Reading through The Bear Went Over the Mountain, the Editor's commentary frequently reams the Soviets for poor reconnaissance, not conducting aggressive mobile patrols on the defense, and questionable security element placement or use (or lack of use) among some other things.
One section, the Editors commentary on pg 149-150 of convoy escort and battle near Maliykhel' which spurred this post, says that
"In these vignettes, however, the Soviets are not taking steps that are standard in western armies. There seems to be no road- opening force on these routes. Evidently, there are no "bait-and- hunt" decoy convoys. Rapid reaction forces supporting the convoy escorts are not apparent. There is no evidence of any planning to use airmobile forces on likely guerrilla escape routes. Artillery fire support planning also seems absent. These examples fail to show map and terrain work to identify chokepoints, kill zones and ambush sites in advance. Reconnaissance forces seem road-bound. The effort appears passive and reactive."
Which begs me the question, how did the West perform in its own occupation of Afghanistan? Were they more combat effective man for man? Did they perform up to the expectations and perform all the procedures that the Editor places on the Soviets? Would that not also be extremely taxing on resources? Which the foreword mentions the Soviets were severely and chronically understrength for their duties in Afghanistan.