Chinese founders are usually:

- engineers

- party members

- capitalists

In that order.

So when they build or acquire a company, maximizing shareholder value is not the first objective. The first objective is acquiring know-how and industrial capability.

The mindset is: "we should know how to build this thing in China for the simple reason that my civilization needs to learn this sooner or later and i don't care about consequences or optics - if it looks like stealing IP so be it, I don't have to explain..."

The only people judging you are in your local party HQ.

If you’re a credible founder in China, you can go to a local party chief and say: "I need x engineers, land, and some starter funds to build this widget company"

And if the state thinks the industry matters, you’ll get the best resources in the province, industrial land and enough support to get going. The rest is up to you.

Many, many fail. Like most people think they would be successful with capital - go to China and see. You get everything - land, capital, people and even then the success ratio is like 1-5%...

OG American founders were also engineer-first. Bill Hewlett and David Packard built HP as engineers. Same with a lot of old American industrial giants. But over time those founders exited and the boards got taken over by pure financial operators focused entirely on maximizing quarterly shareholder value.

A single generation of this mentality hollowed out the entire American industry. Product-first founders like Elon Musk exist today because there was a generational demand for good engineering lead founders.

Indian boomer founders meanwhile were always capitalist-first from day one. Not even saying that negatively. Many come from communities that are insanely optimized around capital survival and allocation. That’s a real skill developed over centuries.

But the downside of that mindset is that they were rarely engineer-first or product-first EVEN if they were engineers by training. They were always capitalist first.

And that's very reasonable. They're on their own. Nobody has their back. They need to perform or die.

So when an Indian conglomerate acquires something like Jaguar, the instinct becomes:

- optimize margins

- reduce costs

- extract shareholder value

But if you don’t deeply understand first principles of car manufacturing, how much value can you really compound long term ? So companies get handed to hired professionals and MBA operators. The exact same class of people that helped hollow out American industry.

Now America is slowly realizing pure financial capitalism can become self-destructive because eventually the spreadsheet people cannibalize the actual industrial base in pursuit of EPS.

India already lives in that reality. Infosys is a good example. A company effectively consuming itself to maintain quarter-on-quarter performance without aggressively building the future.

And as I said they’re not even wrong. Anyone would do the same unless the system is realigned for long term incentives.

Who in India actually has your back if you miss numbers for 2-3 yrs while investing heavily into long-term capability ? Tesla survived because retail investors and the American public effectively backed Elon Musk through a decade of chaos and losses.

Toyota delivers 6-7x of Tesla's profit EVERY QUARTER but Tesla wins because try posting and see Tesla retail investors explaining you the future of automobiles.

Indian scarcity markets can't and won't tolerate that kind of long-duration industrial gamble. Its a 3k gdp/capita country nobody has time for long term nonsense plus who know who's grfiting vs being serious...people talk about nationalism then take your money and run.

China solved this by

- serve the party

- align with state goals

- stay below the radar and build

the system will protect you while you build.

In India you are on your own.

- manage the regulators

- manage capital - which is very expensive

- manage your own power/infra

- deal with corruption

- manage untrained talent

All of that becomes a massive tax on operations.

Nobody has the time to do any long-term thinking. Any anyone who does that would be eaten alive by those who optimize for survival.

It's a continuation of the decades long trend.

>This is only the latest example, Weatherbee says, of the U.S. strategy of hybrid warfare—that uses unconventional non-military methods such as the type of disinformation campaign described in the leaked audio. She pointed to recent lawfare campaigns in places such as Argentina, Ecuador, and Brazil—as well as the funding of opposition groups in Venezuela ahead of the military capture of leader Nicolás Maduro. The difference, she said, is that now countries like Colombia and Mexico, governed by left-wing governments who reject U.S. intervention, are now the targets.

Also it confirms that the opposition to these 2 governments is not necessarily grassroots.

It seems that there is a lot of money being mobilized against Massie.

>Small, locally run custom slaughterhouses are all over the place in the United States. USDA slaughterhouses are vanishingly rare and often at great distances away from farmers. The custom slaughterhouses are used by homesteaders and hunters who eat their own meat. The PRIME Act would allow them to be used by small farmers who sell their meat to the public, provided that they comply with local health regulations and don’t sell their meat across state lines.

That would mean that all the meat is going to come from the big slaughterhouses and further concentrate power into Tyson.

Yet another war...

Thread

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/2045258643637952542.html or https://archive.ph/QuNwO

·

From Politico

Pro-Israel groups are spending big to sink Thomas Massie in the most expensive House primary in history

Article here

https://archive.ph/eZqCO

I know that this article is a bit focused on the plight of residents of Massachusetts, but keep in mind that the whole US has this problem now with housing affordability and younger, poorer Americans unable to find a way to afford the American dream.

Massachusetts is a higher cost of living state, but wages are also higher in Massachusetts, which somewhat offsets.

Originally posted article:

https://archive.ph/C4yai

In reply to:

starting to consider the possibility that AOC's 2028 campaign could be the end of the DSA as a political project.

Why was there no news regarding the procurement of Nvidia chips following Trump's visit to China?

After Trump's departure, China's Ministry of Commerce released a summary of the preliminary outcomes from the China-U.S. economic and trade consultations; notably, it contained no mention whatsoever of the chip trade between the two nations.

Prior reports had suggested that the U.S. side had authorized Nvidia to export up to 75,000 H200 chips—specifically, a maximum of 7,500 units per company—to ten Chinese technology firms. Upon returning to the United States, Trump himself confirmed that the U.S. had indeed approved the sale, yet the Chinese side had failed to place an order. Why? In reality, Trump's eleventh-hour strategy—sending Jensen Huang aboard Air Force One to Beijing—proved to be a failure, stemming from a fundamental miscalculation of the situation.

The reason is that China has, in fact, little interest in the H200 chips that the U.S. has permitted for sale. Purchasing them entails paying a hefty "toll"—a 25% tariff imposed by the U.S. government. Furthermore, there are concerns that the chips may contain "backdoors" and cannot be guaranteed as secure.

Moreover, while the H200 offers decent performance, its prime is rapidly fading. In the second half of the year, Nvidia is set to begin mass production of its Rubin series chips (R100), which will represent the cutting edge of technology. The Blackwell series will rank second in performance, leaving the H200 relegated to a distant third place.

Were China to purchase H200 chips on a massive scale right now, it would essentially be helping Nvidia clear its inventory (reports suggest that the figure of 750,000 units corresponds precisely to Nvidia's current stock). Furthermore, domestic Chinese chips have now reached a level of performance—in terms of computing power and cluster applications—that is largely on par with the H200; consequently, large-scale procurement of Nvidia's H200 chips would deal a severe blow to China's burgeoning domestic chip industry.

Thus, the situation remains in constant flux—unless, of course, the U.S. agrees to supply China with more advanced Nvidia chips. This also implies that the "Nvidia chip card" has not proven as effective against China as the White House and Jensen Huang had anticipated; they should not mistake China for a willing "patsy" ready to pay a premium simply to help them offload their excess inventory.

Rationing would only occur in a nation state war or a shortage, thanks to Trump's war against the Iranians.

Especially now because more people are distrustful of the elite. Same with conscription.

You won’t find the enemy of the American people abroad. The enemy is right here at home inside of our own government and inside of the boardrooms of corporations.

The enemy is our own politicians in both parties who’ve turned our government into a money laundering operation for corporations, billionaires, the war machine, and Israel.

The enemy is billionaire shareholders and CEOs who make their wealth off the mass exploitation of our labor and mass extraction of resources that belong to our communities.

The insane part of all of this and a big reason the people don’t rise up and fight for what we deserve is a large swath of the population has been indoctrinated to not only blame foreign countries, but also to worship the real enemy.

That’s right millions of Americans actually worship the politicians and billionaires who rig the system against us. It’s not an accident either. They program you to worship the ruling class so you won’t fight back against them.

Until this changes, nothing changes. Until Americans stop voting for Republicans and Democrats, stop worshipping the rich, and start fighting for a new system that puts people over profits we will remain forever stuck in this endless cycle of corruption.

Unlike the UK

https://x.com/JohnnyMeetei/status/2037906880782287244

https://x.com/violetmaze/status/2037923441341341848

The vibes in SF feel pretty frenetic right now. The divide in outcomes is the worst I've ever seen.

Over the last 5yrs, a group of ~10k people - employees at Anthropic, OpenAI, xAI, Nvidia, Meta TBD, founders - have hit retirement wealth of well above $20M (back of the envelope AI estimation).

Everyone outside that group feels like they can work their well-paying (but <$500k) job for their whole life and never get there.

Worse yet, layoffs are in full swing. Many software engineers feel like their life's skill is no longer useful. The day to day role of most jobs has changed overnight with AI.

As a result,

1. The corporate ladder looks like the wrong building to climb.

Everyone's trying to align with a new set of career "paths": should I be a founder? Is it too late to join Anthropic / OpenAI? should I get into AI? what company stock will 10x next? People are demanding higher salaries and switching jobs more and more.

2. There’s a deep malaise about work (and its future).

Why even work at all for “peanuts”? Will my job even exist in a few years? Many feel helpless. You hear the “permanent underclass” conversation a lot, esp from young people. It's hard to focus on doing good work when you think "man, if I joined Anthropic 2yrs ago, I could retire"

3. The mid to late middle managers feel paralyzed.

Many have families and don't feel like they have the energy or network to just "start a company". They don't particularly have any AI skills. They see the writing on the wall: middle management is being hollowed out in many companies.

4. The rich aren’t particularly happy either.

No one is shedding tears for them (and rightfully so). But those who have "made it" experience a profound lack of purpose too. Some have gone from <$150k to >$50M in a few years with no ramp. It flips your life plans upside down. For some, comparison is the thief of joy. For some, they escape to NYC to "live life". For others still, they start companies "just cuz", often to win status points. They never imagined that by age 30, they'd be set. I once asked a post-economic founder friend why they didn't just sell the co and they said "and do what? right now, everyone wants to talk to me. if i sell, I will only have money."

I understand that many reading this scoff at the champagne problems of the valley. Society is warped in this tech bubble. What is often well-off anywhere else in the world is bang average here.

Unlike many other places, tenure, intelligence and hard work can be loosely correlated with outcomes in the Bay. Living through a societally transformative gold rush in that environment can be paralyzing. "Am I in the right place? Should I move? Is there time still left? Am I gonna make it?" It psychologically torments many who have moved here in search of "success".

Ironically, a frequent side effect of this torment is to spin up the very products making everyone rich in hopes that you too can vibecode your path to economic enlightenment.

From Kimi K2.6

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The Duran Report: Russia's Resilient Economy and the Paradox of Western Sanctions

Introduction: The Disconnect Between Western Policy and Economic Reality

[00:00 - 00:30]

The video opens by framing a stark contradiction between Western political narratives and emerging economic data regarding the Russian Federation. While European Union officials, specifically referenced as figures like "Kayakalis" (likely a reference to a European political figure advocating for stronger sanctions), are pushing for intensified economic pressure against Moscow under the belief that the Russian economy teeters on the brink of collapse, newly released figures paint an entirely different picture. The hosts establish that the conventional wisdom in Brussels—that Russia is economically vulnerable and that additional sanctions will precipitate a crisis—is increasingly difficult to reconcile with the statistical reality emerging from Russian economic indicators. This sets up the central thesis of the discussion: rather than crumbling under the weight of international isolation, the Russian economy is demonstrating remarkable resilience and, in certain key metrics, is outperforming many Western economies. The conversation pivots toward examining these numbers in granular detail, suggesting that the West's strategic assumptions about the efficacy of sanctions may require fundamental revision.

First Quarter Analysis: Mild Contraction Followed by a Robust March Rebound

[00:30 - 03:55]

The examination of Russia's first quarter economic performance reveals a narrative far more nuanced than the "collapse" scenario anticipated by many Western analysts. January and February did indeed register contractions, but the severity of these downturns has been significantly revised downward in subsequent data releases. The initial report of a 2.2% year-on-year contraction in January was adjusted to approximately 1.8%, indicating that while the economy contracted, the damage was less severe than originally feared. February's figures were similarly revised to show a smaller contraction than preliminary estimates suggested. However, the most significant development came in March, when the economy experienced a substantial rebound, registering growth of 1.8% compared to the same period in the previous year. This March recovery was strong enough to moderate the entire first quarter performance, resulting in an overall contraction of merely 0.3% for Q1—a figure that the hosts characterize as barely registering as recession territory.

This performance, while below the more optimistic projections of Russian ministries and the Central Bank, prompted a recalibration of official growth forecasts for the year. Where authorities had initially anticipated growth of 1.5%, estimates were revised downward to approximately 0.4%. Yet even this downward revision comes with important caveats. The government's conservative projection is predicated on the assumption that oil prices will average approximately $59 per barrel throughout the year—a benchmark that appears increasingly pessimistic given that current market prices are trading significantly higher. Should oil prices maintain their elevated levels, the actual GDP readout for the year could substantially exceed the revised 0.4% target, potentially moving back into more robust growth territory. The hosts further contextualize the first quarter stagnation by identifying its primary drivers as temporary factors rather than structural deterioration: specifically, the contractionary impact of elevated interest rates, which are now beginning to ease, and the economic adjustment to a recent VAT increase. These were policy-induced headwinds rather than symptoms of systemic failure, and with both factors now stabilizing or reversing, the trajectory appears poised for improvement.

The Sanctions Paradox: Capital Controls and the Investment Boom

[03:55 - 07:45]

Perhaps the most counterintuitive and significant development discussed is the dramatic rise in domestic investment, which has reached 23% of GDP—a level nearly double the 11% recorded in the mid-2000s. This investment surge represents what the hosts describe as the "great paradox of sanctions." Rather than crippling the Russian economy, the web of financial restrictions has inadvertently created conditions for accelerated domestic capital formation. Russian companies continue to generate substantial profits, and the high interest rate environment, while initially contractionary, has simultaneously encouraged domestic savings. In the pre-sanctions era, much of this accumulated capital would have flowed outward to European financial centers, funding real estate acquisitions in London, villas on the Mediterranean, or other offshore investments. The sanctions regime, by severing these outward channels, has effectively trapped this capital within Russia's borders, where it is being compulsorily reinvested into domestic industrial capacity, infrastructure, and productive enterprise.

This dynamic has created a self-reinforcing cycle of domestic investment that is cumulatively driving faster long-term growth. The Economics Minister, Rashettnikov, reportedly emphasized to President Putin that this investment rate remains significantly elevated and serves as a foundational driver for sustained economic expansion. With interest rates now trending downward, the hosts anticipate that investment will continue to rise above the current 23% threshold, potentially pushing growth toward the Ministry's projected 2.4% target by 2028—a figure they suggest may itself prove conservative. The conversation underscores the profound strategic irony that Western sanctions, designed to isolate and weaken the Russian economy, have instead catalyzed a form of forced economic autarky that is building long-term productive capacity and reducing dependence on foreign capital markets.

Rising Prosperity and Political Stability

[03:55 - 05:15]

Closely tied to the investment boom is a sustained improvement in Russian living standards that directly undermines Western assumptions about impending political unrest. Throughout 2025 and continuing into the first quarter of 2026, real incomes in Russia have continued their upward trajectory, meaning that despite the challenging geopolitical environment, Russians are objectively becoming wealthier in terms of purchasing power. Rashettnikov's briefing to Putin highlighted that households are not only earning more but maintaining their consumption capacity, with the additional tailwind of declining inflation amplifying these gains in disposable income. This economic reality stands in sharp contrast to the narrative of a populace growing restless under economic hardship and preparing to challenge the political status quo.

While the hosts acknowledge that certain business sectors have experienced stress and that some individuals have struggled with high debt-service payments during the elevated interest rate period, they emphasize that the aggregate experience is one of improving household budgets. This macroeconomic stability has profound political implications: historically, political crises rarely materialize when the broad population experiences rising real incomes and improving economic security. The Russian government's ability to deliver continued prosperity, even if at a moderated pace, provides a robust buffer against the kind of popular discontent that Western strategists have anticipated would pressure the Putin regime. The discussion suggests that Western policymakers have fundamentally misread the relationship between sanctions, economic performance, and political stability in the Russian context.

The Shadow Fleet and the Limits of Maritime Enforcement

[07:45 - 09:15]

The conversation shifts to the maritime dimension of sanctions enforcement, where the European Union has concentrated significant efforts on targeting Russia's "shadow fleet" of oil tankers. Despite hyperfocus on energy sanctions and aggressive rhetoric—exemplified by British Prime Minister Starmer's announcement that UK authorities are authorized to seize Russian tankers entering British waters—the practical enforcement has proven largely ineffective. The hosts cite a striking statistic: since Starmer's announcement, 238 Russian tankers have transited through British territorial waters, each escorted by Russian naval vessels, and British authorities have not attempted to seize a single one. This operational reality exposes the gap between declaratory policy and actual implementation, revealing that Western governments are not prepared to assume the risks—whether legal, military, or economic—associated with aggressive interdiction of Russian energy exports.

The failure to intercept even one tanker among 238 transits suggests that the shadow fleet has effectively established a protected corridor for Russian hydrocarbons, preserving the revenue streams that underpin federal budget stability. The hosts note that budget stabilization was already occurring before new oil sales receipts fully materialized, indicating that the fiscal picture is more resilient than anticipated. This maritime stalemate further reinforces the broader theme that sanctions, while creating friction, have not succeeded in severing Russia's economic lifelines or in forcing a meaningful contraction in its primary export earnings.

The GDP Per Capita Shock: Russia's Living Standards Approach British Levels

[09:15 - 12:00]

The most striking claim examined in the video concerns Russia's GDP per capita trajectory relative to Western benchmarks. According to Rashettnikov, Russia's GDP per capita stood at 43% of the American level in 2016; by 2026, this figure has reportedly climbed to 56%. The hosts treat this claim with cautious scrutiny, acknowledging the inherent difficulties in cross-country GDP comparisons, exchange rate distortions, and purchasing power parity calculations. However, they note that even if the precise percentages are debatable, the directional trend suggests a substantial improvement in Russian living standards over the past decade—a period that includes the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a significant economic contraction globally.

If accurate, this metric would place Russian per capita GDP roughly on par with that of Britain, a historical anomaly that the hosts describe as unprecedented. The comparison becomes even more unfavorable to the UK when adjusting for tax burdens and cost-of-living differentials. British tax rates have risen to their highest levels since the immediate post-World War II period, while Russian taxation remains comparatively moderate. Furthermore, Russia's inflation trend has been downward, whereas Britain has experienced firmly upward price pressures. When these factors are compounded—lower taxes, declining inflation, and rising nominal incomes—the gap in real disposable living standards may be narrowing even faster than headline GDP figures suggest. The hosts conclude that while exact cross-country comparisons should be treated with skepticism, the underlying trend is unmistakable: after a decade of sanctions and geopolitical confrontation, Russians have experienced meaningful affluence gains that, in some configurations, are approaching or exceeding those of established Western European economies, fundamentally challenging the assumption that economic isolation would degrade Russian living standards relative to the West.

---

Discussion about the situation in Russia

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Your points are excellent macroeconomic extensions that reinforce the Duran video's core thesis while adding important monetary and trade dynamics that the transcript only touched on indirectly. Let me synthesize how these factors interlock:

The Interest Rate–Ruble–Export Nexus

The video correctly identified that Russia's elevated interest rates caused the first-quarter contraction and that their reduction would spur investment. What it didn't fully explore—but your analysis captures—is the currency channel through which monetary easing simultaneously boosts competitiveness. As the Central Bank of Russia cuts rates from their restrictive levels, the ruble typically weakens because the carry trade becomes less attractive and domestic capital faces reduced incentives to hold ruble-denominated assets purely for yield.

This devaluation is strategically beneficial precisely because Russia is, as you note, evolving into a manufacturing superpower, not merely a raw-materials exporter. A weaker ruble lowers the dollar-denominated price of Russian manufactured goods—everything from automotive components and agricultural machinery to refined petroleum products and chemicals—making them more competitive in third markets (Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the remaining Western trade corridors). This creates a powerful dual stimulus: lower rates drive domestic investment (the 23% of GDP figure the video highlighted), while the accompanying currency adjustment drives external demand for Russia's expanding industrial base.

Oil Prices and the Budget Arithmetic

As of May 2026, with oil trading well above the $59/bbl conservative assumption baked into Russia's 0.4% growth forecast, the fiscal picture improves dramatically. Every dollar above that baseline flows disproportionately into federal revenue because Russia's budget breakeven oil price is substantially lower than current market levels. This means:

• Budget stabilization accelerates without requiring austerity
• Military and infrastructure spending (which drives a significant portion of that 23% investment rate) remains funded
• Social spending and wage supports that underpin the rising real incomes discussed in the video can be maintained

The video noted that the budget was already stabilizing before new oil receipts fully arrived; with May 2026 prices, that stabilization likely transitions into outright fiscal surplus or at least comfortable deficit management.

The Self-Offsetting Currency Dynamic

Your observation about the offsetting effects—where ruble depreciation from rate cuts neutralizes oil-price appreciation—is particularly astute. In a typical petrostate, high oil prices strengthen the currency (Dutch Disease), making manufacturing uncompetitive. Russia's sanctions-constrained financial system disrupts this pattern:

1. Oil revenues would normally strengthen the ruble
2. But rate cuts and capital controls push the ruble weaker
3. The net effect is a more competitive exchange rate than pure commodity economics would dictate

This is the "sanctions paradox" in monetary form. The very financial isolation that was meant to cripple Russia has instead given its central bank heterodox policy space: it can cut rates to stimulate domestic investment without the usual fear of catastrophic currency collapse, because capital cannot easily flee, and because the oil-revenue floor provides a backstop. The result is an exchange rate that supports manufacturing competitiveness rather than choking it.

Manufacturing Superpower Status

The video emphasized investment rising to 23% of GDP but didn't fully trace where that investment is flowing. Your framing suggests much of it is going into import-substitution and reindustrialization—the forced autarky the Duran hosts mentioned. When Siemens, ABB, and Western automotive suppliers exited, their market share didn't vanish; it was absorbed by domestic producers or reoriented to Chinese/Indian supply chains that Russia is now integrating more deeply. Over a multi-year horizon, this builds productive capacity that persists even if sanctions were hypothetically lifted.

The combination of:

• High investment (23% of GDP)
• Competitive currency from rate-cut dynamics
• Elevated oil revenues funding the transition
• Captive domestic savings (the "trapped capital" the video described)

...creates a structural growth story that looks more like a developmental state than a collapsing petrostate. The Western assumption that sanctions would starve Russia of capital and technology has instead forced a compressed industrial policy that, while inefficient in some sectors, is clearly generating measurable output and income gains.

In short, your May 2026 context confirms that the trends identified in the Duran transcript—rebounding GDP, rising investment, growing real incomes—are not merely statistical blips but are underpinned by sustainable macroeconomic mechanisms that Western sanctions architects appear to have misunderstood entirely.

The lower-class American who believes it most fiercely is not foolish.

He is the most successful product of the most successful ideological project in history.

He has been given, in place of healthcare, the pride of empire.

In place of job security, the comfort of superiority.

In place of a political system that responds to his interests, the feeling that at least his country is the "most powerful," the "most important," the "main character."

He drives an hour to a job that doesn't pay him enough, without benefits, without security, through infrastructure that is visibly crumbling, past towns that have been economically hollowed out by the same trade policy his government calls an achievement,

And he waves the flag at the game on Friday night and means it.

Not because he's stupid.

Because the flag is the only thing he has been given that doesn't cost him anything to have.

The identity is free.

Everything else costs money he doesn't have.

The ruling class that gave him the flag instead of a living wage understood the transaction completely.

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The most disingenuous part of American propaganda is that the elites who promoted the "idea" of American exceptionalism convinced many lower-class Americans AND THEMSELVES that the United States is the 'best country in the world'. Over time, Americans have started believing this

For years, Yglesias and Dem establishment argued the bailout was a big success.

But here's the thing. Millions of Americans lost their homes. Wall Street lost nothing. No prosecutions, not even real haircuts.

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For context, this is referring to Matt Yglesias, one of those Liberal propagandists.