u/Perturbator_NewModel

Do philosophers say that compatibilsm is a "redefinition" of free will? I think some of them do say that. They might explicitly say so; or in some cases, I think it can be taken as a reasonable implication.

Quoting: "Four Views on Free Will" (2007, first edition) John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas

From Robert Kane's response to Manuel Vargas:

"In summary, when Vargas says that libertarianism is a “more demanding” theory empirically than the other alternative theories of free will, this is what he seems to mean: Future science could show libertarianism to be false in ways that would leave the other views still standing. On this point, I think he is right. But, as a libertarian I would respond as follows: Yes, the libertarian view is demanding: It could turn out to be false. Future scientific research into the cosmos and human nature could show it to be false (or true). There are no a priori guarantees or proofs independent of experience that we have libertarian free will.

But I would argue that if the alternative views on free will discussed in this volume are immune to such scientific refutation, it is because what these alternative views give us are merely “watered down” notions of free will and responsibility (or, in the case of hard incompatibilism, no free will or true moral responsibility at all). *If you want something as important as libertarian free will and moral responsibility, then you are going to have to take your chances with the scientific evidence*. And if you don’t want to take those chances, you will have to accept some watered-down versions of free will and moral responsibility (or none at all).

For example, the “freedom to do otherwise” that standard compatibilists offer us (we would have done otherwise, if we had wanted or chosen otherwise, that is, if the past had been different in some way) is indeed compatible with determinism. But such a freedom to do otherwise seems to me, as it did to Kant, “a wretched subterfuge” for the real freedom to do otherwise represented by the garden of forking paths. And notice that Vargas also needs some “compatibilist” notion of the freedom to do otherwise in his revisionist theory. He says the “can” in “can do otherwise” must be interpreted so that it is compatible with determinism. Vargas acknowledges that the standard compatibilist analysis of “could have done otherwise” (“we would have done otherwise, if we had wanted otherwise”) is subject to serious objections. He thinks some better compatibilist analysis can be found, but he does not offer a developed alternative. That is future work for him to do in developing his theory; and it will be hard work, in my view. For every alternative compatibilist interpretation of the ability to do otherwise I have yet seen is a wretched subterfuge for the real freedom to do otherwise represented by the garden of forking paths."

Quoting from the same source, "Four Views on Free Will", specifically the "Revisionism" chapter, where Manuel Vargas makes his case:

"One last example: in many cultures and places people called someone a magician (or something similar in the local language) if they believed that person could cast spells or otherwise had magical abilities. However, today when David Blaine or David Copperfield announces a performance of a magic show, we do not feel robbed that we did not witness a demonstration of occult powers. We do not threaten the Society of American Magicians or the International Brotherhood of Magicians with a lawsuit for false advertising. Instead, we understand that when people talk about Blaine, Copperfield, and so on as magicians, we understand that they mean people who create illusions that have the appearance of violating laws of nature. And, I suspect, few if any adults in their audiences suppose that their magic consists in the invocation of supernatural forces.

In all three of these cases we came to change how we thought about the nature of these things (water, marriage, and magicians), without thereby concluding that water did not exist, that no one had ever been married, and that there were no magicians. These changes did not happen by themselves. They were all driven by difficulties concerning older conceptions of these things. As we learned more about the world and about ourselves, it made sense to acknowledge that how we had previously thought about these things was mistaken. Crucially, the mistakes weren’t fatal. In each of these cases we continued to use the revised concept, but in a different and better way. Revisionism about free will and moral responsibility is the idea that we should do something similar for how we think about free will and moral responsibility."

"To foreshadow what I will argue for: We tend to think of ourselves as having a powerful kind of agency, of the sort described by various libertarian accounts. That is, we see ourselves as having genuine, robust alternative possibilities available to us at various moments of decision. We may even see ourselves as agent-causes, a special kind of cause distinct from the non-agential parts of the causal order. Moreover, we tend to think of this picture of our own agency as underwriting many important aspects of human life, including moral responsibility."

"I have been arguing that there is good reason to think that an accurate diagnosis of commonsense will acknowledge the presence of incompatibilist elements in our thinking (minimally, metaphysically robust alternative possibilities). And, for some of the reasons I have presented, I doubt that we can make good on those elements. So, in broad terms, the revisionist proposal I am offering is a hybrid account: incompatibilism about the diagnosis and compatibilism about the prescription. Alternately, we might say the account is incompatibilist about the folk concept of free will and compatibilist about what philosophical account we ought to have of free will."

Vargas isn't directly accusing other compatibilists of "changing the meaning"; he is just acknowledging that *his own* suggested compatibilism would be a change of meaning away from the folk concept.

This kind of explicit "revisionism" might be a fringe viewpoint, but note that, as far as I'm aware, there are no revisionists going in the other direction, and claiming that the folk are compatibilists but we should prefer an incompatibilist account instead.

From: "Just Deserts: Debating Free Will" (2021) Daniel C. Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso

Quoting the compatibilist Daniel Dennett...

"Mostly people just assume that an inflated concept of free will is the only one worth thinking about – “Accept no substitutes! Look out for Dennett’s *bait-and-switch* move!” Fourth, I am not just willing but eager to “admit” that my account is a *revisionist* one, that seeks to defend a notion of free will that is different than the one ordinary people believe in. One of the besetting foibles of much contemporary philosophy is its regressive reliance on everyday “intuitions” as the touchstones of truth."

In this quote, is Dennett admitting to a redefinition of free will? It's not entirely clear to me that he is, because perhaps he would say, that as he doesn't think the folk intuitions should be the starting point for this philosophical work in the first place, he isn't "redefining" anything.

Regardless, Dennett has clearly admitted to redefining "free will" *relative* to the meaning that, "ordinary people believe in". So he is using a different meaning by comparison, and it's a watered-down meaning. That would be relevant evidence, in the minds of many, for compatbilist redefinition.

As Dennett is downplaying the importance of folk intuitions... Obviously someone is entitled to argue that such "free will" as the folk commonly believe in, doesn't actually exist, or doesn't make sense. It's not like a common folk belief in incompatibilist freedom would prove we actually have that type.

I believe it would also be legitimate, in principle, for a compatibilist philosopher to argue something like: "the folk have a lot of confusion, and while they typically believe in an incompatibilist type of freedom, actually, when you clear up some misconceptions, everything traditionally wanted from "free will" can be provided by a compatibilist account".

Imagine, however, that a philosopher admits that their own account *can't provide* everything traditionally wanted from "free will", either by the folk, or by part of the philosophical tradition; but regardless, they will ignore this limitation, offer their compatibilist account, and call it "free will" anyway. Well that's something different and it's probably going to be challenged.

Quoting from: "Moral Responsibility Reconsidered" (2022) Gregg D. Caruso and Derk Pereboom:

"We follow tradition and define "free will" as an agent's ability to exercise the control in acting required to be morally responsible for an action... though we further specify that the kind of moral responsibility at issue in the traditional free will debate is basic desert moral responsibility. We contend that this definition best serves to draw clear lines of difference between the disputing parties and captures what has been of central philosophical and practical importance in the debate." (p. 20)

From a few pages earlier:

"Some philosophers identify themselves as compatibilists because they hold that some non-basic-desert notion of moral responsibility, often one they regard as sufficient for the moral life, is compatible with determinism.... But if "compatibilism" is defined so that such a position turns out to be compatibilist, virtually everyone in the debate stands to be a compatibilist, thus eliminating substantive disagreement about whether compatibilism is true." (p. 14/15)

So Pereboom and Caruso, in defining free will, set the bar to "basic desert" moral responsibility. This doesn't suggest that compatibilists, broadly speaking, are "changing the meaning".

However, I think the implication, with this BDMR standard, is that the subset of compatibilists (including virtually all the compatibilists around here) that reject the requirement for BDMR, are indeed changing the definition and obviously in the direction of using a watered-down concept.

In one way, this subset of compatibilists get an easy win with such an approach; as a watered-down responsibility concept will indeed "work" under determinism. On the other hand, they then end up with a position that is very close, in a way, to hard determinism. The difference between them appears to be a conceptual dispute over whether it's worth considering such weaker forms of agency and responsibility to be enough for the term "free will".

What's wrong with a conceptual dispute? I'm not suggesting there is anything wrong with a conceptual dispute, generally speaking. And I also wouldn't want to suggest it's just a small detail in the free will debate. Having a clear and accurate understanding of what "free will" means actually seems rather important to the questions in play.

In theory, the (subset) compatibilist could have the correct concept of "free will", and the hard determinist could have the wrong concept. And obviously you should try to point out a conceptual error in the opposing viewpoint, if that were really the case.

However, the problem in practice, is that I don't see that this subset of compatibilists have an especially strong case; and so what results from all this, is that it degrades the debate to the point where it's just a relatively trivial disagreement with no clear path to victory.

These (subset) compatibilists could easily just convert to hard determinism, if they had the desire, and say, "We don't think we have *free will*, but we do still have a significant type of agency that can play certain roles, and we can still justify criminal punishment in such kind of way". This aspect of the debate becomes a fairly flimsy and subjective choice, whether you call yourself a "compatibilist" and say the defined sense of agency is "free will"; or call yourself a hard determinist and say the *exact same sense of agency*, with complete agreement that it's important to society, isn't however enough to be labelled "free will".

I'm not saying there are no good arguments that could be made to try to sway opinion; I think we have good reason to reject this (subtype) compatibilist viewpoint of course; but apparently the arguments aren't decisive, there is enough wiggle room to prioritise different things according to inclination, and someone could switch between these two positions without much of a problem.

On a different topic, something that may be said by the compatibilist in defence of their position, is that compatibilism is an ancient view held by the Stoics. However, it also seems to be an ancient objection that compatibilists are playing a redefinition game. I will quote from Alexander of Aphrodisias, known for his commentaries on Aristotle, but he also authored some original work.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, "On Fate", written approximately 200 AD. (Translation of R.W. Sharples, 1983)

"It is clear even in itself that 'what depends on us' is applied to those things over which we have the power of also choosing the opposite things... This being what [that which depends on us] is like, they do not even begin to try to show that this is preserved according to those who say that all things come to be in accordance with fate (for they know that they will be attempting the impossible); but, as in the case of luck they substitute another meaning for the term 'luck' and try to mislead their hearers into thinking that they themselves, too, preserve the coming-to-be of some things from luck -- so they do also in the case of what depends on us. For, doing away with men's possession of the power of choosing and doing opposites, they say that what depends on us is what comes about through us."

"It is possible to see whether, saying these things, they preserve the common conceptions of all men about what depends on us. For those who ask them how it is possible for what depends on us to be preserved if all things are in accordance with fate do not ask this putting forward only the *name* of what depends on us, but also that thing which it signifies, that which is in our own power.... These ought straight away to have said that it was not preserved..."

"And all the other arguments that they put forward to establish this doctrine are like these, for the most part being ingenious as far as the *words* are concerned, but not gaining credibility from agreement with the facts concerning which they are stated."

Another possible line of argument, is that someone may say that compatibilists aren't "changing the meaning" because there are accepted standards for the meaning of "free will" that all sides tend to agree on.

I think the two most important criteria have been along the lines of (1) the freedom and control needed for moral responsibility, and (2) the leeway principle or "ability to do otherwise".

So (it might be said) we have these standards; there is wide agreement from philosophers for what "free will" means, and what we really have going on is a dispute over whether compatibilism successfully meets the agreed standards.

Now if you had agreement on a "basic desert" moral responsibility standard, with all sides signed up to it, then sure, that would look correct to me. Without that BDMR standard, the other way I think we should probably look at it, is that the criteria are too ambiguous and allow for the different sides to play with very different meanings.

Now I guess if an incompatibilist didn't like the maneuver of the compatibilist, (or vice versa), they could give argument that, say, X is an unreasonable reading of, "ability to do otherwise"; and maybe there is some *in theory* neutral standard and everyone is supposed to be playing by the same rules to work out the correct meaning.

And we can't say that philosophers never change their position at all. For example, compatibilists have moved away from the classic "conditional analysis" of the "ability to do otherwise"; and incompatibilists have had to concede error, and revise, one form of the "consequence argument".

Regardless, this seems like only a little fine-tuning of positions; and what we have in practice, is radically different meanings being pushed by each side, and no easy way to break the deadlock. So it arguably just allows for "redefinition" by the backdoor.