Slightly longer entry, and so it took me some time and effort to plow through. For what it's worth: If you make it to the last line - that one is actually relatively easy!

Reads like a Stoic textbook. Not as personal as some other entries.

2.11 — Ὡς ἤδη δυνατοῦ ὄντος ἐξιέναι τοῦ βίου

Greek Text

1     Ὡς ἤδη δυνατοῦ ὄντος ἐξιέναι τοῦ βίου, οὕτως ἕκαστα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ διανοεῖσθαι.

2     τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀπελθεῖν, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ εἰσίν, οὐδὲν δεινόν· κακῷ γάρ σε οὐκ ἂν περιβάλοιεν·

3     εἰ δὲ ἤτοι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἢ οὐ μέλει αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, τί μοι ζῆν ἐν κόσμῳ κενῷ θεῶν ἢ προνοίας κενῷ;

4     ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ μέλει αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπείων καὶ τοῖς μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν κακοῖς ἵνα μὴ περιπίπτῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν ἔθεντο·

5     τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν εἴ τι κακὸν ἦν, καὶ τοῦτο ἂν προείδοντο, ἵνα ἐπὶ παντὶ ᾖ τὸ μὴ περιπίπτειν αὐτῷ.

6     ὃ δὲ χείρω μὴ ποιεῖ ἄνθρωπον, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο βίον ἀνθρώπου χείρω ποιήσειεν;

7     οὔτε δὲ κατ' ἄγνοιαν οὔτε εἰδυῖα μέν, μὴ δυναμένη δὲ προφυλάξασθαι ἢ διορθώσασθαι ταῦτα ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις παρεῖδεν ἄν,

8     οὔτ' ἂν τηλικοῦτον ἥμαρτεν ἤτοι παρ' ἀδυναμίαν ἢ παρ' ἀτεχνίαν, ἵνα τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπίσης τοῖς τε ἀγαθοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς πεφυρμένως συμβαίνῃ.

9     θάνατος δέ γε καὶ ζωή, δόξα καὶ ἀδοξία, πόνος καὶ ἡδονή, πλοῦτος καὶ πενία, πάντα ταῦτα ἐπίσης συμβαίνει ἀνθρώπων τοῖς τε ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς, οὔτε καλὰ ὄντα οὔτε αἰσχρά· οὔτ' ἄρ' ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακά ἐστι.

 

Translation (Mine)

1     Like someone who could leave life at any moment, so (act) in all doing and saying and thinking.

2     Going away from humans, if the gods exist, is not terrible; they would not let you encounter evil;

3     But surely, if they either don’t exist or are do not care about humans, what is life to me in a cosmos devoid of gods or providence?

4     But they both exist and care about humans, and that man may not fall into the truly bad things, (this) they set wholly up to him.

5     If of the remaining anything were bad, they would also have provided for this, so that it would be up to everyone not to fall into this.

6     But that which does not make the man worse, how could this make the life of the man worse?

7     Neither out of ignorance nor knowing but not being able to prevent or rectify this, the nature of the whole would have overlooked this,

8     And it would not have erred so greatly either because of lack of power or lack of skill so that good and bad things would happen equally to good and to bad people all mixed together

9     Death and indeed life, glory and disgrace, pain and pleasure, wealth and poverty, all these equally happen to good and bad people, and they are neither noble nor shameful, and therefore they are neither good nor bad. 

Waterfield’s Translation

Everything you do and say and think should be predicated on the possibility of your imminent departure from life. But, if the gods exist, leaving this world can't be something to fear, because they wouldn't let anything bad happen to you. On the other hand, if they don't exist or have no care for the human race, why live in such a world, devoid of gods and divine providence? But in fact they do exist and they do care for the human race, and they've made it entirely up to each of us to avoid experiencing anything truly bad. And if anything else were bad, they would also have made sure that it was our choice whether or not to experience that too. (But how could a man's life be made worse by anything that doesn't make him a worse person?) The universe would have neglected this only if it were ignorant, or if it had knowledge but lacked the ability to guard against it or correct it; but neither of these is the case. Nor could it have committed such a great wrong, out of either impotence or incompetence, as to let good and bad things be the lot equally of good and bad people without distinction. But death and life, glory and obscurity, pain and pleasure, wealth and poverty—all these things come to good and bad people alike, since they are morally neutral in themselves, and this proves that they're neither good nor bad.

Hayes’ Translation

You could leave life right now. Let that determine what you do and say and think. If the gods exist, then to abandon human beings is not frightening; the gods would never subject you to harm. And if they don't exist, or don't care what happens to us, what would be the point of living in a world without gods or Providence? But they do exist, they do care what happens to us, and everything a person needs to avoid real harm they have placed within him. If there were anything harmful on the other side of death, they would have made sure that the ability to avoid it was within you. If it doesn't harm your character, how can it harm your life? Nature would not have overlooked such dangers through failing to recognize them, or because it saw them but was powerless to prevent or correct them. Nor would it ever, through inability or incompetence, make such a mistake as to let good and bad things happen indiscriminately to good and bad alike. But death and life, success and failure, pain and pleasure, wealth and poverty, all these happen to good and bad alike, and they are neither noble nor shameful—and hence neither good nor bad.

First line is easy. The rest is anything but (for me). Some bits feel like typos or corruption of text, but probably it's just me. (See my comments.)

2.12 — Πῶς πάντα ταχέως ἐναφανίζεται

Greek Text

1     Πῶς πάντα ταχέως ἐναφανίζεται,

2     τῷ μὲν κόσμῳ αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα, τῷ δὲ αἰῶνι αἱ μνῆμαι αὐτῶν.

3     οἶά ἐστι τὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα καὶ μάλιστα τὰ ἡδονῇ δελεάζοντα ἢ τῷ πόνῳ φοβοῦντα ἢ τῷ τύφῳ διαβεβοημένα·

4     πῶς εὐτελῆ καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητα καὶ ῥυπαρὰ καὶ εὔφθαρτα καὶ νεκρά, νοερᾶς δυνάμεως ἐφιστάναι.

5     τί εἰσιν οὗτοι, ὧν αἱ ὑπολήψεις καὶ αἱ φωναὶ τὴν εὐδοξίαν παρέχουσι.

6     τί ἐστι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ ὅτι, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ μόνον ἴδῃ καὶ τῷ μερισμῷ τῆς ἐννοίας διαλύσῃ τὰ ἐμφανταζόμενα αὐτῷ, οὐκέτι ἄλλο τι ὑπολήψεται αὐτὸ εἶναι ἢ φύσεως ἔργον·

7     φύσεως δὲ ἔργον εἴ τις φοβεῖται, παιδίον ἐστί·

8     τοῦτο μέντοι οὐ μόνον φύσεως ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον αὐτῇ.

9     πῶς ἅπτεται θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος καὶ κατὰ τί ἑαυτοῦ μέρος καὶ ὅταν πῶς ἔχῃ διακέηται τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦτο μόριον.

 

Translation (Mine)

1     How everything quickly vanishes,

2     in the cosmos the bodies themselves, in the age the memories of them.

3     What sort of things are all perceptible things and above all those things luring by pleasure or frightening by pain or made famous by conceit;

4     how cheap and contemptible and dirty and perishable and dead, (one) of rational power (should) attend to.

5     What are these, of whom the opinions and the utterances provide the fame.

6     What is dying, and that, if someone were to only see this and by analysis of thought were to disolve the mental impressions to himself, he will no longer consider this (death) as anything other than the work of nature;

7     but if someone fears the work of nature, he is a little child;

8     this is in fact not only the work of nature, but also beneficial to her.

9     How man touches god and according to which part of himself and whenever, in what condition, may be disposed this small part of man.

 

Waterfield’s Translation

How rapidly everything vanishes, physical bodies lost in the universe and the memory of them lost in eternity! Look at the nature of every object we perceive, especially those that entice us with the prospect of pleasure, frighten us with the prospect of pain, or are celebrated by humans in their vanity! How worthless, vile, sordid, and short-lived things are, just corpses! It is for the intellectual faculty to consider what kind of people they are, those whose views and voices confer fame or obscurity; what death is, and the fact that, if one sees it for what it is and, by analyzing the concept, dissolves the impressions that adhere to it, one will stop believing it to be anything other than a natural process—and there's nothing to fear about natural processes unless you're a child—though in fact not only is it a product of nature, but it also does nature good; and how a human being makes contact with God, with what part of himself, and in what condition this part of him must be to do so.

Hayes’ Translation

The speed with which all of them vanish—the objects in the world, and the memory of them in time. And the real nature of the things our senses experience, especially those that entice us with pleasure or frighten us with pain or are loudly trumpeted by pride. To understand those things—how stupid, contemptible, grimy, decaying, and dead they are—that's what our intellectual powers are for. And to understand what those people really amount to, whose opinions and voices constitute fame. And what dying is—and that if you look at it in the abstract and break down your imaginary ideas of it by logical analysis, you realize that it's nothing but a process of nature, which only children can be afraid of. (And not only a process of nature but a necessary one.) And how man grasps God, with what part of himself he does so, and how that part is conditioned when he does.

Comments

·       Line 4: I’m puzzled by “νοερᾶς δυνάμεως ἐφιστάναι”. Just not to leave it empty, I translated this as “(one) of rational power (should) attend to”

·       Line 5: ὑπόληψις seems to be used in the colloquial sense of “opinion”, not as stoic technical term (judgement about φαντασίαι/impression).

·       The two verbs of the same form following each other are puzzling to me in in "καὶ ὅταν πῶς ἔχῃ διακέηται τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦτο μόριον".

How Hays goes wrong here, and a question to you on ἀνθρώπῳ.

The text:

>Μὴ εἴ τι αὐτῷ σοὶ δυσκαταπόνητον,

>τοῦτο ἀνθρώπῳ ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνειν,

>ἀλλ' εἴ τι ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν καὶ οἰκεῖον,

>τοῦτο καὶ σεαυτῷ ἐφικτὸν νόμιζε.

Hays:

>Not to assume it’s impossible because you find it hard. But to recognize that if it’s humanly possible, you can do it too.

I will argue that this translation is wrong.

You could read this as “stoic pep talk”. Something a sports coach may say: “If it’s humanly possible, you can do it too!” But that seems to be factually wrong. “If Usain Bolt could do the 100m sprint in 9.58 seconds, it’s humanly possible, and yet, I am sure it’s impossible for me (and for most humans), no matter how much I’ll train.” So what is going on? Is Marcus Aurelius “asking for the impossible, to achieve the possible”?

Let’s translate the text:

>Don’t assume that if something is hard to thoroughly accomplish for you yourself,

>that this is impossible for man,

>but think that if something is possible and proper for man,

>that this is also attainable for yourself.

So I have one observation and one question. First, Hays just dropped the καὶ οἰκεῖον, which I translated as “proper for man”. This would seem like a crucial qualification. Running 100m in 9.58 seconds may be a desirable goal for Usain Bolt, but not “proper for man” in general. Virtuous behavior (moderation, helping your fellow man, …) is. So you should believe that anything that is humanly possible and “οἰκεῖον” is actually universally achievable.

Second, my question: Just from the perspective of Greek as a language, what does or can “ἀνθρώπῳ” (without article) mean? “To/for man”. Is that “for all men”? “For at least one man?” “For man as such?”

[Note: I realize that ἀνθρώπῳ is gender-inclusive, while my rending as “for man” is not, but “for human” just doesn’t ring like “for man” does.]

And here is Waterfield’s translation for contrast:

>If you personally find something hard to achieve, you shouldn’t suppose that it isn’t humanly possible. Think rather that, if something is humanly possible and is proper to a human being, it’s attainable by you too.