Early Heidegger and the Will
Since re-reading SZ I’ve come to interpret Heidegger as essentially proposing an existential voluntarism, albeit one that is implied and perhaps accidental at times.
For Heidegger, care grounds all aspects of Dasein (for Dasein is care). But in care we find Dasein able to choose possibilities (this or that possibility) but also choose, first, its own authenticity (to-be authentic or not).
The choice to-be authentic is the first choice Dasein makes before all others. And Dasein has already made this decision, often to the detriment of its own primordiality.
I think this is typified in the authentic moment-of-vision when Dasein chooses to accept its own finitude before death (future), its own thrownness into that finitude (past, or having-been), and can then decide what to pursue in its moment-of-vision (present).
I believe this is Heidegger at his most Nietzschean, and also why he chose to turn [kehre] away from SZ. He thought he was still too subjective, and too technological. Yet I can’t help but sympathize with this voluntarism of Heidegger. Obviously this isn’t a voluntarism of “free will vs. determinism” as these are both metaphysical categories, relegated to the present-at-hand interpretation of Dasein. But the existential ground of these, to me, certainly seems to be Dasein’s “will” understood in relation to authenticity.
Do you a) agree with my interpretation of SZ, and b) agree that this is what Dasein is, or do you lean towards the late-Heidegger’s critique of technological thinking, and find this reading is still a remnant of that thought.