r/hegel

Hi all, I'm sorry for another level one question, I'm sure that's been asked many times, but I am having difficulty understanding a few of the inferences drawn when we consider Pure Being.

My current understanding is that indeterminate immediacy is so indeterminate that it shows itself to be nothing at all. And this "thing" which has no determinations, has produced a determination, namely proving itself to be nothing, thus the logical opposition is found in that the indeterminate immediacy has produced a determinate immediacy, namely nothing.

Now this seems immediately wrong to me. I haven't seen anyone else say this. And I'm reading Houglate, and he doesn't appear to either. I came to it because I don't understand how we can say pure being and pure nothing differ as logical opposites. As Houlgate insists, in the first volume of Hegel on Being, on page 144, it isn't a linguistic or "intention" issue that differentiates them, but is a logical one, they exclude anything else, including each other, but how would they show themselves to exclude each other if there's no distinction to do the excluding within themselves. How are pure being and pure nothing distinct?, if there is no difference between them to draw that conclusion? Please help me out here.

Hello there!!

I'm quite euphoric, since I think I may have finally understood the "Substance as subject" Hegel so frequently mentions.

During the dialectic of reflexion, both appearance and essence are shown to be "split". Appearance indicates an essence, which conceals by way of concealing. It seems to lead to an essence, but the essence is this inner split, the fact that the essence is the split between appearance and essence, which makes appearance essential.

This shows that Hegel goes further than Kant, since, for him, there is no Thing-in-itself, for already knowing about something unknowable is far too much. There is nothing beyond representation, the only thing beyond representation is the fact there is nothing beyond representation. Nothing is beyond phenomenality.

External reflection is characterised by the fact that essence is alien to itself, and split because of that. Essence shows itself immediately as something alien to the very essence. This is what makes it possible for us to see the distinction between essence and appearance, for if essence weren't split, if essence didn't also show itself as alien, the "mere appearance" from which we start wouldn't even be a product of all of this reflection.

This is why we must think substance as subject. In order for there to be a substance, the substance must show itself to be external to the very substance itself. This movement, this thing alien to itself is the subject. Therefore, substance is subject, and subject is substance.

I do not know if I may have oversimplified or misunderstood this, so feel free to correct me!