u/Cold-Jacket2648

Why do we hate ourselves?

So as you may have noticed, I've been posting a lot about Tunisia the past week or so.

First, because I care deeply about this country, but also because I'm trying to understand how Tunisia actually works: structurally, historically and I think if more of us tried to understand, put words on the feelings, we'd blame less each other and start asking better questions.

I'm not writing this to confront anyone actually. I know most of us genuinely believe Tunisia is a sovereign country that makes its own choices. And you're right to be frustrated about the economy and that's real I won't tell you how to feel about it.

But there's something I want to talk about that goes deeper than the economy. I've been noticing in this sub, in conversations with peers in Tunisia, on the streets: the self-hatred, the Tunisia is the worst country on earth, the 'we deserve what we get', the dismissing of each other, the hating each other, the not wishing success on each other, the quiet belief that the west is better and we are less.

Where does this come from? Is this just frustration? Is this just a bad economy? Is it really the current president? Because I've looked at countries with much worse economies and they don't talk about themselves like this.

What is colonial mentality?

There's a clinical psychologist at the University of Sousse named Wael Garnaoui. He works with Tunisian migrants and families of missing migrants. The ones who disappeared at sea. And he documented something he calls "the trauma of immobility."

He describes how the visa system, that humiliating process every Tunisian knows, where you have to prove you'll come back to your own country, where you're guilty until proven innocent, where even people with good jobs and savings get rejected without explanation, how that system is not neutral bureaucracy. It's a continuation of colonial control. The same logic that colonial psychiatrists used in the 1920s when they classified North Africans as "impulsive," "lacking willpower," "halfway between the primitive man and the evolved Westerner" that logic is still embedded in how European consulates treat us today.

And what does that do to a person? To a generation? To a whole country? It teaches you that there is better than here. That you need permission to exist in the "real" world. That your country is the waiting room and the west is the destination.

Garnaoui calls it "the desire for the West" and he says it's not natural. It's produced. By 75 years of colonial rule that said: you are less. By 70 years of post-colonial systems that said: become like us. By a visa regime that says: prove you're not an animal that will run away.

And the result? The place that rejects you becomes the place you idealize. And the place you have becomes the place you hate. Not because it's bad but because it's not there.

The independence we never had

Tunisia gained independence in 1956. We celebrate it. Bourguiba symbolizes that . He did extraordinary things women's rights, education and modernization. I'm not here to erase that.

But the way we became independent matters. And it's different from how other countries did it.

Algeria fought for 8 years. 1.5 million dead. The FLN against the entire French army. When Algeria won independence in 1962, every Algerian knew: we did this. We bled for this. That collective experience of fighting and winning created something in the national psyche that still exists today. Algerians have many many problems but collective self-hatred is not one of them.

Vietnam fought for decades. First against France, then against America. They were bombed, poisoned with Agent Orange, devastated. And they never once concluded that the problem was them. They knew the problem was the system that was doing this to them.

Tunisia? Bourguiba negotiated. He was brilliant at it. But what did the deal look like? French stayed the language of education, business, and status. Arabic became the language of home and religion. The economic ties with France stayed intact. The education system remained heavily modeled on the French one. A hierarchy was built into the culture from day one. One example was that if you spoke French well, you're modern. If you don't, you're behind.

So i'm not saying those countries are better off or have it figured out, they each have their own serious problems. But the way they became independent left a different mark on the collective psyche and Tunisia never experienced the same kind of rupture with the colonial structure.

Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist working in Algeria during the liberation war, predicted what would happen in countries like ours. In 1961, he wrote:

"If it triumphs, the national revolution will be socialist; if it is stopped in its momentum, if the colonized bourgeoisie takes over power, the new state, despite its official sovereignty, will remain in the hands of the imperialists."

Written in 1961. And then look at what happened in Tunisia. The flag, the anthem, the president.

But the structure underneath stayed remarkably similar.

What happened after independence

1987: Ben Ali takes over with documented help from Italian intelligence (SISMI). Why? Partly because of Libyan oil pipelines that run through Tunisia. Corridor politics. Ben Ali keeps the same structure: secular, pro-Western, economically dependent on Europe.

2011: The revolution. The most hopeful moment in our history. But then what? The economic structure didn't change. The IMF came with conditions. The EU came with trade agreements. The debt stayed. The brain drain accelerated. And gradually, the hope collapsed.

Today: Look at what happens every time any Tunisian leader tries to push back against the structure: the economy gets squeezed harder, European media calls him a dictator, while newspapers start publicly discussing replacements, and then another round with another leader until he doesn't obey anymore. That's not normal. That tells you something about how much sovereignty we actually have.

The colonial mentality and what it actually looks like

Researchers have measured this. It's not a metaphor. There's a scale: the Colonial Mentality Scale that identifies four ways it shows up:

  1. Putting yourself down. "Tunisians are bad people." "We don't deserve better." ...
  2. Putting your culture down. "We grew up on hatred." "Our mentalité is the problem." Treating Tunisian identity as a defect rather than a product of a system.
  3. Looking down on people who are "less Western." This is the francophone hierarchy. The subtle (and sometimes not subtle) classism between those who speak French well and those who don't. Between the coastal cities and the interior. This is today slowly starting to change.
  4. Accepting the oppression as normal. "It's just capitalism." "It happens everywhere." The reflex to normalize the structure so you don't have to confront it.

Over generations. Through education, through media, through the visa system, through the economic structure, through 145 years of being told you're not enough.

About the immigration crisis

One more thing because it connects to everything. Before 2011, Libya managed much of the migration flow and supported African economies. When NATO destroyed Libya, all of that collapsed. The economies that Libya supported fell apart. The routes shifted. And Tunisia a small, broke, struggling country became the transit point.

Now the EU pays Tunisia to be Europe's wall. That's the deal. Money so we don't go bankrupt, in exchange for stopping people who are fleeing wars and poverty that Europe helped create. And we don't have the infrastructure, the budget, or the institutions to do it. So terrible things happen.

And the migrants who come through Tunisia? They come from places that are genuinely, unimaginably worse. Sudan. Eritrea. Mali. They've walked through the Sahara. They've survived Libya which survivors describe as hell on earth. And when they arrive here, some of us treat them like they're the problem.

That racism isn't random. It's the colonial mentality turned downward. When you've internalized the idea that there's a hierarchy Europe on top, you in the middle, you need someone below you. It's the same system, just reproduced one level down.

But those people are not our enemy. They're caught in the same structure we are. The only ones who benefit from us fighting each other are the ones who built the structure.

... I'm not saying don't be frustrated. Be frustrated. The economy is terrible, opportunities are disappearing, and the future feels uncertain. That's real. I'm not saying Tunisia is perfect. It's not. There are real problems that are our responsibility to fix. I just want to zoom in on the other part. I'm also not saying Europe is pure evil. There are good people out there, struggling with their own problems, many of them standing in solidarity with us and I'm well placed to know.

What I am saying is: the way we talk about ourselves is not an honest assessment. It's a wound that was inflicted over 145 years of colonial and post-colonial structures that taught us to see ourselves through someone else's eyes.

When you understand the structure and start actually taking it as a reality, when you see that a lot, if not most "Tunisian problem" has roots in decisions made in Paris, Rome, Washington, you stop hating yourself and others here and start seeing clearly.

Tunisia was never really given the chance to be fully sovereign. Not in 1956. Not in 2011. Not yet today. The forms changed protectorate, independence, 'democracy', whatever but the structure remained.

And the deepest part of that structure is not the debt or the trade deals. It's the voice in our heads that says: it's our fault. We're not good enough.

Maybe the first step is hearing that voice for what it is.

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u/Cold-Jacket2648 — 4 days ago
▲ 20 r/Tunisia

Tunisia is being wired into Italy's state apparatus through a foundation called Med-Or. Its chairman paid Libyan militias. Its founder arms Israel. Here's what I found.

Med-Or itself is an academic foundation for cultural exchange and research. But when you look at who created it, who runs it, and who sits on its boards, a very different picture emerges.

I've spent a little bit of time researching this structure and every single claim in this post is sourced from Med-Or's own website, Italian government press releases, UN reports, and established media.
Links at the bottom.

So what is Med-Or?

Med-Or was founded in 2021 by Leonardo S.p.A., Italy's aerospace, defense and security giant. Leonardo is the 12th largest defense contractor on the planet, pulling in €19.5 billion in revenue in 2025. The Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance owns 30.2% of the company, making it effectively state-controlled.

Now here's where it gets uncomfortable. In June 2025, the UN Special Rapporteur included Leonardo in a report titled "From the Economy of Occupation to the Economy of Genocide" for its role in supplying military technology to Israel. According to investigative reporting by Il Fatto Quotidiano, Leonardo's electronics division allegedly supplied F-15 fighter-bomber components to Israel in December 2024 and March 2025, while the bombardment of Gaza was ongoing. Arms expert Andrew Feinstein told the outlet that the F-15 is one of the most frequently used aircraft in the strikes on Gaza. By September 2025, the UN Commission of Inquiry formally concluded that Israel is committing genocide. Leonardo workers in Italy later launched a petition demanding the company cut all ties with Israel.

That is the company that created Med-Or.

As of January 1, 2025, Med-Or was renamed "Med-Or Italian Foundation" and restructured into a "Fondazione per l'Italia," a Foundation for Italy. That name alone tells you this isn't a think tank. It's a national project.

Who runs it?

Chairman: Marco Minniti. Former Italian Minister of the Interior (2016-2018). Minniti is known for signing migration deals with Libyan armed groups in 2017. According to reports by Middle East Eye, VOA, and Italian media, Rome allegedly paid militias in Sabratha, some of whom were themselves linked to human trafficking, to prevent migrants from crossing the Mediterranean. The Council of Europe's Human Rights Commissioner formally wrote to Minniti asking how Italy could guarantee the safety of people returned to Libyan detention camps where torture was documented. Before becoming Med-Or chairman, Minniti served as Senior Vice President at Leonardo.

Director General: Letizia Colucci. Her career is entirely within the Leonardo group. She is currently CEO of Leonardo International and previously served as head of MBDA Italia, the company that manufactures missiles.

At Med-Or's founding event in 2021, Guido Crosetto attended as president of AIAD, the federation of Italian defense industries. Crosetto later became Italy's Minister of Defense.

The member list

This is where it stops looking like a foundation. Med-Or's members are basically a roll call of Italy's state-linked corporate infrastructure:

  • Leonardo (defense, weapons, cyber, aerospace)
  • ENI (oil and gas, Italy's largest company)
  • Enel (energy)
  • Snam (gas infrastructure)
  • Terna (electricity grid, building the ELMED cable to Tunisia)
  • Ferrovie dello Stato (national railways)
  • Fincantieri (naval shipbuilding)
  • Poste Italiane (postal and communications)
  • TIM (telecom)
  • Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (state investment bank)
  • MBDA Italia (missile systems)
  • Edison (energy)
  • Intesa Sanpaolo (banking)
  • BF International (agriculture)

Every strategic sector is represented. Defense, energy, transport, communications, finance, agriculture, shipbuilding. These aren't sponsors or donors. They are structural members.

The Strategic Committee sits in the Prime Minister's office

Med-Or's Strategic Committee held its first meeting at Palazzo Chigi, the office of PM Giorgia Meloni. This is on the Italian government's own website.

The committee includes CEOs of all the companies listed above, plus chiefs of cabinet from:

  • The Presidency of the Council of Ministers
  • Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Ministry of the Interior
  • Ministry of Defense
  • Ministry of Economy and Finance
  • Ministry of Agriculture
  • Ministry of Environment and Energy Security
  • Ministry of Universities and Research

The government's own press release called this "a first in Italy's institutional landscape." They described it as a forum to "exchange information, analyses and experience in a structured and secure way" with the country's major geo-economic players.

Read that again. This isn't a foundation with government contacts. The government is in the room, chairing the meeting.

The International Board

Med-Or's International Board has members from 29 countries. Some names:

  • Khalid Al-Khater: Director of Policy and Planning, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa: Advisor to the King of Bahrain, former Foreign Minister
  • Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President of the Emirates Policy Center
  • Karim El Aynaoui: Vice-President of Mohammed VI Polytechnic University, Morocco
  • Carmelo Abela: former Foreign Minister of Malta
  • Thomas De Maizière: former German Minister of Interior and Defense
  • Plus former ministers and senior officials from Mauritania, Niger, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and others
  • Kamel Ghribi: Tunisian-born entrepreneur based in Italy, Vice President of Gruppo San Donato (Italy's largest private hospital group), President of GKSD Investment Holding and of ECAM, a diplomatic council that organizes high-level bilateral meetings with African and Middle Eastern heads of state. According to his own company's website, he is a member of Med-Or's International Board, connecting the foundation's strategic network directly to "healthcare" contracts, infrastructure projects, and diplomatic access across Africa and the MENA region.

The Abraham Accords alignment and the Tunisia question

Med-Or's International Board reads like an Abraham Accords roster: UAE (Al-Ketbi), Bahrain (Al-Khalifa), Morocco (El Aynaoui), and Saudi Arabia (Prince Turki) (not officially but we know the backdoor), the primary target for normalization expansion. In March 2023, Med-Or chairman Minniti personally traveled to Israel to sign a cooperation agreement with INSS, Tel Aviv's top national security think tank, described on Med-Or's own website as the first agreement of its kind between an Italian and Israeli entity. The foundation has since hosted joint workshops and offered scholarships to Israeli students.

Now consider this: Kamel Ghribi, a Tunisian-born entrepreneur who sits on that same Med-Or International Board, was named on May 1, 2026 by Il Foglio, an Italian newspaper close to PM Meloni, as a potential successor to Tunisian President Kais Saied. Ghribi issued a carefully worded statement that stopped short of an actual denial. Saied, who in 2019 called normalization with Israel "high treason," responded indirectly by warning against "publications on social media and suspicious pages."

The question writes itself: what would it mean for Tunisia's position on Israel if its next president sits on the board of a foundation that has a formal partnership with Israel's national security establishment, created by a company named in a UN genocide report?

Med-Or and the Piano Mattei

Med-Or is formally embedded in Italy's Piano Mattei, the Meloni government's strategic plan for Africa. According to the government's own press release, Med-Or sits on the Plan's steering committee and contributes analyses to "the decision-making process for Italy's new approach towards the African continent."

Multiple analysts and the African Union itself have criticized the Mattei Plan for being designed with minimal African input, treating the continent as a space for Italian economic and strategic interests rather than a genuine partnership.

The Tunisia connection: ELMED

A concrete example. ELMED is a €850 million submarine power cable connecting Sicily to Tunisia's Cape Bon peninsula. It's being built by Terna (Med-Or member) with Tunisia's state electricity company STEG. The EU put in €307 million, the World Bank $268 million, the EBRD €45 million. It is officially a Piano Mattei project.

The framing is "energy bridge between Europe and Africa." What it means in practice: Italy gets to control a critical energy infrastructure link to North Africa and positions itself as Europe's energy hub. Tunisia's role is to serve as a transit point and potential "green battery" for European renewable energy. Energy produced on African soil, consumed in Europe.

How the pipeline works

Zooming out, the operational logic based on publicly available information looks like this:

  1. Med-Or institutionalizes those relationships through scholarship programs, master's degrees at LUISS Guido Carli in Rome, and cybersecurity training. The CyberBridge program, for example, was launched together with Italy's National Cybersecurity Agency and developed with support from Leonardo.
  2. Commercial contracts follow. Infrastructure projects, energy concessions, submarine cables, hospital construction.
  3. Leonardo delivers the defense technology, cybersecurity systems, and surveillance infrastructure.
  4. The other members fill the remaining sectors. ENI handles oil. Terna builds the grid. Ferrovie does rail. Fincantieri builds ships. Snam lays gas pipelines.

The end result is structural integration into the Italian economic system.

Target countries

Based on Med-Or's own publications, board composition, and events:

Morocco (first Med-Or project country, most deeply integrated, Abraham Accords signed), Kenya (Med-Or office in Nairobi, Ruto spoke in Rome), Libya (Minniti's historical relationships), Tunisia (ELMED, energy concessions, training programs), Iraq (healthcare and reconstruction), Saudi Arabia (training programs, Prince Turki on the board), Qatar (Al-Khater on the board), plus Niger, Mauritania, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia through various MoUs and cooperation agreements.

Leonardo itself has defense contracts in 20+ countries.

Questions worth asking

  1. Why is a weapons company's foundation sitting on the steering committee of a national government's Africa strategy?
  2. How does a foundation chaired by the man who allegedly paid Libyan militias to stop migration, and run by a missile company executive, get to call itself "academic"?
  3. When Med-Or provides "cybersecurity training" to African governments through programs co-developed with Leonardo, is that capacity building or building dependence on Italian defense systems?
  4. What does it mean that the former head of Saudi intelligence sits on the board of a foundation created by a company that, according to UN reports, is implicated in supplying weapons used in Gaza?
  5. Who actually benefits from ELMED? Tunisia provides the geography and the renewable energy potential. Italy controls the cable, the technology, and the market access. Where does the value go?
  6. Med-Or is not a ministry. It's not subject to parliamentary oversight. It operates as a private foundation with state membership. What accountability exists?

Sources

  • Med-Or Foundation website - members, boards, projects, events: med-or.org/en/the-foundation
  • Italian Government (governo.it) - Strategic Committee at Palazzo Chigi, Piano Mattei role: governo.it/en/articolo/medor-project
  • Leonardo S.p.A. website - Med-Or founding, corporate structure: leonardo.com/en/about/foundations
  • UN Special Rapporteur report (June 2025) - "From the Economy of Occupation to the Economy of Genocide," naming Leonardo: Report A/HRC/59/23
  • UN Commission of Inquiry (September 2025) - genocide determination: Report A/HRC/60/CRP.3
  • Il Fatto Quotidiano / Palestine Chronicle - investigation into Leonardo F-15 component shipments, Dec 2024 and March 2025
  • Leonardo workers' petition (November 2025) - reported by MENA Solidarity Network
  • VOA, Liberties.eu, Middle East Eye, ISPI - Minniti's Libya migration deals, militia payments, Council of Europe criticism
  • ELMED Project website: elmedproject.com
  • Terna press release (May 2024) - MASE authorization, Piano Mattei designation
  • EBRD (June 2024) - €45 million ELMED financing
  • World Bank (June 2023) - $268.4 million ELMED financing
  • King Faisal Center - Prince Turki at Med-Or International Board: kfcris.com/en/news/read/442
  • Med-Or Palermo conference (September 2025) - Prince Turki keynote: med-or.org
  • Med-Or / President Ruto (April 2026) - Kenya partnership at LUISS: med-or.org/en
  • Leonardo ownership - 30.2% Italian state: corporate governance filings, Wikipedia
  • Med-Or / INSS MoU (March 2023): med-or.org
  • Decode39 on Med-Or/INSS collaboration: decode39.com
  • GKSD Healthcare (Ghribi bio): gksdhealthcare.com/en/chairman
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u/Cold-Jacket2648 — 7 days ago

Kais Saied has had six years of power. No parliament blocking him. No opposition that can stop him. He promised to fight corruption and clean the system… But today we face the reality that nothing changed.

So what has he actually done? He arrested politicians, former prime ministers, party leaders, journalists, activists. He shut down the only independent anti-corruption body in 2021 and transferred its files to the Interior Ministry. He dissolved the elected local councils and replaced them with ones that have no budget and no authority. He promised to recover $5 billion in stolen assets and recovered $10 million.

But the actual system? Untouched.

The banking cartels that have controlled finance since Ben Ali. Still there. The import monopolies that determine prices for ordinary Tunisians. Still there. The smuggling networks in the south. Still there. The trade oligopolies. Still there. The military’s foreign funding pipeline. Still there. The bureaucratic structures built under decades of dictatorship… Still functioning exactly the same way.

He punishes the small fish while the ocean stays dirty.
And when it comes to external interference, instead of creating transparency, his draft NGO law gives the executive the power to approve or deny foreign funding… which is control, not accountability.

The solution exists and it’s not complicated in principle.

Internally:
- reestablish an independent anti-corruption authority: not under the Interior Ministry but genuinely independent, with real enforcement power.
- Mandatory asset declarations for every public official, with legal consequences for non-compliance. Public procurement transparency.
- Functional whistleblower protections. Currently you have to show up in person to report corruption, which destroys your anonymity.

Externally: a Foreign Agents Registration Act like the US (since 1938) or Australia (since 2018). Anyone operating on behalf of foreign interests registers, discloses funding, and is transparent. Not banned. VISIBLE.

Both together mean: the public knows who is stealing from inside and who is operating from outside.

So why doesn’t any of this happen?

Because in my opinion the system that Saied claims to fight is the same system he depends on to survive. Not because he profits from it. look at the man, he looks miserable, but because after six years of ruling alone, with no party, no team, no institutional support, the opaque structures he inherited are the only thing still holding the state together. He didn’t build an alternative.
And now he can’t tear down the old system without everything — including his own position collapsing with it.

That’s not corruption. That’s a trap he built for himself by choosing isolation over institution-building.

The military is loyal but it’s foreign-funded. The economy runs but on EU loans with conditions. The state functions but through the same opaque structures it always has.

A real transparency law would expose the system itself.
But every leader who enters the system discovers that cleaning it means making their own floor fall. And then they stop cleaning 🧹

The only thing that would actually help Tunisia is starting with a TRANSPARACY LAW. Without that it’ll be just a never ending cycle of misery.

Yes diversify to China, GOOD. To Russia GOOD. But what will that change if the domestic system is blocked?

He’s getting cornered by foreign countries at a humiliating point that they publicly start showing a foreign puppet to take his position. Which is insane.

Also one thing. Since my sentiment is that the president is probably panicking right now.
We should be reflecting as a people how to react on this. Are we going to let foreigners or malicious people use our discontent to install their own agenda or what can we do as a community?
How do we adress our discontent on Kais without giving it as a weapon to foreign countries or domestic traitors to use it on us?

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u/Cold-Jacket2648 — 8 days ago
▲ 4 r/geopolitics2+2 crossposts

https://preview.redd.it/o2duncvrw9zg1.png?width=564&format=png&auto=webp&s=f2bef89e05c676451568cdd91d7527a457589f02

Every Tunisian knows the pattern. Carthage fell to Rome. The Hafsids fell to the Ottomans. The Ottomans gave way to France. France left in 1956, but the strings never fully cut. None of this is news to anyone.

But here's what's different about right now. What's happening to Tunisia in 2026 isn't just the old colonial reflex of powerful countries wanting to control weaker ones. It's something more specific, more structural, and more urgent than anything since independence. And the reason has less to do with who's president and more to do with where Tunisia sits on a map that most people aren't looking at.

THE MAP THAT MATTERS

From a satellite view of the Mediterranean, the picture is simple. The northern coast is Europe: Italy, France, Spain, Greece. The southern coast is North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt. Between them sits the most strategic body of water on the planet, connecting the Atlantic to the Middle East, Africa to Europe, and increasingly, China to its largest export market.

If you zoom into Tunisia, the position becomes even clearer. 1,300 kilometers of coastline. Sitting almost exactly in the middle of the Mediterranean's southern shore. To the west: Algeria, Russia's biggest arms client in Africa and a major gas supplier to Europe. To the east: Libya, where Russia (via Wagner/Africa Corps), Turkey, and various militias have been fighting over oil and territory since 2011. Directly across the water: Sicily, 140 kilometers away. Closer than Tunis is to most Tunisian cities.

Tunisia isn't just a country. It's a door. And right now, at least four different powers want the key.

WHAT CHANGED, AND WHEN

For decades, Tunisia was stable, predictable, and firmly in the Western camp. Ex-President Ben Ali cooperated on everything: migration control, counterterrorism, trade agreements, military access. The West didn't care that he was a dictator because he was their dictator. The door stayed locked and they held the key.

The revolution changed the lock. Not immediately. The transition years were messy but the Western framework survived. Ennahda cooperated. Essebsi cooperated. Even the chaos was manageable because the fundamental alignment didn't shift: Tunisia needed Western money and the West needed Tunisian cooperation on migration and security.

Then came president Kais Saied. And for a while, he cooperated too. The migration MoU with Meloni in July 2023. The continued military partnership with the US, four C-130 Hercules delivered since 2021. The EU funding pipeline.

But starting in 2024, something shifted. Saied flew to Tehran for President Raisi's funeral, the first Tunisian presidential visit to Iran since Bourguiba in the 1960s. He flew to Beijing for the China-Arab Cooperation Forum. He began engaging with Russia, not publicly, not dramatically, but enough that Russian cargo planes started appearing at Djerba airport. He refused the IMF program. And China offered zero tariffs on Tunisian goods, the first time in Tunisia's history that a non-Western power offered unconditional market access.

Saied didn't declare a break with the West. He did something more dangerous: he demonstrated that alternatives exist.

WHY THAT TERRIFIES THE WEST

To understand why this matters, it helps to see what China has been building across the Mediterranean. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese companies now manage or hold stakes in ports in Piraeus (Greece), Istanbul (Turkey), Valencia and Bilbao (Spain), Marseille (France), and Port Said (Egypt). On the North African coast: Tangier Med (Morocco), and potentially Bizerte, Enfidha, and Zarzis in Tunisia.

Bizerte in Tunisia is not just any port. It sits at a critical hub of fiber optic submarine cables, the physical infrastructure that carries internet traffic between continents. And it provides direct access to Europe across the narrowest part of the western Mediterranean.

China signed a BRI memorandum with Tunisia in 2018. The projects included developing Zarzis into a free trade zone, building a railway linking Gabes to Zarzis, constructing a bridge connecting Djerba to the mainland, and developing deep-water port capacity at Bizerte. A Chinese-built university hospital was completed in Sfax in 2020. A diplomatic academy opened in 2022 with Chinese funding.

None of this has fully materialized yet. Tunisia's political instability and economic crisis have slowed everything. But the framework is there. The agreements are signed. And the moment Tunisia has a government willing to implement them, China's maritime silk road gains a critical node in the central Mediterranean, right between its ports in Morocco and Egypt, right across from its port in Piraeus.

That is what keeps European strategists awake at night. Not Russian planes in Tunisia. The real threat is a Chinese-developed port in Bizerte that gives Beijing a logistics hub 140 kilometers from Sicily, at the crossroads of every major Mediterranean shipping lane.

THE IRAN PARALLEL: SAME LOGIC, DIFFERENT INSTRUMENTS

If you've been following the connectivity war in the Middle East, this architecture looks familiar. Iran sits at the intersection of three corridor systems: China's Belt and Road Initiative, the International North-South Transport Corridor connecting Russia to India via Iran, and the Ashgabat Agreement linking Central Asia to the Persian Gulf. Iran's geographic position makes it the unavoidable crossroads of Eurasian trade.

That's why Iran gets bombed. Not because of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has nuclear weapons and is a US ally. Not because of human rights. Saudi Arabia's record is comparable and it's America's closest Arab partner. Iran gets bombed because it controls corridors that, if they become fully operational, would bypass every maritime chokepoint that the Western naval order has controlled for five hundred years.

Tunisia sits on a smaller but analogous crossroads. It doesn't control a Strait of Hormuz. But it controls something equally valuable in the current moment: the central Mediterranean migration corridor, which gives leverage over European domestic politics. Potential port infrastructure for Chinese maritime routes, which threatens Western control of Mediterranean shipping. A geographic buffer between Russian-influenced Libya and EU-aligned Morocco, which determines who controls North Africa's coast. And the psychological precedent of a small Arab country successfully diversifying away from Western dependency.

That last point is the most important one. If Tunisia, small, economically fragile, militarily weak, can successfully build alternative partnerships with China, Russia, and Iran without being punished, then Algeria will follow. Then Libya's next government will follow. Then Egypt will recalculate. And suddenly, the entire southern Mediterranean coast, the border between Europe and Africa, the shipping lane between the Atlantic and the Middle East, is no longer a Western-controlled space.

Tunisia is small. The precedent is enormous.

WHERE IMEC DIED AND WHY IT MATTERS HERE

One more piece that connects this directly to the broader corridor war. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, IMEC, was announced at the G20 in September 2023. It was supposed to be the Western answer to China's BRI: a rail and shipping route from India through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe via Greek ports.

IMEC is structurally dead. The war in Gaza killed the normalization process between Saudi Arabia and Israel that was its political prerequisite. The Houthi operations in the Red Sea demonstrated that the corridor's proposed route passes through contested waters. And the fundamental problem remains: IMEC requires cooperation between countries that don't trust each other, while BRI only requires cooperation with China.

With IMEC dead, Europe has no alternative connectivity strategy for the Mediterranean. The only remaining option is to control existing infrastructure, which means controlling the ports, the shipping lanes, and the governments on the southern shore. And the most vulnerable point on that shore, the one with the weakest economy, the most isolated president, and the most developed Chinese BRI framework, is Tunisia.

That's why everyone is obsessed with Kais Saied. The West has always tolerated dictators who cooperate. Not because of human rights. The policy papers only started when he stopped cooperating on migration. He's a target because he sits on a door that he's starting to open to the wrong people. And the only way to close it is to replace him with someone who holds it open exclusively for the West.

WHAT THIS MEANS

Every Tunisian knows the feeling of being fought over. It runs through the history of a country that has been colonized by every Mediterranean power in recorded history. But knowing the feeling and understanding the mechanism are two different things.

The mechanism in 2026 is corridor control. Whoever controls Tunisia's ports, its migration routes, its financial dependencies, and its institutional alignments controls a critical node in the Mediterranean network. And the competition for that control is intensifying precisely because the old monopoly is breaking. China offers an alternative to Western financing. Russia offers an alternative to Western security partnerships. Iran offers an alternative to Western diplomatic alignment.

Tunisia doesn't need to choose sides. But it needs to understand why it's being asked to choose, and it needs the institutional tools to protect itself from being chosen for. That means transparency about who has access to the state apparatus and why. It means a legal framework that makes foreign institutional penetration visible. And it means a public that understands its own strategic value, not just in the memory of what was done to us, but in the hard structural logic of corridors, ports, and shipping lanes that explains why it keeps happening.

Because the next one won't come with a name you recognize.

reddit.com
u/Cold-Jacket2648 — 10 days ago
▲ 5 r/Tunisia+1 crossposts

https://preview.redd.it/dwwkxy50e3zg1.jpg?width=780&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=805eae7bf2818851e5b5d1fc146540d6675f92d7

In my previous post, I raised three questions about a pediatric heart catheterization lab donated to La Rabta Hospital in Tunis by Italy's Gruppo San Donato and its vice president, Kamel Ghribi.

Why did the Defense Ministry co-sign the agreement?

Why did the "Oxygen for Tunisian Hospitals" project launch one day before the president's power grab?

And why did two successive health ministers attend events by an organization none of them seem to have investigated?

So I dug a little bit deeper, read carefully:

THE NUMBER THAT DOESN'T MATCH

Every Tunisian news outlet that covered the CATH Lab inauguration in June 2021 reported the same figure: a 2.5 million dinar donation by Gruppo San Donato and Kamel Ghribi. Leaders, La Presse, Entreprises Magazine, Nessma TV, Directinfo, Successful Tunisia, Réalités, WebManagerCenter, Mosaique FM — all of them, same number.

But four months earlier, on February 4, 2021, La Presse published a TAP report — TAP being Tunisia's national news agency. In it, the director-general of La Rabta hospital, Mongi Khemiri, gave exact figures:

  • Unit 1: installed by the Tunisian Ministry of Health — cost: 2,330,000 dinars
  • Unit 2: donated by the Italian side — cost: 1,670,000 dinars

(Source: La Presse / TAP, February 4, 2021 — original removed, archived version)

(Nessma TV also reported two separate units in February 2021)

So the Tunisian state invested more than the donor. The Ministry of Health's unit cost 2.33 million dinars. The Italian donation was 1.67 million. But from the inauguration onwards, the narrative became: "2.5 million dinar donation by Ghribi and San Donato," and the state's own, larger investment disappeared from every article.

One outlet not reporting the state contribution might be an oversight. Nine outlets consistently presenting an inflated figure while omitting the state's own investment raises a question: Who wrote the press release they were all working from?

NOT 2021. NOT 2020. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS.

The inauguration coverage made this sound like a generous one-time gift. But the earliest article — a Leaders.com.tn exclusive from November 18, 2020 — tells a fundamentally different story.

In a video interview, Prof. F. Ouarda Torgeman, head of pediatric cardiology at La Rabta, explains that for more than 25 years, Tunisian doctors have been trained in the best catheterization centers in France, Belgium, and Italy. During that entire period, with support from CNAM — Tunisia's national health insurance fund — children were regularly transferred to Italy for treatment at hospitals including those in the San Donato group.

(Source: Leaders.com.tn, November 18, 2020 — original article currently down, archived)

(Video: Leaders Facebook page) (Might get deleted..)

Think about what this means. For a quarter century, Tunisian public money funded the transfer of patients to hospitals where Ghribi is vice president. The children were helped — absolutely. But the financial relationship ran from the Tunisian state to Ghribi's hospitals, not the other way around.

The 2021 "donation" didn't start a relationship. It moved one indoors. Before, patients traveled to Italy. Now, Ghribi's name, his equipment, and his institutional agreements sit permanently inside a Tunisian public hospital. The dependency didn't end — it changed address.

THE MILITARY HOSPITAL — NOW CONFIRMED BY NAME

My first post asked why the Defense Ministry co-signed an agreement about children's heart surgery. The November 2020 Leaders article provides the answer — and it goes deeper than a signature.

Prof. F. Ouarda confirms that a collaboration was established with the cardiology department of the Hôpital Militaire de Tunis — the military hospital. She names specific colleagues: Prof. W. Fehri (head of cardiology at the military hospital), and Professors N. Hajlaoui and D. Lahidheb. Together with the La Rabta team, they performed 20 pediatric heart catheterization procedures in a single day — before the donated lab even existed.

(Same Leaders source, November 2020)

So the Defense Ministry didn't co-sign because of a bureaucratic quirk. Military doctors were already embedded in this medical network. The question is: how deep does that embedding go? If military medical personnel have been working alongside teams trained in San Donato hospitals for years — how many professional relationships exist between Ghribi's network and the Tunisian military medical corps?

This does not mean military doctors were political actors, but it does mean the relationship was not limited to a civilian hospital donation; it touched the military medical sector too. Given Tunisia's political context, that deserves transparency.

THE TUNISIAN MINISTER WAS IN ROME BEFORE THE LAB EXISTED

Here is something no one has reported.

On October 22-23, 2020, Ghribi organized the first ECAM Council summit in Rome, in collaboration with Gruppo San Donato and The European House – Ambrosetti. The published guest list included Faouzi Mehdi, Tunisia's Minister of Health. (Source: AllAfrica, October 22, 2020)

One month later, in November 2020, Leaders.com.tn published the article announcing the CATH Lab donation.

Eight months after that, in June 2021, Mehdi stood at the inauguration of that same lab, next to the Italian ambassador and Ghribi's representative.

The sequence matters: Ghribi brought Mehdi to Rome first. The donation was announced after. The inauguration came last. The relationship preceded the project — not the other way around.

THE WEEK THAT MOVED EVERYTHING

The timeline of what happened next deserves to be read day by day.

June 11, 2021: CATH Lab inaugurated. Minister Mehdi attends alongside Italian Ambassador Lorenzo Fanara, San Donato representative Marwen Okbi, CNAM director Habib Toumi, and One Day One Dream president Dorra Garali. (Source: Leaders.com.tn inauguration article, archived) (Source: Réalités.com.tn, archived)

July 20, 2021: Prime Minister Mechichi fires Minister Mehdi over the chaotic handling of the COVID vaccination campaign. The health system has "collapsed." Mehdi learns of his own firing through social media. (Source: France 24, July 20, 2021)

July 21, 2021: President Saied personally receives Mehdi and thanks him for his service. Saied blames Mechichi. The Arab Weekly describes Mehdi as "a personal friend of the president." The same day, Saied orders the military to take over the pandemic response. Military trucks begin transporting oxygen to hospitals. (Source: The Arab Weekly, July 22, 2021)

July 24, 2021: Ghribi launches "Oxygen for Tunisian Hospitals" through ECAM. This project gives him direct contact with hospital directors across the country — at the exact moment when oxygen is literally the difference between life and death. (Source: Ghribi confirms date in Hospital Magazine interview, June 2024, archived)

July 25, 2021: Saied activates Article 80. Dismisses Mechichi. Suspends parliament. Seizes executive power.

So: the minister who attended Ghribi's CATH Lab inauguration, who went to Ghribi's ECAM summit in Rome, who was described as the president's personal friend — was fired five days before the power grab. And Ghribi launched his oxygen project in the 24-hour window between the military taking over pandemic response and the president seizing power.

Question: What was happening here exactly?

THE LIVESTREAM: A CHILD'S SURGERY AS AN OPENING ACT

On November 1, 2021, the first operation in the new CATH Lab was performed on three children — a seven-year-old girl, a two-month-old, and a one-year-eight-month-old. The new Minister of Health, Ali Mrabet — the second Saied-appointed health minister to attend a Ghribi project event — was present. Italian Ambassador Fanara attended again.

The operation was live-streamed as the opening moment of the second ECAM Council summit at the St. Regis Hotel in Rome.

(Source: Globe Newswire via Yahoo Finance, November 2, 2021) (Archived)

(Source: Al Bawaba, November 2, 2021) (Archived)

(Source: Entreprises Magazine, November 2, 2021)

(Source: Leaders.com.tn, November 1, 2021 , archive)

Who was watching? The official ECAM press release — written by GKSD itself lists the keynote speakers: Tony Blair, Prince Turki bin Al Faisal Al Saud (former Saudi intelligence chief), WHO Director-General Tedros, President Tshisekedi (DRC / African Union chair), Luigi Di Maio (Italian Foreign Minister), Roberto Speranza (Italian Health Minister), José Barroso (GAVI chair), Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati (President of the Italian Senate), Cardinal Peter Turkson (Vatican), and the Secretary-General of the GCC. The pre-summit announcement also listed Mahmoud Abbas, Uhuru Kenyatta, and Salva Kiir Mayardit.

(Source: ECAM event page — archived)

(Source: AllAfrica pre-announcement, October 27, 2021) (Archived)

(Source: Ghribi's own event page — now 404, archived)

A child's heart surgery in a Tunisian public hospital was the opening showcase for a room containing a former Saudi intelligence chief, an ex-British prime minister, the heads of the WHO and GAVI, three sitting African presidents, and the Italian foreign minister.

The children were helped. That is not in question. But who in that room saw a child being saved — and who saw a demonstration of institutional access?

THE NAMES THAT APPEAR IN EVERY ARTICLE BUT VERY LITTLE INFORMATION

  • Marwen Okbi — identified as San Donato's representative at the inauguration. A Tunisian name representing an Italian hospital group in Tunis. Who is he? Is there a permanent local operator for this network inside Tunisia?
  • Dorra Garali — president of the association One Day One Dream. She supplied additional equipment and is personally credited by Prof. F. Ouarda as essential to the project's completion. Who funds this NGO? What is its structure?
  • Habib Toumi — director-general of CNAM, present at the inauguration. The person who administered the public funds that flowed to Italian hospitals for 25 years. Has that spending ever been publicly audited?

(All names sourced in: Leaders.com.tn inauguration article, June 2021, archived)

WHAT IS DISAPPEARING — AND WHEN

While researching this post, I documented the following:

  • Leaders.com.tn — Lot's of articles Deleted.
  • kamelghribi.com/events-single/69/ — Ghribi's own page about the 2021 ECAM summit — now returns 404: Page not found.
  • kamelghribi.com/press/69/ — the press page reposting the Leaders article about the CATH Lab — also 404.
  • ECAM Council participant lists — previously available as PDFs on ecamcouncil.com404. The "200 leading figures" who attended the summit where the surgery was livestreamed remain unnamed.

I am not claiming every deletion is deliberate. But given the timing and relevance, the disappearance of these pages raises questions.

ENDNOTE

I'm not saying the children weren't helped. The medical team at La Rabta are clearly dedicated professionals. Their work saves lives.

But a set of questions emerges that we don't have answers for:

  1. Why do nine outlets report "2.5 million from the Italian donor" when the national news agency documented a different figure four months earlier?
  2. If CNAM funded patient transfers to San Donato hospitals for 25 years, how much Tunisian public money flowed to this network — and has it ever been audited?
  3. How many Tunisian military medical personnel have professional relationships with San Donato through training and collaboration programs?
  4. Why was the Minister of Health brought to Rome by ECAM before the donation was announced?
  5. Why did the oxygen project launch in the 24-hour window between the military takeover of pandemic response and the president's seizure of power?
  6. Why was a child's surgery livestreamed to a room that included a former intelligence chief, an ex-prime minister, and sitting heads of state?
  7. Does the Tunisian public have access to the full text of the CATH Lab agreement signed by both the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Defense?
  8. Why is documentation being removed from websites in May 2026 — years after it was published?

These are questions. They deserve answers.

ALL SOURCES — WITH ARCHIVES:

  1. La Presse / TAP — cost breakdown, Feb 4, 2021 (archived)
  2. Nessma TV — two units confirmed, Feb 2021
  3. Leaders.com.tn — Prof. Ouarda interview, Nov 18, 2020 (archived)
  4. Leaders.com.tn — same article, Wayback Machine
  5. Leaders Facebook — video interview
  6. AllAfrica — ECAM Summit 27, Oct 2021, Mehdi invited to Rome (archived)
  7. Leaders.com.tn — inauguration, June 2021 (archived)
  8. Réalités.com.tn — inauguration (archived)
  9. France 24 — Mehdi fired, July 20, 2021
  10. The Arab Weekly — Mehdi "personal friend of the president," July 22, 2021
  11. Hospital Magazine — Ghribi interview, June 2024 (archived)
  12. Globe Newswire / Yahoo Finance — ECAM livestream confirmed, Nov 2, 2021 (archived)
  13. Al Bawaba — same press release (archived)
  14. Entreprises Magazine — livestream confirmed (archived)
  15. Leaders.com.tn — first operation, Nov 1, 2021 (archived)
  16. ECAM event page — speaker list (archived)
  17. AllAfrica — pre-summit announcement, Oct 27, 2021 (archived)
  18. Ghribi event page — now 404, archived
  19. ECAM pre-summit press release (archived)
  20. Nessma TV — first operations, Nov 1, 2021 (archived)
  21. Directinfo — first operations (archived)
  22. Successful Tunisia — first operations (archived)
  23. WebManagerCenter — first operations, Nov 2, 2021
  24. Mosaique FM — first operations
  25. AP / EMS Airway — oxygen crisis context, Aug 2021 (archived)
  26. Faza.tn Facebook — One Day One Dream / Dorra Garali
  27. Ghribi press page — now 404, archived
  28. Hospital Magazine — second profile, March 2026 (archived)
reddit.com
u/Cold-Jacket2648 — 11 days ago
▲ 1 r/Tunisia+1 crossposts

In June 2021, Gruppo San Donato (where Ghribi is vice president) donated a pediatric heart catheterization lab to La Rabta Hospital in Tunis — a public state hospital. Worth 2.5 million dinars. The inauguration was attended by Tunisia’s Minister of Health and the Italian ambassador.

On November 1, 2021, the first operation in that lab was live-streamed to the ECAM summit in Rome — where Tony Blair, José Barroso, and the WHO director were in the audience. Tunisia was the showcase: the opening moment of the summit.

Three things are unusual about this:

First, the agreement was signed with BOTH the Ministry of Health AND the Ministry of Defense. Why does a children’s heart surgery lab need a Defense Ministry signature? What is in that agreement beyond the lab itself?
(Source: ECAM project page, ecamcouncil.com)

Second, the “Oxygen for Tunisian Hospitals” project — also by ECAM/Ghribi — was launched on July 24, 2021. One day before Saied’s power grab on July 25. During the COVID peak, Ghribi was building direct relationships with hospital directors and health ministry officials across the country under the cover of humanitarian aid.

Third, two successive Saied-appointed health ministers attended Ghribi’s project events. That means Saied’s own government facilitated this — possibly without understanding what ECAM actually is. Because who says no to heart surgery for children?

And that’s exactly why healthcare is such an effective entry point. You can refuse a weapons deal. You can block a military agreement. But you cannot refuse a children’s heart surgery lab without looking heartless. Once the lab is there, Ghribi’s name is permanently inside a Tunisian state institution, with working relationships with at least two ministries — including Defense.

The question isn’t whether the children were helped — they were. The question is what else was built alongside the lab. What contacts, what access, what agreements exist between GKSD/ECAM and the Tunisian state that we don’t know about?

Sources: ecamcouncil.com project pages, Barbacetto article in Il Fatto Quotidiano (October 2020) on San Donato board composition (link in my earlier post).

u/Cold-Jacket2648 — 11 days ago
▲ 6 r/Tunisian_Atheists+2 crossposts

We have to be very attentive to what is going on right now. Tunisia is struggling that’s a fact. But we have to be very very aware. Foreign powers are using the tunisian struggle for their own plans:

Over the past three days, I traced a coordinated, multi-layered operation to prepare a post-Saïed transition in Tunisia since I saw that italian regime change article I had to dive in:

What emerged is a six-layer structure operating in parallel: Washington think tanks writing the intellectual blueprint for how Saïed can fall and what should replace him. An Italian-Tunisian businessman named Kamel Ghribi — vice president of Italy’s largest private healthcare group, with historical ties to the BCCI scandal and secret mediations with Gaddafi — being positioned as a candidate through ECAM (do some reasearch about that it is not a normal thing), a diplomatic platform whose advisory board includes Tony Blair and José Barroso. A domestic political vehicle through the PDL coalition under Thameur Saad (Maybe, we have to see he created a PDL coalition exactly at the same timing external forces where brewing) who took over the party after Abir Moussi was sentenced to 12 years. An information operation using GDPR right-to-be-forgotten requests to make Ghribi very restricted only the clean slate is visible on Google in Europe while Saïed remains fully searchable — surgical censorship tested from Belgium and confirmed via Yandex. A media pipeline through Italpress that turns Kamel Ghribi’s own press releases into what looks like independent news coverage across dozens of Italian outlets.

And a European propaganda machine through ARTE and M6 documentaries that produce the right narrative not because someone orders it, but because the ecosystem of subsidies, editorial policy, and political consensus is configured that way. The trigger is threefold: China offered Tunisia zero tariffs — a direct alternative to Western-conditioned financing. A €750 million Eurobond comes due in July 2026. And the EU safe country law takes effect on 12 June 2026. All three converge in the same window. What makes this different from the usual political noise is the pattern. The EU ignored four years of democratic dismantling — dissolved parliament, dismissed judges, decree 54, mass arrests of opposition — as long as Saïed cooperated on migration. The regime change papers only started when he stopped cooperating in 2025. Not when he grabbed power. Not when he locked up opponents. When he became inconvenient.

Saïed is the first Tunisian leader since Bourguiba who was not installed or financed by a foreign power. He won in 2019 with zero personal financing, no party, no headquarters. That makes him uncontrollable — and that is why he is a target. Not because he is a democrat — he is not. But because he cannot be managed.

He is also structurally encircled. The army is American-trained, American-financed, and institutionally connected to the US security apparatus — the former US ambassador knows every general personally. The economy is EU-dependent. The information space is GDPR-filtered from Europe. The political space is infiltrated. The diplomatic space is controlled by think tanks that write the scenarios and then promote each other’s conclusions on LinkedIn.

Kamel Ghribi himself is probably burned — But the network remains intact: ECAM, San Donato, the PDL coalition (to check!), Italpress, the Washington think tanks. They can put forward another face tomorrow. The €750 million Eurobond in July 2026 is the tipping point. If Tunisia gets through it, the window closes and foreign debt pressure drops structurally.

That is why everything is accelerating now. We have to start paying attention to everything & everyone right now. Yes I agree that kais saied hasn’t been the best but this foreign mélange is not what we need. Opposition is normal & needed but what their trying is not organic it is an externally constructed coalition, with think tank blueprints, a pre-selected candidate, a media pipeline, and a financial deadline driving the timeline — that is not how politics works, that is how regime change operations work.

In Europe, opposition parties are not built around foreign policy papers that describe how your president can fall, promoted by former ambassadors who know your generals by name — and the fact that this is being treated as normal is exactly why trust in any opposition figure right now is dangerous… So I don’t even know what to think…

What are you guys’s opinions & how do we fix this without getting duped again?

Here are some sources — go through them yourself:

  1. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kais-saied-appears-be-drivers-seatfor-now

• ⁠Sabina Henneberg, “Kais Saied Appears to Be in the Driver’s Seat…For Now” (Washington Institute, August 2025) — lays out three scenarios for how Saïed falls, including “sudden serious health problems.” Describes the exact profile needed to replace him. And “possible scenarios”

  1. https://www.stimson.org/2026/reassessing-tunisias-strategic-importance-for-the-united-states/

Joey Hood wrote this on 16th of april 2026 (!) : Reassessing Tunisia’s Strategic Importance for the United States” — Hood is the former US ambassador to Tunisia from october 2023 until october 2025 (so this guy was in tunisian months ago) He literally uses the word “leverage.” Talks about STEM graduates as cheap labor, pre-vetted vendor lists to block Chinese companies, and ends with: “Adversaries will always covet Tunisia.”

  1. On 1 May, Sabina Henneberg shared Joey Hood’s paper on LinkedIn calling it “this excellent policy brief.” They cross-reference and cross-promote. You can check her LinkedIn yourself.

  2. ecamcouncil.com — ECAM’s advisory board includes Tony Blair and José Barroso. The 2021 summit opened with a live stream from a hospital Ghribi donated to Tunisia. The participant lists? Not to be found hmm. We need to dive deeper into ECAM & Tunisia.

  3. Kamel Bghiri: His Instagram: 6.4 million followers. Scroll through the followers — Indian bot farm. He lost 73,000 in two weeks during a purge. His Twitter: 1,700 followers. That ratio doesn’t happen organically.

  4. tps://www.giannibarbacetto.it/2020/10/04/impero-san-donato-il-mistero-kamel-ghribi/ Barbacetto’s article in Il Fatto Quotidiano (October 2020) on Gruppo San Donato as a political machine — the board includes former ministers of Interior, Justice, and Foreign Affairs, plus former vice-chair of Italy’s privacy authority (the GDPR people), plus two former intelligence generals.

  5. https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/in-edicola/articoli/2020/07/06/non-solo-maroni-e-alfano-sua-sanita-ingaggia-spioni/5858462 Non solo Maroni e Alfano: Sua Sanità ingaggia spioni. 6 july 2020.

  6. My personal trigger for research: Il Foglio, “Si cerca il successore di Saied” (1 May 2026) by Gambardella. This is the one that set it off: https://www.ilfoglio.it/esteri/2026/05/01/news/si-cerca-il-successore-di-saied-nella-tunisia-senza-soldi-ne-diritti–324363

So yeah,…

u/Cold-Jacket2648 — 12 days ago