
r/IRstudies

Why Trump Cannot Walk Away From Canada
foreignpolicy.comPM Carney declares U.S. ties now a ‘weakness’ in address to Canadians
With the United States acting more like an economic foe than an ally under the presidency of Donald Trump, Prime Minister Mark Carney said Canada’s former strength, built on our bond with America, has become a “weakness” that must be corrected.
In a pre-recorded address released Sunday morning, Carney said his intention was to talk “directly and regularly” about his plan for Canada and promised he would “never sugarcoat our challenges.”
The main point of this message, according to a source, was that during a time of disruption he wanted a venue where he could talk directly to Canadians, and in an extended format.
The world, he said, has become more “dangerous and divided,” and Canada must re-evaluate its most critical international relationships and undergo a shift in national strategy.
“The U.S. has fundamentally changed its approach to trade, raising its tariffs to levels last seen during the Great Depression,” said Carney in the nearly 10-minute-long address that was recorded in a home in Ottawa. “Many of our former strengths, based on our close ties to America, have become our weaknesses; weaknesses that we must correct.”
Workers in the auto, steel and lumber industries are “under threat” because of U.S. tariffs, he said, and businesses are holding back investments because of the “pall of uncertainty that’s hanging over all of us.”
“The U.S. has changed and we must respond,” said Carney, before launching into his Liberal government’s record and achievements, and invoking the “Canada Strong” plan he announced during the 2025 election campaign; a plan that was meant to Trump-proof the nation.
The new reality
Without naming the opposition Conservatives, Carney seemed to allude to them when he said there are “some who say there’s no need for a comprehensive plan” –- that Canadians should “wait it out” in the hope that U.S. relations will go back to how they were in the “good old days.”
He pointed out that young Canadians have experienced no such good days -- their entire lives having been impacted by the shocks and crises of global wars, financial strife and COVID-19.
He admitted his plans that include building new trade and energy corridors, doubling the size of clean energy capacity and creating “one Canadian economy out of 13” are ambitious. “But in a crisis, fortune favours the bold,” he said.
The prime minister then showed a small statue of Maj.-Gen. Sir Isaac Brock, the British army officer known as the “Hero of Upper Canada” for his role during the War of 1812. He said the statue, a gift from comedian Mike Myers, reminds him “that when we’re united as Canadians, we can withstand anything.”
“Before Canada even existed, it had a shape in Brock’s imagination,” said Carney. “Faced with the threat of an American invasion, Brock built alliances across our land and inspired what would eventually become Canada.”
Carney continued referencing history, saying it was an “ambitious” and “determined” Canada that built big things like the St. Lawrence Seaway, the CN Tower and the Trans-Canada Highway after the Second World War. He said his government is making big structural changes now, too, to “make us stronger at home and less reliant on the United States.”
He closed his message with a sentiment meant to instill confidence, invoking a practice called “forward guidance” that he developed during the financial crisis when he was governor of the Bank of Canada – a practice that involved using “overwhelming force against our problems until they were solved.”
“There’s much forward guidance to be found in our shared history. We will get through this because of who we have always been,” he said. “It’s our country. It’s our future. We are taking back control, to build Canada strong.”
Interviewing the Philippines 🇵🇭 Ambassador to India 🇮🇳
Hey everyone, I’ll be interviewing the Ambassador of the Philippines to India soon. I’ll be focusing on defence cooperation, Indo-Pacific strategy, China’s role in the region, and India-Philippines ties.
Will also talk on defence exports including BrahMos missiles.
If you’ve got any strong or relevant questions, drop them below. I’ll try to take the best ones into the interview.
Please keep the language civil. 🇮🇳🇵🇭
GSQ study: A recent book by historian Pekka Hämäläinen characterized the Comanche and the Lakota as empires. However, by any reasonable definition of empire, neither the Comanche nor the Lakota can be said to have constituted empires.
academic.oup.comQuestion: What is the correct attire for an MA student (male) in International Affairs for Linkedin?
Hey everyone,
I’m pivoting from another field and will be starting a Master’s program in international affairs soon. I’m currently updating my LinkedIn and had a quick question about profile photos.
For men in international affairs, what’s the general norm? I often see suits, but I’m unsure whether a tie is expected or not. Is a full suit and tie standard, or is a suit without a tie, or even business casual, acceptable? I personally would like a suit with no tie, but I am not sure what the standard/norm is here.
Just trying to get a sense of what’s typical in the field, especially for students or early-career folks. Thanks in advance!
want to move to China for a bit
Hi I have a degree in IR and am soon going to finish my second degree in medical science.
I would really like to just live in China for a bit but don't know if there are any jobs for Canadians there.
I don't speak mandarin but have started to learn. I want to move there because I took a China relations course and thought it would be cool to learn more about China.
edit: I am from Canada btw, is this possible?
Anyone else feel like Reddit can just be very blatantly Sinophobic?
Hi all, I'm a long-time lurker on Reddit (mainly here for news and finance), but whenever I see news about China, it often extends beyond criticism of the government to the people as well. I know Redditors often say they don't conflate the two, but I feel like it's the opposite. I have no problem with people going after the government, but treating all Chinese people as a monolith is kinda sucky.
Honestly, I just feel sad as a Chinese American seeing all this stuff. This was on an older news sub, but I still see stuff like this pretty often.
Has anyone experienced this on Reddit, or am I just having unfortunate experiences?
Only One Side Has Clearly Broken the Law In the Strait of Hormuz
thenation.comThe Semiconductor Supply Chain Isn't Breaking. It's Just Stopping Being Generous.
The geography vs technology debate misses something more fundamental, the inputs that neither geography nor technology can easily replace.
Right now semiconductor manufacturing is running on helium. Not metaphorically. Literally. Cooling, photolithography, vacuum processes, none of it works without continuous helium supply. Qatar was providing roughly a third of global semiconductor-grade helium before the Hormuz situation tightened.
Micron already told investors in Q1 2026 that DRAM and NAND supply-demand conditions will stay tight beyond this year. The household level effect is already visible — delivery dates shifting, cheaper variants disappearing, promotions quietly pulled before prices formally rise.
The middle-link countries question is real. But the undervalued geography isn't necessarily where the trade routes run. It's where the invisible industrial inputs come from. Helium. Rare earths. Specific port infrastructure for LNG carriers.
Most IR analysis tracks visible chokepoints. The dangerous ones are the inputs nobody tracks until the system stops being generous.
Is the Yen Carry Trade the biggest threat to the US economy right now? What are your thoughts on Japanese bonds?
reddit.comIs Xi Jinping Preparing to Take Taiwan Before 2027? - Dr. Gregory Moore - The Carry On Podcast
Dr. Gregory Moore, eminent authority on Chinese politics and foreign policy, examines one of the most serious geopolitical questions of our time: Is Xi Jinping preparing to move on Taiwan before 2027?
Dr. Moore lays out Xi’s strategic “dashboard,” 13 key indicators that could shape Beijing’s decision timeline, and explains why most of those windows are closing, not opening. We discuss Taiwan’s shifting national identity and what that means for Beijing, China’s hypersonic advantage, the semiconductor choke point and global economic leverage, and whether deterrence is strong enough right now.
If Xi believes time is no longer on his side, the next two years become critical, and global stability may hinge on what happens between now and then.
Outlining why I think war with Iran is unwise
For me, the debate lies in the practicality and affordability of it. Ultimately, the United States does not have an unlimited amount of troops, capital, and munitions to chase down every horrid government around the world. The question is why the Iranian government deserves intervention over Haftar’s Libya or Ghazouani’s Mauritania, which are guilty of chattel slavery, or the RSF annihilating the Darfurian population of Sudan, or the dictatorship in Myanmar, which has slaughtered 80,000 people and displaced millions. We don’t even impose blanket sanctions on those respective countries like we do with Iran. Some of them we inadvertently supply with weapons. If alleviating humanitarian suffering is the primary goal here, then those countries warrant intervention before Iran. But even overlooking the inconsistencies there,
Moreover, there are several geopolitical variables and anomalies that make Iran more difficult than Iraq or Afghanistan. First, Iraq was more or less irrelevant after the First Gulf War. Shias were able to capture control of northern and southern Iraq. The Northern Alliance was able to capture footholds in northern Afghanistan as well. On the other hand, Iran has virtually zero armed opposition with regional control within the country. It has officially been a theocracy longer than Afghanistan as well. Neither of the following countries had major trade deals with Russia, India, China, or neighboring states much either, nor did they have something like the Strait of Hormuz as global leverage. In addition to that, neither of the following countries had a broad array of proxy networks to prop them up. Saddam was viewed as an apostate by many for supporting Maronites in the Lebanese Civil Wars and for backing India’s claim to Kashmir. The IRGC is partnered with several Kurdish, Hazara, and Kashmiri paramilitaries to mitigate an invasion on the ground. They have already been deployed across the country right now.
So already, we are dealing with extraneous variables that we had not dealt with in Iraq or Afghanistan. The other component which cannot be stressed enough is geography. Iran is 4 times the size of Germany. Most of its terrain is plateaued and clustered with mountains. It primes the conditions for the invading army to experience countless casualties. Then, it also becomes a game of being able to decipher who is an IRGC informant, combatant, supporter, or opponent. In Vietnam, we assembled a system in which anti–Viet Cong soldiers wore white headbands to distinguish themselves, and we had “free-fire” zones in which any Vietnamese person was fair game to consider as a combatant if found there. It also becomes a game of being able to kill faster than the IRGC can recruit.
In addition to quelling the IRGC as a political institution, we have to evaluate the aspirations of Iran’s neighbors and how they may interfere. Turkey, for instance, has already heralded that they would expand their “buffer” zone to counter the refugee efflux and Kurdish separatism. Iraqi and Syrian Kurds could also arm Iranian Kurdish insurgencies across the border too if the IRGC military cannot guard their borders. We saw this phenomenon unfold before. Albania armed Albanian nationalist movements in Serbia and Northern Macedonia when those countries were at war to exert further geopolitical dominance. The same is likely to occur here, in which Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Turkmenistan arm their respective ethnic groups in Iran to expand their geopolitical influence and extract Iran’s natural resources. So yes, even if we hypothetically succeed in totally stomping the IRGC out, if Iran’s borders are left open, the country would cease to practically exist and turn into a proxy war cesspool.
In order to sufficiently occupy a country and seal its borders from extraneous influence, you need 20 troops for every 1,000 civilians.
Currently, the US has 1.2–1.3 million active duty reserves. This would necessitate a withdrawal of American troops in Taiwan and South Korea, which more or less are stuck in frozen conflicts. There is a risk, although a minor one, that China and North Korea may roll the dice and invade with Taiwan and South Korea’s defenses thinned. Consequently, Iran is a country with around 90 million people. This means that we would need 1.8 million troops at minimum.
In addition, I believe the claim that they are seconds away from creating a nuclear bomb to be very hyperbolic. We demolished their sites last summer, and US intelligence has clarified that Iran has not recalibrated after that.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/iran-was-nowhere-close-to-a-nuclear-bomb-experts-say/
Furthermore, the arguments that a couple more air strikes will yield a political transformation have historically been debunked. Airstrikes only serve as a device to accelerate one side in a civil war over the other (Libya and Bosnia). We simultaneously witnessed this phenomenon in bombing Dresden, Tokyo, and Raqqa. The Third Reich, Imperial Japan, and Al Qaeda could not be eradicated with a bombing campaign alone or inspired to topple internally. We were required to station boots on the ground to seal the deal.
In short, this war is pointless. If Iran was seconds away from a nuclear bomb, you would see a lot more international support for this. Not even Russia or China want a nuclear-armed Iran. If they really did, they would have sold Iran a nuclear warhead a long time ago. I support arming Iranians to topple their government on their terms. An invasion is just impractical on a material and geopolitical level.
How do you think the shift in global logistics will impact small developing nations in the next decade?
We often talk about the big players like the US, China, and the EU, but I’ve been thinking a lot about the "middle-link" countries. With new trade routes opening up and the digital transformation of supply chains (especially in major transit hubs), are we looking at a future where geography matters less than technology?
I’d love to hear some insights on which regions you think are currently "undervalued" in terms of their future geopolitical importance. Is it Central Asia, parts of Eastern Europe, or maybe the North African coast?
Let’s discuss!
IR at edinburgh or at leiden uni?
just wondering which yall think is a better school for an MSc in IR between the uni of edinburgh and leiden uni
En la carrera de Relaciones Internacionales hay alguna salida laboral relacionada a la gestión ambiental o lo ambiental en general?
Estoy cursando la carrera, sin embargo, quiero especializarme y tener un master en algo relacionado a lo ambiental, crisis climática, animales, etc. También estoy cursando complementarios de sostenibilidad, geografía, etc. Podrían comentarse si es que hay alguna salida en ese aspecto, puesto que, todavía no sé si hay. Gracias
Would Iran have been just as peaceful and its citizens just as content with the government as Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC countries if the US had been just as supportive?
- Both enshrine Islamic law (Sharia) as the primary foundation of their legal and judicial systems.
- Both lack multi‑party parliamentary democracy and restrict political pluralism.
- Both centralize high‑level authority in a small leadership elite (guardian‑jurists and Supreme Leader in Iran; royal family in Saudi Arabia).
- Both tightly control key institutions such as the judiciary, security forces, and religious establishments.
- Both instrumentalize religious identity and clerical bodies to legitimize state rule.
- Both heavily restrict civil‑political freedoms (speech, assembly, press).
- Both are rentier states heavily dependent on oil and gas revenues to fund government and social subsidies.
- Both use state‑controlled media and education systems to promote regime‑approved narratives of national and religious identity.
- Both maintain strong security and intelligence apparatuses to monitor and suppress perceived domestic dissent.
- Both practice a high degree of centralized decision‑making, with major policy choices concentrated in a narrow circle of leaders.
- Both tolerate or sponsor loyal religious authorities while marginalizing or repressing independent clerics and religious critics.
- Both place significant limits on opposition parties, independent civil‑society organizations, and non‑governmental political activity.
- Both frame regional foreign policy in part through a self‑perceived Islamic leadership role (e.g., Saudi custodianship of holy sites, Iranian "Islamic resistance" axis).
- Both combine formal institutions (councils, parliament, courts) with parallel informal structures that hold de‑facto power behind the scenes.
So basically, in terms of political system and governance and even societal structure, they are similar.
YET! One is a very peaceful society with a population that is seemingly content with their government, while the other is in the midst of a brutal revolution.
The only variable and distinguishing factor that I can perceive is the US's relationship with them; favorable with one and not with the other.
Therefore, would it be accurate it presume that had the US's relationship with Iran been as good as it is with the GCC countries, Iran's society would be just as prosperous and harmonious with the same current regime (given the regime isn't more extractive and predatory)?