfare reductions, opposition to environmental protection, and measures harmful to vulnerable groups. These are detrimental to fairness and harmony in British society and damaging to Britain’s long-term interests.

Although some of the populists’ criticisms of the establishment are valid, the remedies they offer carry severe side effects, and most problems ultimately remain unresolved. Issues such as wealth inequality and bureaucracy often continue to exist after populists take power and may even worsen.

Farage and other British populist leaders are similar to Donald Trump in that they rely on sensational rhetoric and attacks on the establishment to attract support. However, both their moral character and governing abilities are questionable, and if they govern, they are unlikely overall to bring beneficial changes to Britain.

Nevertheless, judging from the results of recent British elections, more and more Britons are choosing to vote for populist forces such as Reform UK. Not only did right-wing populists achieve sweeping victories, but the Green Party, representing the radical left and also possessing some populist characteristics, achieved results several times greater than its previous vote share and seat count in this election.

This means that left-wing voters are becoming more left-wing and right-wing voters more right-wing, with both sides moving toward extremism and populism, while the traditional establishment and centrist forces are shrinking dramatically. British politics is becoming increasingly polarized, and society will become more divided as well.

In this election, Britain’s two traditional major parties — the center-left Labour Party and the center-right Conservative Party — both saw dramatic declines in votes and seats, symbolizing the decline of the traditional establishment. In particular, the Labour Party, which represents center-left social democracy and long enjoyed support from the working class, suffered the largest seat losses, reflecting the decline of center-left social democracy and the shift of the working class.

Most of these workers chose to switch their support to Reform UK, reflecting how many British workers, like their American counterparts, have shifted from left to right, from supporting traditional establishment parties to embracing populism. The Conservative Party also faces the danger that conservative voters will abandon it for Reform UK, replacing the Conservatives as the political representative of the right-wing electorate. In short, both the center-left and center-right establishment camps are facing severe crises.

However, Britain’s future political trajectory is still not settled. Although populist forces represented by Reform UK are advancing aggressively and rapidly expanding their influence in politics, their advantage may not last long, nor are they guaranteed to become a national ruling party. Labour and the Conservatives possess deep roots and strong resilience. Although they have suffered setbacks for now, they still have a strong possibility of regaining support in various constituencies.

As Reform UK rises forcefully, Labour and the Conservatives may also, like the center-left and center-right forces in France confronting the far right, reach compromises and alliances in elections to jointly suppress Reform UK. In that case, Reform UK would face extremely difficult challenges. Likewise, whether the radical left-wing Green Party can continue breaking through in the future or will fade after a brief surge remains uncertain.

Britain’s long tradition of moderate conservatism may also restrain the further rise of far-left and far-right populism. During the several centuries since the birth of modern political systems and ideologies, continental Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America have all experienced many violent revolutions, upheavals, and populist waves, whereas Britain has remained comparatively stable. Before World War II, fascism rose across many countries, with fascist groups becoming active and even seizing power, yet British fascism failed to gain dominance.

Meanwhile, “Fabianism,” advocated by famous thinkers such as George Bernard Shaw and Bertrand Russell and promoted by certain politicians as a reformist social democratic path, enabled Britain to achieve social progress without revolution and with relatively little bloodshed, including the establishment of the globally respected National Health Service (NHS), with remarkable results. A Britain possessing such resilience may still be capable of containing populism.

Regarding the results of this election and the rise of populist forces such as Reform UK, if this had happened many years ago, the author would certainly have adopted a wholly negative critical stance. However, after experiencing more events and engaging in deeper reflection, the author now has more “sympathetic understanding” toward the rise of populist forces and a greater awareness and criticism of the flaws of the establishment and the current order. Simply labeling populist supporters as “ignorant” is an oversimplification, an evasion of the problem, and irresponsible.

Although the author still does not support populist forces and does not believe Reform UK or populist parties around the world can bring beneficial changes to their countries, the author does recognize and respect the public’s use of voting to express dissatisfaction with the establishment, their strong desire for change, and the voices of those who feel ignored. The public possesses its own consciousness and emotions, and populism is also a way of expressing emotions and achieving goals. Even if this may not be wise, from their perspective, supporting the establishment is not necessarily a good choice either.

Compared with ordinary people who, burdened by difficult livelihoods, troubles, and lack of prospects, desperately turn to populism as a “last resort,” Britain’s establishment and social elites bear greater responsibility and possess greater capacity to reflect upon themselves and the structural problems of British society, to better understand the hardships of ordinary people, to confront both longstanding illnesses and new problems of the current era, and to seek solutions beneficial to all sides while favoring the vulnerable. Only in this way can Britain hope to ease social divisions and prevent the country from sliding down a more dangerous path under populist rule.

(The author of this article is Qingmin Wang(王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics.)