I welcome any correction here, especially on my interpretation of Platonic philosophy. It is pointless to attack a strawman. So, if you think I misrepresented any view, feel free to point out the error.

Explanation of the Problem and Origins of the Solution

Euthyphro's Dilemma refers to the challenge that theists face when trying to ground morality on God. Is x good because God commands it? If so, then had God commanded murder, it would be good. In that case, goodness is arbitrary. Or does God command x because it is good? If so, then x is good independently of God's commands.

The most prominent and popular solution that apologists concocted denies this dichotomy: it is neither arbitrary nor independent of God. Rather, God's commands are shaped or dictated by His nature or identity, which is goodness itself. So, it is not grounded on something independent of God, but it is not arbitrary either.

(Note: when philosophers talk about something's 'nature' or identity, they're referring to its essential traits, properties or characteristics. For example, it is part of man's nature that he is a rational animal. In the case of theism, immense power is part of God's nature, i.e., it is a trait of God that He can actualize a great many things).

Now, I think this idea ultimately comes from Platonic philosophy. Plato made a distinction between "universals" and "particulars." Particulars are things like a red car, a red tomato, a red apple, etc. In this case, the universal is "redness." In Plato's view, red objects obtain their color by 'partaking' in or reflecting the universal redness. Plato did the same thing with the concept of good; he grounded good actions and traits (that is, the particulars) on the universal of goodness ("the form of the good"). When it comes to morality, apologists do the same thing, but they go one step further and assert the universal of good is part of God's nature:

>It is widely recognized that Platonic philosophy had a significant influence on the development of the Christian doctrine of God. According to some church fathers, Plato's idea of a Good (the Idea of the Good) has been recognized as analogous with the notion of a Christian God. (Aleksandar, 2013)

A problem with that solution

In reality, when we say that an apple is red and round, we don't mean it partakes in or reflects weird immaterial substances called 'redness' and 'roundness.' Obviously, it is the other way around: we see instances of red and round objects and then we create the concepts of 'redness' and 'roundness' to describe these shared similarities. In other words, we abstract the universal from the particulars. Further, we avoid Plato's error (i.e., reification) by not treating the concept of a universal as existent.

In light of this clarification, we can now clearly see that the idea of universal 'goodness' existing as part of something's nature doesn't make any sense. Think about it, the apologist is proposing that a concept we invented to describe good traits and actions is a feature of God. Evidently, this is incoherent and absurd. When you carefully dissect the meaning of these words, they no longer make any logical sense in this context. It is like saying the color blue weighs 10 pounds; a category error.

At best, we could say it is a feature of God that He always thinks and acts in good ways. But that's just saying He is good; not that He is goodness itself. Although the former is victim to Euthyphro's dilemma, it at least makes sense. The latter avoids the dilemma by appealing to an incoherence, as a made-up concept can't be a trait of a concrete thing.

It is important to note, however, that rejecting Plato's error doesn't mean embracing relative or subjective morality. Perhaps it is still objective somehow; it is just that it is not derived from a concept of universal.