u/Shekari_Club

There are credible reports that Iran’s government conducts influence operations targeting U.S. public opinion and politics. But it’s important to separate documented activity from exaggerated claims.

What is well documented:

• online propaganda campaigns
• fake social media accounts and news sites
• cyberattacks and “hack-and-leak” operations
• attempts to influence U.S. elections and public discourse

For example:

In 2024, the FBI, ODNI, and CISA released a joint statement saying Iran was conducting influence operations targeting the American public and U.S. elections.[1]

The U.S. Department of Justice indicted IRGC-linked cyber actors for allegedly hacking people connected to U.S. political campaigns and attempting a “hack-and-leak” operation intended to influence the election.[2]

Meta, Microsoft, Clemson researchers, and others have reported Iranian-linked fake personas and media networks operating online to influence Western audiences.[3]

There have also been long-running controversies around lobbying groups, activists, analysts, and some journalists accused by critics of being unusually aligned with Tehran’s interests.

One of the most debated examples is NIAC (National Iranian American Council) and its founder Trita Parsi. Critics, including some Iranian dissidents and U.S. commentators, have alleged that NIAC acted as a de facto lobby advancing positions favorable to the Islamic Republic.[4][5]

Parsi and NIAC have denied being agents of Iran and say the accusations are politically motivated attacks against advocates of diplomacy with Iran.[4]

A major controversy came from the lawsuit Parsi v. Daioleslam. NIAC and Parsi sued journalist Hassan Daioleslam for defamation after he accused them of lobbying for Tehran. The case was dismissed, and the court sanctioned NIAC and Parsi over discovery issues and withholding documents.[6][7] The court did not rule that NIAC or Parsi were agents of the Iranian government, but critics often cite the released communications and court findings as suspicious.

There are also accusations aimed at some journalists and analysts, including claims online that certain reporters or Iran policy experts are too close to the regime. However, many of these accusations are politically charged and less clearly substantiated than the documented cyber and influence operations above.

Another major example was the targeting of Iranian-American journalist and activist Masih Alinejad. U.S. prosecutors said individuals linked to the Iranian government were involved in kidnapping and assassination plots against her in New York because of her criticism of the regime.[8][9] Multiple people were later convicted or charged in murder-for-hire cases connected to the plot.[10]

Critics of the regime also frequently point out that many children and relatives of senior Iranian officials live, study, or work in Western countries, including the United States.[11][12] Iranian dissidents argue these family and social networks can indirectly help Tehran build soft influence, lobbying connections, or access to elite institutions, especially in academia and media circles.[13] Even some Iranian state-affiliated figures have acknowledged that thousands of officials’ relatives live abroad.[14] However, there is usually limited public evidence proving direct coordination with the Iranian government, so these claims should be distinguished from documented intelligence or cyber operations.

Overall, the evidence supports the idea that:

• Iran does run influence operations in the U.S.
• Some public figures and organizations are accused of promoting Tehran-friendly narratives
• But claims of massive hidden Iranian control over U.S. institutions usually go beyond what has been publicly proven

Sources:

[1] FBI / ODNI / CISA statement, https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-on-iranian-election-influence-efforts

[2] U.S. DOJ indictment of IRGC-linked cyber actors, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/three-irgc-cyber-actors-indicted-hack-and-leak-operation-designed-influence-2024-us

[3] Overview of Iranian influence campaigns, https://www.politifact.com/article/2026/mar/23/iran-disinformation-campaigns-influence-operations/

[4] Trita Parsi background and controversy, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trita_Parsi

[5] Criticism of NIAC and alleged Tehran links, https://iranianknowledge.com/2023/03/niac-the-lobby-groups-links-with-the-islamic-republic/

[6] D.C. Circuit opinion in Parsi v. Daioleslam, https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/12-7111/12-7111-2015-02-10.html

[7] District court opinion, https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1%3A2008cv00705/130874/189

[8] DOJ announcement on plot targeting Masih Alinejad, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-eastern-european-organized-crime-leaders-convicted-murder-hire-targeting-us-based

[9] DOJ statement on Iran-linked murder-for-hire network, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-russian-mob-leaders-sentenced-25-years-prison-murder-hire-targeting-journalist-behalf

[10] DW coverage of charges against IRGC-linked figures, https://www.dw.com/en/us-charges-iran-general-in-plot-to-kill-dissident-journalist/a-70572036

[11] Report discussing children of Iranian officials living/studying in the U.S., https://www.factually.co/fact-checks/politics/how-many-children-of-iranian-officials-live-in-us-cb665d

[12] Reporting on relatives of Iranian officials at U.S. universities, https://nypost.com/2026/03/18/world-news/children-of-iran-regime-leaders-teaching-at-elite-us-universities/

[13] Discussion of concerns about influence and elite access, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/apr/04/soleimani-family-arrested-us-federal-authorities

[14] Report citing Iranian officials acknowledging thousands of officials’ relatives abroad, https://iranwire.com/en/world/106466-report-4000-children-of-iranian-regime-officials-living-abroad/

Planning to shut it down soon if there’s no interest.

SAVAK was formed in 1957 to serve as the Shah's secret police. The Washington Post, in a contemporary article summarizes SAVAK's role as such:

>One begins with SAVAK. Formed in 1957, SAVAK, the National Intelligence and Security Organization, was handed far-ranging powers to go with a loosely drawn penal code. SAVAK investigated opponents of the Shah, arrested them, could and did detain them indefinitely without filing charges, and encouraged them to confess. In the next stage of the legal process, SAVAK switched hats and, in the role of hearing examiner, remanded prisoners to trial after weighing its own evidence. Persons accused of political crimes were sent before military tribunals which, after 1972, tried cases in secret. Guilt or innocence was determined by the evidence in the SAVAK dossiers alone, without witnesses and, of course, without defense lawyers.

Of note, what changed in 1972 was that in 1971 leftist terror groups killed 3 gendarmes in the remote Siakhal village outpost, SAVAK director Parviz Sabeti announces the formation of the "Joint Anti-Sabotage Committee" which essentially was SAVAK's declaration of war against such leftist terror groups, and the scope of their "counter-terrorist" activities was greatly expanded. This is when SAVAK got their notoriety, as political prisoners expanded greatly as did the commencement of the use of torture against these prisoners.

The question is then: how many people were "disappeared", how many people were tortured, and just how many prisoners did SAVAK actually keep?

Amnesty International was the first "major" HR organization to report on this in 1976. They themselves do not narrow it down to any specific number and report simply that it's "impossible to give a reliable estimate": The Pahlavi regime themselves reported 3200 (corroborated in now declassified sworn congressional testimony in the USA) political prisoners; some foreign journalists estimated as high as 100,000! The former was most likely an accurate reporting, as it was later verified by The Red Cross, whose figures came exclusive on-scene inspections and put the prisoner tally at 3,500 for 1977, down to 2,100 for 1978.

So how many people were actually killed by SAVAK? The answer comes ironically from the Shah's declared enemies. During the Islamic revolution, the Islamic Republic announced plans to identify and memorialize each victim of Pahlavi "oppression" in a fact-finding mission for the Martyrs Foundation, led by Emad al-Din Baghi. Andrew Scott Cooper in his work The Fall of Heaven (pgs 11-12), writes about Mr. Baghi's conclusions:

>...lead researcher Emad al-Din Baghi, a former seminary student, was shocked to discover that he could not match the victims' names to the official numbers: instead of 100,000 deaths Baghi could confirm only 383, of whom 197 were guerrilla fighters and terrorists killed in skirmishes with the security forces. That meant that 183 political prisoners and dissidents were executed, committed suicide in detention, or died under torture.

This estimate is again corroborrated by Abrahamian again in Tortured Confessions, where he himself estimates that SAVAK and other Pahlavi federal agencies killed 368 guerrillas, and executed up to 100 political prisoners. For context, Canadian federal agencies (Canada is comparable in population to Pahlavi-era Iran) kill about 400 people every 10 years. See attached image for Abrahamians detailed account of how these guerrillas died and their political associations (Table 4 pg. 103). Interestingly, in another chart later on in the same book (Table 5 pg. 104), it shows almost all of the people killed by SAVAK were college students or college-educated. And as one can see by the image here, all were associated with either leftist or islamist groups.

As to the number of people tortured, there is obviously far less objective information. What we do know is that the period of time in which torture was performed was effectively 1971-1976. The AI reports and the Carter admin put significant pressure on the Pahlavi regime, who "accomodated" the criticisms, and by what we can tell made a genuine effort to change. Once again, I'll quote the Washington Post:

>Prof. Richard W. Cottam of the University of Pittsburgh, an Iran specialist, told the subcommittee that the shah "had responded in ways that are not simply cosmetic." "Iran is a country in which the Carter human rights proposals have had a major impact," Cottam declared: "The shah is willing to accommodate President Carter's human-rights eccentricity." Butler told the subcommittee the ICJ was unaware of any cases of torture in Iran in the preceding 10 or 11 months.

And once again, the Red Cross seems to be our best measure of objectivity to these claims:

>Two visits to Iran by the Red Cross in the spring of 1977 had uncovered complaints of torture and marks on inmates at 16 of 18 prisons, according to a New York Times dispatch from Geneva. Returning in the fall, Red Cross doctors found no new marks, and "virtually all" of the prisoners denied that they were being ill-treated. Trips the next spring and summer disclosed further improvements in prison conditions....The Red Cross had access to all prisoners for physical checkups and private interviews.

This is corroborrated by Ervand Abrahamian, who in his book Tortured Confessions writes:

>The regime did more than ban torture. It allowed the International Red Cross to make two separate visits to the main prisons. It agreed to try future political cases in civilian rather than in military courts—which broke the precedent set in 1953 and gave defendants access both to the media and to proper defense lawyers. Amnesty International was allowed to observe one such trial in 1977...

Regardless, SAVAK's actions left them with a reputation that to this day is one of brutality. But the reality is, in a country of 35 million people, the chance of the average Iranian citizen having any interaction with SAVAK or political prisons, let alone being killed or executed by them, was slim to none, based off the information we have. Of course, we have absolutely no objective way of knowing the amount of people who were interviewed or "intimidated" by SAVAK, which was no doubt higher and contributed to their notoriety.

Injecting my own personal bias, I think the reputation of SAVAK's brutality is highly exaggerated to the point of being borderline disinformation, and was no doubt used as propaganda by the succeeding Islamic Regime and Pahlavi's opponents from the leftist political spectrum. But then again, one could easily argue that even one political prisoner and one execution is one too many, and make the case that the the aforementioned actions still make the Pahlavi era "bad" for those reasons alone. That's up to you to decide for yourself.

This survey was conducted by the Metropolis Institute (a division of the Association for Canadian Studies) over the period March 29th to April 13th, 2026. You can view it here.