u/simonperry955

Morality looks factual and real. This point is not in dispute. Our moral convictions are not in doubt. If I say "murder is wrong", I mean it. If you say "murder is right", I will believe that you are mistaken.

Morality looks factual and real because it operates on a conditional ought. In the abortion debate, IF my primary goal is the welfare of the foetus, THEN I factually ought to be anti-abortion. Given that's my goal, my anti-abortion activism is factually necessary and required. The IF-THEN, goals-methods construction introduces facticity. The methods of achieving the goal are factually required, if you want to achieve the goal.

Moral judgements are factually right or wrong according to moral values. A moral value is a method of achieving mutual well being; the moral "good". As such, a moral value is a goal in itself. This goal, e.g., fairness, charity, etc., can be achieved measurably, objectively, factually better or worse. We can evaluate the fairness or charity of action X; we can judge X according to multiple relevant values.

Moral realists state that the appearance of realness is enough to say that morality IS real, because when we perceive the realness of things we know are real, like the blueness of the sky, they really are real. Unless there is a defeater. In this case, there is an epistemic defeater - an alternative explanation for the appearance of the objective realness of morality.

Why do you believe in moral realism? I hear a number of arguments, and to my mind, they're all shallow, simplistic, and weak. These are the arguments I hear:

• anything I "know" must be factually true.
• what about? the opposition. If moral realism isn't true, then anything goes.
• moral progress. Moral realism is true because the arc of history tends towards justice.

I think philosophers should be ashamed of themselves for putting so much faith in such simplistic, surface-level, weak arguments.

Why is moral realism not arbitary? As I understand it, it doesn't specify any actual moral content. It's content free. Therefore, arbitrary.

Evolutionary ethics is not arbitrary because historically and anthropologically, nobody ever justifies genocide, slavery, rape, child abuse etc. on moral grounds. (If they try, then nobody believes them.) There is a limited palette of evolved moral values that are used to justify actions. Religious morality is another kind of morality that sometimes allows terrible things.

Historically and anthropologically, what is seen as moral by real people is methods of achieving mutual fitness benefit or altruistic fitness benefit.

If you introduce the conditional ought (if I want mutual benefit, then...) then you can have:

• factual moral judgments: action A is factually correct according to value V.
• factual normativity: if you want to achieve goal G then you are factually required to X.

The implication of this is that people can pick and choose their values and the values' goals. E.g., I don't want to achieve the goal of dominating and controlling women (the goal of patriarchy - on the way to males' reproduction). So, the logical implication of this position is non-arbitrary subjectivism.

Moral progress can be equally well, or better, explained by the biological pressure towards achieving welfare.

Moral realists say, "I factually ought to X". The rest of us say, why? Who says? Etc.

However, factually: if my goal is G, then I factually ought to X.

This is a form of moral realism. I think that hidden in the discourse of moral realists who say, "my values are the correct ones", is the conditional ought. "My values are the correct ones" if I have goal G. That actually makes sense.

Moral realism is incoherent because it is unable to coherently account for competing moral viewpoints. We contrast two moral domains: patriarchy, and compassion/fairness/equality. These two moral domains are at odds with each other. According to patriarchy, it is correct for me to beat my wife because she looked at another man. A moral realist could say, wife-beating is objectively immoral because it violates a sapient being's bodily property rights and is therefore categorised as an immmoral act. Yet, what's to stop the patriarch responding, "yes, but women need to be controlled and dominated, and this trumps your bodily property rights".

The point is, "who says?" Why exactly is the "realist" right and the patriarch wrong? On the face of it, each one has an equal claim to moral correctness.

Subjectivism says, patriarchy is correct according to patriarchy. Compassion/fairness/equality are correct according to themselves. Which one is "really" correct? There is no "really". If I accept the normative pressure to be patriarchal as legitimate, then patriarchy is correct *for me*, and compassion/fairness/equality take second place. If I view patriarchy as illegitimate, it's because I prefer compassion/fairness/equality.

So, subjectivism is coherent because legitimacy and rightness are perspectival to the moral agent (individual or group), and in real life, everyone has their own perspective - that's a thing already.

The argument for moral realism should not be, "it's philosophically necessary". The argument should be, moral realism is true because of X, Y, Z factual and logical reasons.

The point is not so much the merits of utilitarianism vs. deontology. Rather, why do lay people think that a deontologically organised society will beat a utilitarian one for actual welfare maximisation?

E.g., page 33:

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