The investors said our market was too small. Our customers told us it was too big.
I co-founded a digital health company in 2023 after twenty two years in pharma. Initial idea was a platform for menopause support, GP-to-patient communication layer, prescribing workflow, the whole thing. Pitched it at seven institutional investors in the first six months. All seven passed. Common reason: market too small to support venture returns.
I was demoralised for about a month. Then I went back to the four pilot customers we had. Two GP surgeries in the south of England, one private clinic, one occupational health team at a university.
I asked all four what they thought our product actually was. Three of them said our value was not menopause specifically. It was that we had built a workflow for a category of patient care that does not fit the standard 8 minute GP appointment. They were already using us for chronic fatigue patients, perimenopause adjacent issues, complex hormonal cases, even some longer term mental health follow ups.
The market the investors thought was small was actually the wedge into a much larger market for slow medicine workflows in primary care. The customers had been telling us this since month two. We were so attached to the original pitch that we did not hear it.
We rebuilt the positioning in late 2024 around "low-volume high-touch primary care workflows." Closed a seed round in March of 2025 at terms 30 percent better than our original asks. Currently in 41 GP surgeries across the UK.
The investors were right about the market we said we were in. They were wrong about the market our product was actually in. We had been wrong about it for longer.
When buyers and investors disagree about what your product is, the buyers are almost always right.