An AI coding assistant installed malware into production environments. Nobody typed the command. AMA on what "supply chain attack" means now.
You probably remember the old supply chain attacks. SolarWinds. Log4j. Someone sneaks bad code into a trusted piece of software, and everyone who installed that software is suddenly in trouble. Here's what happened on March 24 of this year, and why it's different.
A popular open-source tool called LiteLLM — it's a connector that a lot of companies use to route requests to ChatGPT, Claude, and other AI models — got compromised. Someone slipped malicious code into it. That part's the old playbook.
The new part: a lot of the exposure didn't come from a person clicking install. It came from agent frameworks pulling the poisoned version in as part of doing normal work a developer had asked for. Anywhere pip install litellm ran without a pinned version during the window — CI jobs, build containers, agent frameworks with LiteLLM as a transitive dependency — was potentially exposed.
And here's the kicker: the attackers didn't break into LiteLLM directly. They first broke into Trivy, which is a security tool companies use to scan for this exact kind of threat. The compromised Trivy action ran inside LiteLLM's CI/CD pipeline and exfiltrated the PyPI publishing token, which the attackers then used to push the bad code. The tool you use to catch supply chain attacks became the way one got in.
Three big attacks in under three weeks — LiteLLM, then Axios (the JavaScript library that runs in a huge chunk of the internet, present in roughly 80% of cloud and code environments), then a roughly six-hour hijack of the CPUID website that pushed trojanized CPU-Z installers to anyone downloading from the official page. Different attackers, same pattern: the bad stuff came in through software you already trusted.
So when we say "supply chain attack" in 2026, we mean three things that used to be separate:
- The code your team installs — packages, libraries, signed apps
- The AI infrastructure your agents depend on — model gateways, connectors, MCP servers, fine-tuned models pulled from public repos
- The AI agents themselves — which are now installing things, making decisions, and running with permissions they probably shouldn't have
We're Itamar Golan (u/Itamar_PromptSec) and David Abutbul (u/David_PromptSec) from Prompt Security, the company inside SentinelOne securing enterprise AI usage. We spend our time on what happens at the agent layer specifically, the part that's newest and weirdest. We also maintain an open-source project called ClawSec, a security skill suite for OpenClaw and related agents (Hermes, PicoClaw, NanoClaw) that does drift detection, skill integrity verification, automated audits, and live advisory monitoring, so an agent's behavior and configuration can't quietly drift out from under you.
Ask us anything about:
- The March 24 LiteLLM attack — what actually happened, what the poisoned code tried to do, and why the fact that a lot of the exposure came through automated pipelines and agent frameworks (not humans clicking install) matters for how you defend against this going forward.
- Agents doing things you didn't explicitly ask them to — your coding assistant grabbing a library, your customer-service agent pulling from a data source, your internal chatbot chaining tools together. Where's the line between "helpful" and "this thing just ran a command with your permissions"?
- Shadow AI, but worse — last year it was employees pasting stuff into ChatGPT. This year it's agents your company officially deployed quietly connecting to tools and services nobody mapped. How do you even get visibility into that?
- Why "just add another approval step" isn't going to work — the whole point of agents is speed. If every action needs a human to click yes, you don't have an agent, you have a very slow chatbot. What actually works instead.
- ClawSec — why we made it free and open source, what it does differently from the usual "AI guardrails" pitch, and what we've learned from people actually using it.
- State-sponsored actors, ransomware crews, and who's really behind this — who profits from attacking trusted software, and why the economics point to a lot more of this coming, not less.
- What a normal company should actually do on Monday — not a 40-page framework. The two or three things that meaningfully reduce your exposure this quarter.
We'll be live Wednesday, May 20, and sticking around all day (Israel time). Bring the hard questions — the dumb ones too. Honestly, the "dumb" ones are usually the ones everyone else is afraid to ask out loud.