A lot of discussion around free will focuses on whether we have the capacity to choose, but it seems like a deeper issue is how much of what we are, our preferences, impulses, reasoning habits, is shaped by factors outside our control.
If that’s right, then even when someone does something wrong, their action still arises from a chain of causes they didn’t choose.
That raises a question:
If no one ultimately chooses their character, what justifies punishment?
One response is that punishment is needed for social reasons (deterrence, protection, communication of norms). But that seems different from saying someone deserves to suffer.
So I’m curious how philosophers handle this distinction:
- Is “desert” still doing real work in justifying punishment?
- Or is the justification ultimately forward-looking, even if it’s not always framed that way?
- And does belief in free will make it easier to justify retributive attitudes?
Would be interested in how people working in moral responsibility or criminal law theory think about this.