If you could snap your fingers to get a metro rail option at Cleveland Circle and Kenmore, with more capacity and faster transit times into the city and east to the airport, but have to give up thru service on the tram, would you . . . snap, that is?
Okay, boys (and girls), AI says there is a flyover (or under) west of Kenmore Station, But, I can find no documentation of such. It indicates that the B-branch has unfettered access in and out of Kenmore Station due to this infrastructure feature.
Who can confirm or dispelll this assertion? And, if so, who knows of a diagram illustrating it?
If New Yorker's want a good rail link to LGA, you can lobby for it. It would cost to the city/state less than half what is projected, per passenger, for the IBX and 40% of the SAS2.
LGX $25K/ passenger, IBX $48k/passenger, SAS2 $62k/passenger
This google cloud doc details it out . . . LGX.
That rate of $25k is a local funding and local passenger ratio. It uses only the expected non-air-traveler ridership, local non-airport and airport employee use, against the city/sate's portion of the cost, roughly estimating it at 25%, but could be less.
75% of the system is funded via airport funds and premium fees paid ONLY upon entering the two main airport stations. This is a major attraction of this system, other uses, and airport access, are included in the existing MTA fare.
FYI, for those following the earlier LGA transit saga, this design proposal does meet PANYNJ's requirement for funding, which is that there be a certain amount of employee parking within a certain distance of a train station. All other alternatives to the Cuomo airtrain failed to meet that stipulation.
Interestingly, that while this line will equal the length of the JFK air train line, at just under 8 miles, the LGX will intersect many metro and commuter lines, from Manhattan to Woodside.
It innovatively (at least for modern times) makes use of single tracking between stations, with trains operating in a coordinated fashion rather than independently. Distances between major stations are similar making for timely movements. The efficient single tracking makes both new guideway less expensive and easier to place, while also affording the use of rail resources not now in use. These greatly reduce the capital cost of this project.
All emergency, malfunction, operatonal, and maintenance issues are considered and handled with no less efficiency than with a 2-track system. Think about it. You're taking it to a place where you get on a large machine and speed down a single track runway, without a thought as to the practicality of that process.
This has already been vetted by a NY university engineering depart head. The problem lies in its cost effectiveness being at odds with government practices.
Chatting about the Twin City's rail had me recall Boston's on going saga of very poor MassDOT choices.
This starts out slow, giving some background on what created the present situation, that is relevant to this post.
Here you have a city, whose transit system folks began, many decades back, producing these color coded maps to keep up with the 'Jones' in other cities around the world. Having only two and one-half metro lines, the Red, Orange, and Blue, they thought it would look better to include the tram system (after all some of it was grade separated, at least), calling it the Green Line.
Many generations of Bostonians grow up being brainwashed into accepting the situation. Like frogs in a pot of ever hotter water, they get comfortable, accepting, and even docile.
Yet, today, you'll find no shortage of complaints from Bostonians who have to endure the over taxed, and under peak hour performing, trams the MBTA calls the Green Line.
What virtually none of the Green Line dependent riders know, is that their situation wasn't suppose to be. It stems from the age when public transit infrastructure was just transitioning from commission oriented planning, to bureaucracies.
The misstep didn't occur because of that transition period, but it has persisted to this day largely because of that shift. Bostonians, don't appreciate the fact that virtually all of the city's best rail assets were created by the, over century old, Boston Transit Commission, an astute civic minded group, assembled prior to the start of the modern day DOT's.
The Boylston Tunnel, their last charge, was under construction in the second decade of the 20th century, NOT to carry street-cars/trams (as it does today), but to perform as a metro rail tunnel for the (even then) growing need to move large numbers of people swiftly, at peak commute times.
Its terminus was to be at Park Street, where there was a need to aleve the platform overcrowding caused by so many differently destined tram cars.
The BTC was just wrapping up construction of a similar tunnel project, which is today a portion of the Red Line (metro service), so they used the same specifications for the Boylston Tunnel. Long stations, not like the short platforms used by trams.
But, 'special' interest intervened as the tunnel neared completion. The state legislature was split by this influence, which was lobbying to change the new line's terminus to Post Office Square (for real estate reasons). Not agreeing on a decision, they saw the opportunity to punt.
They'd spent so much money on the tunnel construction (back when states and cities funded their own transit, no Uncle Sam pockets to pilfer), they knew they'd get hell if it was not well used, but since the tunnel was approaching the Tremont Street tunnel, they directed the BTC to fix the tracks to send the street cars into the new tunnel.
This was specified as a 'temporary' situation, until a decision could be made on the intended metro line's terminus. FYI, that was the word used in the legislation, "TEMPORARY."
Well, guess what? That decision never came; the temporary situation is still in operation. So what was suppose to be metro rail service toward the western side of the city never came about. In this 1926 planning map, years later, newly ensconced bureaucrats still saw the 'vision' of their predecessor BTC, indicating the east-west metro connection desired.
Now, how does this factor into the above post Title. Along with the long tram/GreenLine riders clamoring for better service, there has been also a situation of where two metro lines do not intersect. With so few metro lines, you'd think the ones they have would all intersect.
But the Red, going to Cambridge/Harvard/MIT etc, doesn't connect to the Blue Line heading east to Logan Airport. But, like with the horrible GLX, group think has made the choice, shouting, "oh just push the Blue down Cambridge Street to the MGH Red Line station."
A child playing with blocks might think that is the logical choice, and thus MassDOT obliges with a plan to TBR a couple of hundred yards beneath Cambridge Street, not even doing a cheaper cut-n-cover, like most cities would do. Admittedly, utility and bordering foundation issues could have made it more cost effective (overall), once they examined the pathway.
BUT . . . if one is going to TBR anyway, why the heck would you 'choose' to intentionally and permanently dead-end the Blue Line going toward the Red Line river station of MGH, when a Red-Blue connection could be had for no more cost at the Red Line Park St station, making for not only a better connection point, but also setting up the Blue Line to enter the Boylston Street tunnel, which a century back was constructed for metro service?
For those not familiar with Boston, Boylston runs westward along the border of the Boston Common & Garden you see in the photo.
Here is a graphic illustrating the superior 'connection' comparison between the two options.
An often 'naysayer' comment is that "Park Street station is already over crowded," thus in their opinion, it makes no sense to connect at Park St. Alas, their thinking goes, the Red-Green and Red-Blue connections should be separated.
Stretching minds is hard. The Blue Line station would not be stacked on top of the Park Street tram station. The Blue runs below, thus the traffic between them is directed below, away from the upper tram traffic.
But, no amount of cost/benefit revelations will affect entrenched group think. Such as the fact that the complexities at MGH puts a Blue Line platform three levels away from a Red Line platform, having to go up to the fare control level, the street level, then one more to the elevated Red Line. Or that the same complexities puts the center of one platform laterally 1 1/2 football fields distance from the beginning of the other platform.
What's more, the 'overcrowding' situation certainly didn't divert group-think or MassDOT from a poor choice of extending the Lechmere end of the tram service into Somerville/WestMedford.
They didn't mind that it could dump another 15-20k daily tram line riders into the mix at Park Street, when that need was better served, both cost effectively and operationally, by an Orange Line (metro) branch, bringing those commuters into the CBD at near by stations.
Indeed, the Orange Line tracks are within 50 yards (less than the above platform separation) of the tracks running through Somerville, and the line had sufficient capacity for branching on its northern end.
Even worse, rather than merging two relatively low ridership commuter lines well outside the city, with a 1.6 mile connector, which would free up those existing tracks through Somerville, they chose to give lots of goodies to their dirt mover, concrete pouring, steel erecting, friends, charging the taxpayers ($1,000,000,000) for the cost of needlessly expanding the entire rail corridor for new tracks.
But, ever since the poor choices made in the Big Dig, which was a huge windfall in excess concrete pouring, the Boston public has been an easy target for special interest profit schemes. Just look at what Harvard has managed to pull off.
One almost worked using South Station as a ruse, but the USPS wouldn't budge off of their prime Fort Point Channel property.
How much of engineering is focused upon achieving space efficiency, whether due to cost or lack of space?
I'm quite curious as to Metro-North riders relationship to LGA? Is it mostly one of driving and parking? And, if a 'good' rail option from the Harlem station were in place, rather than only the M60 Bus, would it make any difference in mode choice? I'm presuming LGA is generally the closest major airport to the region served by Metro-North, while aware of a few other options.
I didn't find any complaints about getting to/from LGA from LIRR riders. Fair enough, the MTA buses from Woodside seem to be satisfactory. I'm all for cost efficiencies in public transit.
I wonder though how many choose to drive to and park at LGA rather than rely upon the train/bus combo? How many might choose a rail option if it were available.
I know a way, but don't want this to become about 'it', as of now, only to know if it would matter should an efficient (in cost and operation) link from Woodside existed?
