Ciao a tutti, 

We wanted to share a legal reading of Italian Constitutional Court Judgment No. 63/2026, because many headlines have described it as the end of jure sanguinis. And we think that is too simplistic. 

The ruling is important, and it is not good news for every applicant. But it did not abolish Italian citizenship by descent in general. 

The Court rejected the constitutional questions raised by the Tribunal of Turin against Article 3-bis of Law No. 91/1992, introduced by the Tajani Decree. That part is true. 

But the ruling did not decide every issue created by the reform. 

1. The real shift: “acquired at birth” vs. “potential” citizenship

For more than a century, Italian jure sanguinis citizenship was generally understood as a status acquired at birth. The consulate or court did not create the citizenship; it recognized a status that already existed, assuming the line was valid and uninterrupted. 

Judgment No. 63/2026 moves toward a different framework. 

The Court treats the position of descendants born abroad and not yet formally recognized as not fully certain, almost “potential”, until formal recognition. 

That is the real legal shift. 

If citizenship was already acquired at birth, a retroactive law that removes it looks, in substance, like a loss of citizenship. If citizenship is only “potential” before recognition, the legislature has more room to redefine it before recognition occurs. 

2. Section 9.1: people who acted but did not get an appointment

Section 9.1 is very important. 

The Court expressly left open the question of people who had initiated the citizenship recognition procedure before 23:59 Rome time on March 27, 2025, but did not receive a consular or municipal appointment by that deadline. 

That matters because, in many jurisdictions, Prenot@mi was structurally saturated: closed calendars, unavailable slots, long waiting lists, and repeated failed attempts. 

The Court did not say these applicants win. 

But it also did not say they lose. 

It said this issue was not decided in the Turin case. 

So the question remains: should someone who tried to act before the cutoff be treated the same as someone who did nothing? 

3. Section 9.2.2: legitimate expectations

Section 9.2.2 also matters. 

The Court recognized that, from the standpoint of legitimate expectations, applicants who acted cannot necessarily be treated the same as applicants who remained inactive. 

That does not automatically protect everyone who started collecting documents. 

But it makes evidence important. 

Potentially relevant evidence may include: 

• Prenot@mi attempts;  
• emails to consulates;  
• certified communications;  
• civil record requests;  
• naturalization record requests;  
• engagement letters with professionals;  
• translations, apostilles, or legalization requests;  
• communications with Italian municipalities, archives, churches, courts, or public offices.

  

The legal question may no longer be only: “Did you have an appointment?” 

It may also become: “Can you prove that you had already begun the recognition process before the cutoff?” 

4. Bologna

This is where the Tribunal of Bologna ruling No. 3335 of April 17, 2026 becomes relevant. 

In a case handled by our firm, the Tribunal recognized Italian citizenship for descendants who had not obtained a consular appointment but had formalized their intention to request recognition before March 27, 2025. 

It appears to be one of the first known Italian decisions after the Tajani Decree to accept this type of argument. 

It is not binding on all courts, and it does not mean every similar case will win. But it shows that the issue is legally real, not theoretical. 

5. The EU law front

The Constitutional Court did not refer the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 

But ordinary Italian courts may still be asked to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU. 

The key EU-law question is whether the reform is truly a rule of “non-acquisition” of citizenship, or whether in substance it operates like a retroactive loss of citizenship for people who, under the previous jure sanguinis framework, would have been treated as Italian from birth. 

If the issue reaches the CJEU, the Court may look at substance rather than labels: proportionality, individual assessment, automatic effects, reasonable deadlines, and whether the person had a real opportunity to protect their position. 

This route is possible, but not guaranteed. 

6. The labeling problem

Article 3-bis does not simply say that citizenship by descent will be more limited going forward. 

It says that certain people born abroad and holding another citizenship are considered never to have acquired Italian citizenship. 

That is the label: “non-acquisition.” 

But if Italian law traditionally treated jure sanguinis citizenship as acquired at birth, then saying today that the person “never acquired” citizenship may produce, in practice, the same effect as a retroactive loss. Italian legal commentary sometimes calls this the truffa delle etichette - the “labeling problem.” 

Changing the label does not necessarily change the substance of the effect. 

Bottom line 

Judgment No. 63/2026 did not close the entire jure sanguinis debate. 

It closed part of the constitutional challenge raised in the Turin case. It left open the position of applicants who acted before March 27, 2025 but did not obtain an appointment. It did not prevent ordinary courts from asking the CJEU to review EU-law issues. And it did not eliminate the deeper question of whether “non-acquisition” is, in substance, retroactive loss. 

So we would avoid both extremes: 

• “Everyone can still apply.”  
• “Jure sanguinis is dead.”

  

Both are inaccurate. 

The more accurate answer is: the field is now more technical, more evidence-based, and more dependent on the applicant’s timeline. 

For many applicants, especially those who acted before March 27, 2025, the most important practical step is to preserve every dated piece of evidence showing what they did before the cutoff. 

This is general legal information, not individual legal advice. We’re happy to discuss the legal meaning of the ruling generally, but individual cases depend on the full family line, naturalization history, filing status, appointment history, and documents. 

For a more in-depth analysis of the ruling and its repercussions, you can refer to our latest blog post.   

Una buona giornata a tutti, 

Avv. Salvatore Aprigliano