Hello everyone, As-Salam Aleykoum,
There is something that crossed my mind recently: you all know that according to the traditional narrative, the third Caliph Uthman burnt every other codices and asked everyone to rely only on his own manuscript.
I don’t want to question the traditional narrative (I stand with the Uthmanic canonisation), however I wondered if the burning of other codices was an undeniable fact.
Because the Sanaa palimpsests were not destroyed and I know that in some Jewish practices, unreliable manuscripts were buried rather than burnt because in spite of the mistakes, there were still remains of divine scripture.
What do you think ?
#Direct Link to the Book:
Depictions of the Prophet Muhammad is more nuanced than the common assumption that “Islam completely forbids images.” Contrary to popular belief, academic research shows that visual depictions of Muhammad were produced in certain Islamic contexts, especially between the 13th and 17th centuries. Christiane Gruber argues that there is a “notable corpus” of such images, meaning depiction was not unheard of but rather limited and context-specific prohibition developed over time rather than being uniformly applied from the beginning.
The issue of images is not directly settled by the Quran, so it becomes how the Quran is interpreted, supplemented, and historically developed. The Quran does not explicitly prohibit images or depictions of Muhammad it condemns idolatry worship of images or statues but does not ban representation as such. Interestingly, the Quran is not fully “anti-image” it mentions that Solomon had statues made (Q 34:13). Hadith literature introduces stronger prohibitions on making images of living beings the clear prohibition comes from Hadith not the Quran
So I noticed some Muslims are not aware of the different modes of recitation, or if they have heard about them, they have not actually heard them since in Salah there is general conformity today, which was not the case historically.
Given that, I thought I’d share the above as an audible example. Helps put things into proper context. Will add other examples below.
@AbuTaymiyyahMJ on youtube has many examples.
Kecia Ali states that 2:223 gives husbands sexual domination over their wives in her Sexual Ethics in Islam, p.g. 129–131.
To the contrary, Professor Saqib Hussain instead argues in note 35 of his article The Bitter Lot of the Rebellious Wife: Hierarchy, Obedience, and Punishment in Q. 4:34, in line with with tradition, that 2:223 instead justifies the no-sex-during-menstruation rulling in 2:222 and states, in metaphor, the positions allowed during sex, allowing only vaginal penetration. Furthermore, he states that her reading of the verse is only possible if it is completely decontextualized:
>Note that Q. 2:223 is sometimes adduced as giving husbands sexual dominion over their wives (Bauer, Gender Hierarchy, p. 167, and Ali, Sexual Ethics, p. 129–131), which certainly would be a stark instance of wives being required to submit and be obedient to their husbands. The passage (vv. 223–24) is as follows:
^(223)They ask you concerning menstruation. Say, ‘It is a hurt, so keep away from women during menses, and do not approach them until they are purified. And when they are purified, go in unto them in the way God has commanded you.’ Truly God loves those who repent, and He loves those who purify themselves.
^(224)Your women are a tilth to you, so go unto your tilth as (annā) you will, but send forth for your souls. And fear God and know that you shall meet Him, and give glad tidings to the believers.
The particle annā in verse 223, here translated ‘as’, is often translated as ‘when’ or ‘whenever’, which could indeed raise questions of sexual consent. Although this matter requires more research, I am sceptical that annā can carry the latter meanings. Certainly, late lexicographic sources give three definitions of annā: kayfa (‘how’), min ayna (‘whence’), and matā (‘when’) (see, for example, al-Zabīdī, Tāj al-ʿarūs, ‘ʾ-n-n’). But in fact the earliest lexicographic sources, both dictionaries and works devoted to particles, give only two definitions of annā: kayfa (‘how’), min ayna (‘whence’ or ‘from where’) (see Khalīl b. Aḥmad, Kitāb al-ʿAyn, ‘al-lafīf min nūn’, vol. 8, p. 399, and al-Zajjājī [d. 337/949], Ḥurūf al-maʿānī, p. 61). It may well be that the later sources incorporated the meaning of matā (‘when’) from the exegetical tradition which, as far back as al-Ṭabarī, suggested that annā could mean matā in verse 223. This would then be an instance of a speculative exegetical gloss eventually influencing the lexicographic tradition. (See also the discussion on nushūz below). Indeed, works that give all three possibilities for annā are able to adduce philological evidence from the Qur’an or Jāhilī poetry only for the senses of kayfa and min ayna – see, for example, the popular modern balāgha textbook by Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm, Jawāhir al-balāgha, p. 82. The philological evidence for the sense of matā, where it is produced, is invariably ambiguous, such that the text in question could just as well just carry the meaning of kayfa; for example, al-Baghdādī, Khizānat al-adab, vol. 7, p. 95, interprets the first hemistich in Labīd’s verse fa-aṣbaḥta annā taʾtihā taltabis bihā, as: ‘So you were such that whenever (annā) you would approach it (i.e. some affair), you would get entangled in it.’ The poet is describing here a difficult situation that his addressee has to navigate. As is clear, the particle annā here could just as easily be translated as ‘however’ or ‘from wherever’.
The parable in verse 223, Your women are a tilth to you, so go unto your tilth as (annā) you will, is providing a justification for the rulings in the previous verse, which prohibits sex during a woman’s menstruation (just as a field should only be planted in the appropriate season), and prohibits non-coital sex (just as the seed should only fall on fertile soil) (see Isḷ āḥī, Tadabbur-i Qurʾān, vol. 1, p. 526). The verse’s concern is thus what is permissible with regards to sexual enjoyment between a husband and wife. Reading issues of consent into it is only possible after a thorough literary de-contextualisation of the verse. Note finally that Rabbinic sources, just like the Qur’an, also use an allegory to illustrate permissible sexual activity with one’s wife. Thus in b. Ned 20a Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Dehavai prohibits that husbands ‘overturn their tables’ during sex, i.e. that they pedicate. His opinion is rejected however in b. Ned 20b, and an allegory is produced to counter him: ‘A man may do whatever he pleases with his wife [at intercourse]: A parable; Meat which comes from the abattoir, may be eaten salted, roasted, cooked or seethed; so with fish from the fishmonger.’ Much of Q. 2, including the section in which verse 223 is situated, is in ‘close dialogue with Late Antique sexual purity regulations’ (Zellentin, ‘Gentile Purity Law’, pp. 165–169). For a comparative study of laws regarding pedication in early Islam and rabbinic Judaism, see Maghen, After Hardship, pp. 161–209, esp. pp. 182–183, where this verse is briefly discussed.
A small sidenote: Saqib Hussain here mistakenly labels verse 2:222 as 2:223 and 2:223 as 2:224. So beware of this.
Link to the article: https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/full/10.3366/jqs.2021.0466
So someone on Academic Quran posted the following, asking why Muslim Academics exists when there are other Muslim groups on Reddit. I thought it would be useful to spark debate on here now that we have grown, so I will share both his question and my answer.
Question:
is there anything like Christian academics like Muslim academics[r/muslimacademics]? I think for practicing faith traditional islam is out there.And if someone prefers academic studies, why he needs to presuppose something,is not traditional islam enough for that? we know there are sects in islam . One can follow any of them or invent one of his own.But why the "tag'' 'academics' is necessary here for them.? Are they trying to reform or mold islam in another form by using academia and trying to increase credibility.?
Answer:
I founded Muslim Academics, so I'll chip in here to explain what our project is. It's worth saying upfront why we call ourselves Muslim Academics and how we differ from the other Muslim pages on Reddit. The short version: we hold that being a Muslim and choosing to evaluate the Quran outside a strictly naturalistic framework doesn't disqualify you from doing intellectually honest work. The argument for that turns on a methodological distinction worth laying out carefully. Many of the tools that we use are identical with HCM - but our methodological commitments, and therefore the way we process and evaluate evidence, differs. IE there is a distinction between the tools of HCM, such as intertextuality, linguistics, etc, (which we use), and its methodological commitments, which we do not adopt. The rejection of methodological naturalism doesn't make you unacademic - that's our primary contention, methodological naturalism does not own logic or its respective tools to asses historical evidence.
Apologetics works backwards from a fixed conclusion. The conclusion is the input; the reasoning is the output. Whatever the evidence shows, the conclusion stands and the work is to find a path from the evidence back to it.
HCM works forward from a fixed methodological floor: methodological naturalism. Whatever the evidence shows, the conclusion has to land within naturalist range and the work is to find which naturalist account, and only a naturalist account, fits best.
Both have a commitment that survives the evidence. They differ in what that commitment is, but structurally they are the same shape: a fixed point the reasoning serves.
Muslim Academics is a third thing (or at least we try to be); and has no such fixed point. The designation "Muslim" is a statement of where we currently judge the evidence to lie, not a framework we analyse evidence through. We believe the Quran is from God because of our assessment of the evidence otherwise we wouldn't be Muslims and we're honest about declaring that. But the conclusion doesn't shape how we assess.
Everyone has priors; the difference is whether they're load-bearing only insofar as the arguments for them hold. If the arguments fail, the priors go. That's a real and falsifiable commitment, not a verbal one, and the test of it is what the project does when its reasoning runs into trouble whether it follows the argument, or protects the conclusion.
The deeper difference is what each project is committed to in advance. Apologetics is committed to a conclusion defending the traditionalist framework of Islam as defined by sect. HCM is committed to a range of naturalistic explanations for the origin of the Quran. Muslim Academics, if it means anything distinct, is committed only to the reasoning itself willing to follow it into Islam, willing to follow it out, and willing to follow it into positions neither apologists nor HCM scholars would arrive at, because both are constrained in advance.
We don't lock God out as a possible explanatory factor, but we also don't hold the Quran to be from God merely as a function of identity.
Title :) Edit: intercession/intercessory prayer/istighatha
If there are any quotes about the positions of the four schools of thought, I would be grateful!
In a recent article available on the Oases of Wisdom Substack (https://open.substack.com/pub/oasesofwisdom/p/they-ask-you-about-dhu-al-qarnayn?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=77nwo7), Delman Rasheed (u/dmontetheno1) discusses the historical development of interpretation surrounding the story of Dhul Qarnayn, beginning with its place in the works of classic Muslim exegetes, all the way to the way in which the story is discussed today online.
The article itself is great and informative, but there are a couple of things I want to comment on here.
This post will be no means exhaustively review this very deep and insightful contribution. Instead, this post will focus on a particular aspect of it and attempt to address a specific question: To what extent should we see the DQ pericope of Q 18 as being dependent on the Alexander Legend?
In the view of the present OP, one of the most important characteristics of Q 18 is its possession of an ”internal motif that speaks directly to how narrative speculation should be handled.” Rasheed does good to highlight this fact. (See Q 18:22)
Q 18 is often looked to as evidence that the Qur'ān has inherited folklore from its milieu: this is of course due to the surah’s close connection to the Alexander Legend, the Sleepers of Ephesus. Yet it is often overlooked that the author of this surah himself admits to the existence of antecedents to this surah’s pericopes: this is quite evident, for example, in the fact that such stories therein at times begin with the phrase "And they ask you about...", itself suggesting that the respective pericopes with which such rhetorical phrases are associated are not inclusive of stories which are wholly new to those to whom they are being addressed.
As Rasheed carefully explains, ”The verse draws a line between two ways of dealing with narrative material. One way tries to fill in gaps through speculation about what cannot be accessed.” It is without a doubt this model that we often see at play in a number of our classical books of tafsir when it comes to the ways in which a given exegete may explain a certain Qur'ānic story of an aspect thereof. As this article explains, biblical traditions were often "integrated into Qur’anic exegesis to expand narrative detail and situate stories within broader historical imaginaries.”
As for the second way: “The other stays within the limits of what can actually be said with confidence and avoids turning those gaps into certainty.” Such is the approach advocated by Q 18. To be sure, many Qur'ānic exegetes historically found comfort in this view as well: Rasheed points to the example of Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 944 CE) as a case in point. This notion of suspending knowledge is reminiscent of Islamic theology‘s concept of belief "bi-lā kayf," though the former also has Late Antique precursors.
As the article very clearly admits, “diverse ideas did exist within early understandings of Dhū Al-Qarnayn,” one understanding, Rasheed notes, identifying DQ with Alexander. As he explains: “While the Alexander identification appears often within the tradition, it exists alongside a range of alternative portrayals that remain active in early exegetical work.”
Rasheed eventually extends this conversation to the present day, and go on to argue that historians today view the story of DQ is divergent ways. For example, Rasheed makes mention of (among others) Zishan Ghaffar, whose work links “Dhū Al-Qarnayn to propaganda surrounding figures like Heraclius.” Disappointingly, however, he seems to (erroneously) present this position as one wholly incompatible with, or at least distinct from, for instance, the position of scholars who push “for the idea of direct engagement between the Qur’an and Syriac Christian textual traditions...” These two ‘paradigms’ are not mutually exclusively, at least not necessarily anyway.
Thus, a few criticisms should be given when it comes to the question of dependence/engagement. Rasheed points out that ”parallels are often incorrectly extended into claims of dependence,” and even goes so far as to argue that "The presence of Alexanderian motifs in the story of Dhū Al-Qarnayn therefore remains insufficient as decisive evidence for identification. The resemblance, at minimum, reflects shared narrative conditions that shape how stories take form individually across traditions.” In this same vein Rasheed contends that "If one were to remove the name of Moses and replace it with a generic title, certain elements of his story could easily be read within the broader Alexanderian narrative world," thus emphasizing his broader point that parallels alone are not evidence of direct narrative dependence. While such points are not necessarily lacking in merit, they do lead to a separate inquiry.
Rasheed is evidently of the view that not enough evidence exists to establish that Q 18’s DQ pericope is dependent on the Alexander Legend: it seems that Rasheed would rather view these two narratives of products of a common environment, opposed to one having descended from the other. Against such a backdrop of argumentation, a question arises: In terms of asserting narrative dependence, should the Alexander Legend be given priority over, say, other hypothetical texts which might share varying degrees of parallels with any number of Qur'ānic passages? In our humble opinion, it seems that we should be answering this question in the affirmative.
Within the story of DQ, there seems to exist a key piece of evidence suggesting that the relationship of the respective stories of DQ and Alexander may be closer than Rasheed has hitherto believed.
In his 2023 monograph, Tommaso Tesei argues that the Alexander Legend of the 7th century is actually an edited version of an earlier version of the Legend which was composed in the 6th century, the former being written as a praise of Heraclius, with the latter being written as a way of mocking Justinian. Thus, in a sense, we actually have two different "versions" of Alexander which we have to grapple with.
In his book, Tesei highlights an evident layer of redaction, arguing that in the 6th century version of the Alexander Legend, Alexander orders a scribe to write a single prophecy upon his gate, while in the 7th century version the scribe is ordered to write two prophecies: basically, an extra prophecy was added during the 7th century. The two prophecies of the 7th century Legend are predicted to transpire at two different points in time, and they're each related to enemies bypassing Alexander’s gate.
Accordingly, the present OP (see Allah in Context) has argued that the Qur'ān is not merely engaging directly with the Alexander Legend, but with its edited (7th century) version in particular.
Thus, as Q 18 is evidently familiar with the extra prophecy which, according to Tesei, was not added to the Alexander Legend until the 620s. The Qur'an's familiarity with this addition seems to be captured at Q 18:97.
As stated, according to the Alexander Legend, each of its two prophecies concern a future invasion to be carried out by Gog and Magog, each predicted to occur at different points in time. The Qur’ān seems to ‘debunk’ these prophecies by depicting Gog and Magog as unsuccessfully attempting to carry out an invasion at two different points in time, in neither case being able to bypass the barrier behind which they are contained (Q 18:97).
With respect to each of these attempts, Q 18 states that they were [1] unable (isṭā‘ū / اسطاعو ) to pass over it and [2] unable (istaṭā‘ū / استطاعو ) to penetrate it (v. 97).
Note: In the first of these negations, the letter ‘ tā’ / ت ‘ has been omitted. This indicates that these two unsuccessful attempts took place at different points in time, the omission serving as a mechanicism of distinction. Speaking on this exact omission within the context of a subject completely unrelated to the Alexander Legend, Muhammad Madbūlī ‘Abd al-Rāziq of al-Azhar has also pointed out that this omission carries the implication that these two negations are indicative of two distinct attempts to do harm to Dhul Qarnayn’s structure, which occur at two different points in time (cf. ‘Abd al-Rāziq, Muḥammad Madbūlī. "Balāghah ḥadhf al-ḥarf fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm: Dirāsah fī Ishkāliyāt al-Tarjamah li-Namādhij Mukhtārah ilā al-Lughah al-‘Ibriyyah fī Tarjamatī Rīflīn wa Rūbīn,” Majallah Kulliyah al-Lughāt wa al-Tarjamah 4.31 (2013): 138-141.
Based on this, it seems that the Qur'ān must be expressing familiarity with the edited version (7th century) of the Alexander Legend, not the earlier, 6th century version. If the Qur'ān simply parallels this story as a consequence of having emerged from a world in which similar stories circulated, why is it that Q 18 just so happens to adjust this story in a way identical to how it was, coincidentally, adjusted a few years earlier? It seems much easier to simply posit that Q 18’s DQ pericope is engaging directly with the edited, 7th century form of the Alexander Legend.
This tradition comes to us from Late Midrash (roughly 8th–9th century CE)
Is Late Midrash directly dependent/influenced by Quran?
Maybe it belongs to a shared religious storytelling environment, where similar ideas about Adam, angels, and knowledge circulated across Jewish, Christian, and emerging Islamic traditions.
Source: “The Cambridge Companion To The Qur’an” edited by Jane Dammen McAuliffe
In my latest article, published in JIQSA, I examine two key Qur’anic verses related to warfare, what I term the “fitnah-fighting verses”:
“Fight them until there is no fitnah and al-din is wholly for God” (Q 2:193; 8:39).
According to an aggressive interpretation of these verses—accepted by many classical Islamic and modern Western scholars—fitnah is glossed to mean shirk (“idolatry”) and kufr (“infidelity”), whereas the subsequent din clause is interpreted to entail the eradication of paganism/polytheism.
In this article, I uphold a defensive reading according to which fitnah refers to religious persecution and the din clause refers to the believers’ own worship, including at the Holy Sanctuary.
Direct Link:
https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/jiqsa-2024-0028/html
Alternative link:
Fārūq ʿUmar writes (336):
>لماذا لم تستجب حركة القرامطة وحركة الصفارين لصاحب الزنج «صاحب البرامج الاجتماعية الاقتصادية - للاتحاد ضد العباسيين ؟؟ إن يعقوب الصفار اعتبر الحركة (مارقة) وأن القرامطة ثم يفكروا جدياً في تحقيق أي تعاون مع علي بن محمد.
But this is historically questionable, because the Qarmaṭians did reach out to ʿAlī b. Muḥammad for cooperation, and it was ʿAlī who declined:
>“A major factor contributing to the rapid success of Ḥamdān was the revolt of the Zanj, the rebellious black slaves who for fifteen years (255–270/869–883) rampaged through southernʿIrāq and distracted the attention of the ʿAbbasid officials at Baghdad. The Qarmaṭıs of Iraq had become quite numerous by 267/880, when Ḥamdān found it opportune to make an offer of alliance to the leader of the Zanj, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Zanjī. The latter, however, being at the height of his own power, declined the offer.” (Daftary, Farhad. The Ismāʿīlīs: Their History and Doctrines. 2nd ed., Cambridge UP, 2007, p. 108).
Of course, even Daftary’s reading of ʿAlī’s alleged refusal remains dependent on interpretation (see Popovic, Alexandre. The Revolt of African Slaves in Iraq in the 3rd/9th Century. Princeton, 1999, pp. 81–82, 139, 153) but that only reinforces the point: the historical record is far more nuanced than Fārūq ʿUmar presents it.
What makes this even more interesting is that Daftary himself elsewhere gives a slightly different framing:
>“It was under such circumstances that Ḥamdān embarked on anti-Abbasid activities in Iraq. His rapid success is attested by the fact that references to the Qarmaṭīs began to appear soon after 261/874; and by 267/880, when Ḥamdān attempted in vain to join forces with the Zanj, the Qarmaṭīs had indeed become quite numerous in Iraq. Aside from the narratives traceable to Ibn Rizām and Akhū Muḥsin,²⁰ valuable details on the early history of the Ismaili (Qarmaṭī) movement in Iraq have been preserved by al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) who had access to Qarmaṭī informants.²¹ At this time, Ḥamdān acknowledged the authority of the central leader of the Ismaili movement in Salamiyya, with whom he corresponded but whose identity remained a guarded secret; Ḥamdān had established his own secret headquarters in Kalwādhā near Baghdad.” (Daftary, Farhad. A Short History of the Ismāīlīs: Traditions of a Muslim Community. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1998, p. 41).
Notice the wording: “Ḥamdān attempted in vain to join forces with the Zanj.” That is plainly incompatible with the claim that “the Qarmaṭians never seriously considered cooperation with ʿAlī b. Muḥammad.” On the contrary, the evidence indicates that they did.
And it was not merely Ḥamdān b. al-Ashʿath. Even al-Ḥusayn al-Ahwāzī appears to have explored such contacts. Muṣṭafá Ghālib mentions in al-Qarāmiṭah bayna al-Madd wa-al-Jazr (p. 160):
>الحسين الأهوازي يا مولاي يبشرنا بأن الدعوة في السواد تتقدم باستمرار وإقبال الناس على الإستجابة كثير جداً ، بعد أن استطاع بما أوتيه من جلد وصبر أن يجلب إلى صفه أحد علماء السواد ، وهو عبدان ، بالإضافة إلى حمدان بن الأشعث وعائلته وأهل قريته بأجمعهم ، وكذلك أجرى الأهوازي اتصالات مفيدة مع مهرويه وولده زكرويه ، وهما من دعاتنا الأفاضل ، ثم أنه قام برحلة إلى كلوازي حيث قابل دندان وعرض عليه أوضاع الجماعات في السواد وأنهم بحاجة إلى المساعدة المادية ، فتبرع له بمبلغ كبير من المال ، فوزعه بالتساوي على الجماعات ، مما زاد الإقبال على الاستجابة فكثر عدد الأتباع . وبنفس الوقت يذكر الأهوازي بأنه أوفد بعثة إلى البحرين لإجراء الإتصالات مع آل الجنابي في البحرين والقطيف ، كما وان الأهوازي ينوي إجراء اتصالات مع صاحب الزنج الاستمالته ووعد الأهوازي بأنه سوف يعلمنا بكل الإتصالات التي سيجريها .
