u/ExplodingPotatoTank

Say we have two ghosts, existing “within” each other. They have completely identical properties, thoughts, memories, actions, history, etc. What would make them two entities rather than one? If we say they are distinct consciousnesses, how do we make that distinction? For the two ghosts themselves, can they distinguish, versus an outside observer?

Correct me if I’m mistaken, but compatibilism seems to hold that free will does not require the ability to do otherwise. Instead, it is grounded in the fact that one acts in accordance with one’s own reasons and reflective capacities (i.e., without coercion), even if those reasons and reflections are themselves causally determined.

This view strikes me as somewhat uncompelling and unintuitive. I don’t fully understand why our reasons, reflections, and deliberative capacities are not undermined by the fact that they are themselves determined. I understand the point that seeking a notion of free will beyond this—such as “ultimate authorship”—may be incoherent. However, I’m wondering about the alternative of rejecting free will entirely, treating it as a psychological by-product rather than a real feature worth preserving in our concepts.

Is there a reason, within compatibilist frameworks, for still calling this “free will”? Or is compatibilism best understood as a revision of the concept rather than a defense of something real that we ordinarily mean by free will?