Was appeasement in the lead up to World War II a logical strategy within the context of the lessons taken from The Great War?
The failures of appeasement by the western allies, namely by the UK’s PM Neville Chamberlain, is seen by many historians as among the greatest geopolitical failure of the Twentieth Century. The “Lessons of Munich” is a term I heard referenced many times in my undergrad, as shorthand for the philosophy of never appeasing an aggressor.
In hindsight it is clear to most that appeasement of Hitler in 1938 was a mistake. However, I’m constantly reminded not to read history backwards. Because we already know how the story of World War II ends, tens of millions dead, shattered continent, genocide, Cold War, we make to the erroneous assumption that all of the decisions made by people in history were logical steps leading us to this outcome. What I’m getting at is do you think appeasement was a reasonable strategy as understood by the people who made it?
Was appeasement reasonable as a strategy to the policymakers trying to take lessons from the lead up to The Great War? Diplomacy had repeatedly failed to avert the catastrophe of 1914, with many actors, but especially the Germans and French, unwilling to negotiate an alternative to the conflict. In the wake of that disaster, where it seemed that diplomacy had not been adequately explored, do you think the French and British decision to appease Hitler at Munich in 1938 was reasonable within the historical context in which they lived?